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Rebuild, Retreat, or Resilience: Can Taipei Plan for Resilience?
Abstract
Taiwan is ranked as the country most exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank 2005). Taipei City is
the capital city as well as the economic and political center of Taiwan. The United Nations report World
Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision places Taipei City third on the list of the worldâ??s top 10
urban areas exposed to three or more natural hazards, with the highest risk of cyclones, floods, and
landslides. In order to gauge the vulnerabilities and damages of Taiwan and Taipei City, this research
creates a natural disaster density indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study of Taiwan, Japan,
China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands over the past three decades. The results indicate that
Taiwan has both the highest disaster occurrence and highest death toll among these seven countries.
The Taipei case study, a chronology of policies implemented to prevent flooding, explains that costly
engineering structures, rebuilding, and fortification against floods eventually created a false sense of
security, which has encouraged more intensive residential and commercial developments in flood-prone
areas, and led to a higher level of vulnerability.
This research further simulates and evaluates the vulnerabilities of population, land value, properties, GDP,
and critical facilities in three scenarios: heavy rainfall, typhoon conditions, and extreme weather rainfall,
through the technology of Geographic Information System (GIS) by using ArcMap 10.2.2 software. The
results indicate 40% of Taipei City is located in flood risk areas in an extreme weather scenario. This
percentage is higher than other global cities such as Londonâ??s 15%, Tokyoâ??s 10%, and New York
Cityâ??s 25%. Based on the 10% of total flooding areas above 0.5 meter, the vulnerable population is
estimated at 200,000 people, or 7% of the total population. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion.
More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable. A least one million subway passengers will be impacted
each day. There is little evidence that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to floods. On the contrary,
some neighborhoods with high income households face a higher risk of floods. Very few medical centers,
oil and gas stations, and electrical power substations are located in flood-prone areas, but, a large
number of public schools, administrative buildings, and major subway stations are susceptible.
Additionally, the likelihood analysis of flooding in an extreme weather rainfall scenario concludes that the
possibility will be five times that of the existing assumption with a flood in every 200 years. Thus, Taipei
Cityâ??s infrequent once-in-two-century floods are likely to occur more frequently. Further, the 1% of
Taipei metropolitan region flooding above 1 meter will possibly cost up to $ 1.5 billion in damages.
Therefore, in the future, rather than strengthening and rebuilding costly structures, Taipei should focus on
land-use and environmental planning for resilience. Urban policies should include environmentally
responsible development in the face of continued population and economic growth, and being resilient
regarding natural disasters. Most important is the need of a strong political commitment and leadership
to initiate and implement urban policies toward resilience. In doing so, resilience can be achieved in
Taipei.
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ABSTRACT
REBUILD, RETREAT, OR RESILIENCE:
CAN TAIPEI PLAN FOR RESILIENCE?
Yu-Shou Su
Eugenie L. Birch
Taiwan is ranked as the country most exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank
2005). Taipei City is the capital city as well as the economic and political center of Taiwan. The
United Nations report World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision places Taipei City
third on the list of the world’s top 10 urban areas exposed to three or more natural hazards,
with the highest risk of cyclones, floods, and landslides. In order to gauge the vulnerabilities
and damages of Taiwan and Taipei City, this research creates a natural disaster density
indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study of Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France,
and the Netherlands over the past three decades. The results indicate that Taiwan has both
the highest disaster occurrence and highest death toll among these seven countries. The
Taipei case study, a chronology of policies implemented to prevent flooding, explains that
costly engineering structures, rebuilding, and fortification against floods eventually created a
false sense of security, which has encouraged more intensive residential and commercial
developments in flood-prone areas, and led to a higher level of vulnerability.
This research further simulates and evaluates the vulnerabilities of population, land
value, properties, GDP, and critical facilities in three scenarios: heavy rainfall, typhoon
conditions, and extreme weather rainfall, through the technology of Geographic Information
System (GIS) by using ArcMap 10.2.2 software. The results indicate 40% of Taipei City is
located in flood risk areas in an extreme weather scenario. This percentage is higher than
other global cities such as London’s 15%, Tokyo’s 10%, and New York City’s 25%. Based on
the 10% of total flooding areas above 0.5 meter, the vulnerable population is estimated at
200,000 people, or 7% of the total population. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion.
More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable. A least one million subway passengers will be
impacted each day. There is little evidence that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to
floods. On the contrary, some neighborhoods with high income households face a higher risk
of floods. Very few medical centers, oil and gas stations, and electrical power substations are
located in flood-prone areas, but, a large number of public schools, administrative buildings, and
major subway stations are susceptible. Additionally, the likelihood analysis of flooding in an
extreme weather rainfall scenario concludes that the possibility will be five times that of the
existing assumption with a flood in every 200 years. Thus, Taipei City’s infrequent
once-in-two-century floods are likely to occur more frequently. Further, the 1% of Taipei
metropolitan region flooding above 1 meter will possibly cost up to $ 1.5 billion in damages.
Therefore, in the future, rather than strengthening and rebuilding costly structures, Taipei
should focus on land-use and environmental planning for resilience. Urban policies should
include environmentally responsible development in the face of continued population and
economic growth, and being resilient regarding natural disasters. Most important is the need of
a strong political commitment and leadership to initiate and implement urban policies toward
resilience. In doing so, resilience can be achieved in Taipei.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview and Research Questions
Since the 1980s, the number of climate-related disasters around the world has

increased dramatically, often devastating cities. The United Nations’ estimation of
losses from disasters around the world is between $250 billion to $300 billion each
year (Wahlström 2015). Making cities resilient to natural disasters has therefore
become a priority for many policy makers. In developing countries, approximately
30-50% of urban populations live in environmentally fragile areas (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013). The World Bank also describes the
growth in developing countries as sensitive to natural disasters. Asian nations in
particular have experienced significant damage, accounting for approximately 70% of
all disaster-related economic losses worldwide in 2011 (Munich RE 2012). Much of
the vulnerability facing Asian nations stems from the region’s rapid urbanization.
Their cities are among the most vulnerable to natural disasters, and remain the least
prepared to deal with them. Further, the United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (2013) describes Asia as having weak policies and actions,
inadequate risk information, insufficient budgets and poor implementation capacities.
The rapid urbanization in Asian nations along with little preparedness for natural
disasters are likely to dramatically increase the damage from natural disasters in the
1

future.

Taiwan has performed well economically during the past four decades, with
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increasing from $432 in 1970 to $21,141 in
2013. However, economic development can be profoundly hampered by natural
disasters. Sustainable economic development requires environmental resilience. With
23 million people occupying only 13,974 square miles of land,1 Taiwan is both
densely populated and highly exposed to natural disasters: 73.1% of the total
population lives in vulnerable areas, and Taiwan is ranked as the country most
exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank 2005). Storms and floods damage
Taiwan frequently, with an average of six typhoons hitting Taiwan annually for the
past four decades. According to EM-DAT,2 an international disaster database,
Taiwan had the highest occurrence and highest death toll on the natural disaster
density indicator (NDDI) in comparison with China, Japan, U.S.A, U.K., France, and
the Netherlands from 1985 to 2014. Also, Taiwan’s economic losses during the past
thirty years are estimated at $650, 000 per km². This is approximately 5 times that of
the Netherlands’ $134,362 and the U.K.’s $135,292, 8 times that of the U.S.A.’s

1

The land area is approximately one-third that of Pennsylvania.

2

EM-DAT is under the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). EM-DAT was

created with the initial support of the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Department
of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-DHA), the Belgian Government, and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).
2

$78,186 losses, and 9 times that of France’s $70,599. Research finds that every dollar
invested into disaster preparedness would save $4 to $7 dollars in post-disaster
damages (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005; The National Academy of Sciences
2012). Hence, promoting urban resilience policies for disaster risk reduction should
become a priority in Taiwan and other Asian nations in the future.

Taipei City is the capital city as well as the cultural, economic, and political
center of Taiwan. New Taipei City, which surrounds Taipei City, is the most populous
and fastest-growing city in Taiwan. Approximately 30% of Taiwan’s total population
lives in the Taipei two cities (hereinafter referred to as “Taipei Twin Cities”). The
GDP of Taipei Twin Cities represents more than half of the country’s total GDP.3
Hence, the Taipei Twin Cities are economically the most important cities of Taiwan.
However, Taipei City is also the most vulnerable among Taiwan’s major cities.
According to the United Nations report World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011
Revision (2012), Taipei City is third on the list of the world’s top 10 urban areas with
750,000 or more inhabitants exposed to three or more natural hazards, with the
highest risk of cyclones, floods, landslides, and earthquakes. For instance, Typhoon
Nari flooded most of Taipei City in 2001, causing 94 deaths and approximately $800
million of damage. Over the last forty years, Taipei has promoted flood resilience

3

Taiwan’s total GDP is approximately 489 billion as of 2013.
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mainly through engineering and other structural interventions aimed at reducing flood
risk. These massive structures were intended to control, block out, and resist water,
rather than accommodate water. Riverside dikes, floodways, flood prevention gates,
flood diversion systems, storm sewer systems, and pumping stations were the major
facilitates developed to reduce flood risk in Taipei City. Despite Taipei City
improving flood control facilities during the past four decades, the lack of integration
between flood control engineering and land-use planning remains. Taipei City is still
vulnerable to floods due to lack of resilience planning policy and strategies. As Chang,
Seto, and Huang (2013) point out, “the lack of integration between flood control and
land-use planning is the main problem. The unclear government responsibilities and
the minimal coordination among governmental agencies have resulted in ineffective
policies in flood risk reduction”. They indicate that “despite numerous policies, Taipei
is still highly vulnerable to flooding and the risks are not distributed equally among
the population” (Chang et al. 2013).
The issues surrounding Taipei’s resilience elicits several questions: What has
been done and what still needs to be done to promote flood resilience in Taipei? How
vulnerable is Taipei in different flooding scenarios? How can Taipei achieve more
effectiveness in flood resilience through land-use planning? To respond to these
questions, this dissertation first analyzes the urban resilience literature discourse and
4

conducts a comparative study of damage from natural disasters in Taiwan and six
other countries. Second, it analyzes Taipei’s current approaches, assessing and
explaining important gaps. Next, this research also uses GIS-based simulations to
assess Taipei’s vulnerability under a set of varying flooding scenarios and likelihoods.
This dissertation concludes by proposing remedies to fill the gaps these flood
simulations reveal and, in doing so, promotes urban resilience in Taipei. This
dissertation provides an example for other cities in Taiwan and Asian nations.

5

1.2

Research Design and Method
This research first builds on the current urban resilience discourse, debate, and

practice through literature review and case studies. Second, because the number of
floods around the world has soared since the 1980s, there are few studies analyzing
the environmental vulnerability of major cities around the world. This research
analyzes flooding issues in five major global cities: New York City, London, Tokyo,
Randstad, and Shanghai. Third, in order to understand Taiwan’s vulnerability and
damages from natural disasters, this research creates a natural disaster density
indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study with six other countries, including
Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. This dataset is retrieved
from the EM-DAT in 1985-2014. Fourth, this research undertakes a case study of
Taipei to survey current practices and historic analysis as a tool to evaluate a
chronology of policies implemented to make Taipei resilient to flooding. Fifth, this
research conducts flood simulation and scenario analysis, a method similar to the
U.S.A.’s Hazus model for estimating potential losses, through the technology of
Geographic Information System (GIS)4 by using ArcMap 10.2.2 software to gauge

4

Most research in flood simulation is done through the method of mapping in GIS. Luino et al. (2012)

indicate that the identification of flood-prone areas can be well approached by GIS to capture, store,
extract, transform and display real-world spatial data. Suriya and Mudgal (2011) explain that GIS adds
a great deal of versatility to the hydrological analysis, due to its spatial data handling and management
capabilities.
6

the vulnerabilities in Taipei. These GIS-based datasets are collected from Taiwan’s
central and local governments, including the National Development Council, the
Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics,
the Water Resource Agency, the Central Weather Bureau, and Taipei City Government.
This research analyzes the vulnerability of population, land value, residential
properties, GDP, and critical facilities, such as major subway stations, medical centers,
public schools, major public buildings, electric power substations, and gas/oil stations.
Additionally, it analyzes the likelihood and cost-benefit of different flooding scenarios
based on typhoon and rainfall datasets in 1975-2014. After a thorough analysis of
vulnerability, likelihood of flooding, and cost-benefit analyses, this research develops
Taipei resilience policies to address the vulnerabilities.

7

1.3

Significance of the Study
Asian nations experience significant damage from natural disasters. The urban

population has grown faster than in any other region in the world. The rapid
urbanization in Asian nations is likely to exacerbate the risk and damage from natural
disasters in the future. However, a focus on urban resilience is still lacking in most
studies of Asian cities. This research provides an important contribution and example
of urban resilience to Asian cities as well as other cities in Taiwan.
This research analyzes vulnerability on both a national and city scale. On the
national scale, this research creates a natural disaster density indicator (NDDI), and
compares seven countries’ disaster occurrence, death toll, number of affected people,
and economic loss from natural disasters. On the city scale, this research includes case
studies of urban flood resilience in five major global cities: New York City, London,
Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai. Additionally, Taipei city flood simulation, likelihood,
and cost-benefit analyses will be demonstrated. Although some research exists on
Taipei flood damage in the central Taipei area, none of the research in flood resilience
builds on a comprehensive city-wide analysis and simulation as well as a regional
approach through the newest datasets from Taiwan’s central and local governments.
This study simulates flooding scenarios, assesses vulnerability, and analyzes the
cost-benefit of floods in Taipei City, and also evaluates the possible cost of a severe

8

flood in the Taipei Twin Cities. Finally, this study promotes resilience planning and
policy through the integration of land-use planning and water management as well as
a regional cooperation approach. Overall, this study will provide examples for
promoting urban resilience that can be replicated in other cities of Taiwan, and Asian
cities in general.

9

1.4

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation has eight chapters (see Figure 1-1). Chapter 1 is the

introduction of the research question, design, and method. Chapter 2 is the urban
resilience discourse, debate, and content. Chapter 3 includes case studies on
rebuilding and resilience. Urban flood resilience in New York City, London, Tokyo,
Randstad, and Shanghai are also included. Chapter 4 analyzes Taiwan’s vulnerability
to damage, and creates a natural disaster density indicator (NDDI) to compare Taiwan
with six other countries: Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands.
This will help to explain the vulnerability in Taiwan. Chapter 5 undertakes a case
study of Taipei City by surveying its historic and current practices, and developing a
chronology of various policies implemented by national and local governments to
protect Taipei from flooding. Chapter 6 will assess the probability and vulnerability of
the flooding scenarios occurring, and assess the costs of each scenario in Taipei. This
research will develop three scenarios to gauge the vulnerabilities: 1. heavy rainfall (24
hour duration/14 inches), 2. extreme weather rainfall (72 hour duration/47 inches) and
3. typhoon conditions (48 hour duration/24 inches) in Taipei. This chapter will
identify the extent of flooding damage overall, hotspots, property values, population,
transportation and critical facilities such as hospitals and schools in each scenario
through flooding simulation. Chapter 7 develops Taipei’s resilience plans and policies

10

to address the vulnerabilities, and will discuss how to implement the proposed plan,
exploring current legal structures and funding. This will encompass a review of the
current governmental structures needing change to uncover the opportunities and
barriers to achieving greater resilience in Taipei. Chapter 8 includes the conclusion,
further research, and suggestions.

Figure 1- 1 Organization of the dissertation
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CHAPTER 2: RESILIENCE DISCOURSE, DEBATE, AND PRACTICE

Stemming from the Latin word “resilire”, the original meaning of resilience
was the ability of a substance or object to spring back. Equilibrium resilience focused
on the ability of a system to return to its normal condition after a disturbance (Holling
1973). However, the resilience debate is shifting from equilibrium resilience to
adaptive, evolutionary, and social-ecological resilience. This results in shifting the
very meaning of “resilience” from “bouncing back” to “bouncing forward” in the
twenty-first century. Resilience discourse and debate also influence the rebuilding
policy from back to normalcy to retreating from potential natural disasters. In a city’s
practices, the urban resilience to flooding moves from the engineering strategy of
blocking out floods to the land-use planning strategy of accommodating floods or
retreating from flood risk. Rather than engineers, land-use or environmental planners
will play a key role in urban resilience to flooding.

However, in the planning field, resilience is still a new topic. There is a lack of
studies in urban resilience. Few planning books use the word “resilience” or
“rebuilding” in their titles. Notable are two pioneer books: Vale and Campanella
(2005), The Resilient City, explain how modern cities recover from disasters,
particularly after devastating earthquakes and city fires; Birch and Wachter (2006),

12

Rebuilding Urban Places after Disaster, written after Hurricane Katrina, describe
how to rebuild, prepare for flood risk reduction, and make cities less vulnerable. Also,
over the past two decades, very few articles in the Journal of Planning Education and
Research (JPER) or the Journal of the American Planning Association (JAPA) discuss
urban resilience. Most articles were published after Hurricane Katrina devastated New
Orleans in 2005. In 2010, a new international journal in disaster resilience was
established, the International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment
(IJDRBE). Urban resilience research is still a new planning topic in the twenty-first
century. International organizations and policies promote urban resilience. Notable is
the United Nations’ Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of
Nations and Communities to Disasters (known as HFA). HFA puts emphasis on the
importance of city planning to achieve resilience and reduce disaster risks. HFA’s
“Making Cities Resilient Campaign”, launched in 2010, has provoked cities and local
governments to play a role in applying land-use planning in disaster risk reduction.

13

2.1

Resilience discourse and debate

Resilience is gaining influence. Resilience originally meant the ability of a
system to return to its original condition after a disturbance. Now there are different
concepts regarding resilience: adaptive resilience, evolutionary resilience, and
social-ecological resilience (Pickett 2004; Davoudi 2012; Goldstein 2012). One major
debate regarding resilience has been the contrast between “bouncing back” and
“bouncing forward”. Initially, in the 1970s, bouncing back dominated the argument,
where Holling (1973) defines “engineering resilience as the ability of a system to
return to an equilibrium or steady-state after a disturbance”. The idea of engineering
resilience is to return to normalcy, and to return as soon as possible. The strength and
speed of bouncing back after a disturbance are the main concerns. The faster that a
system bounces back, the more resilient it is.
However, Vale and Campanella (2005) argue that “a city is not a rubber ball.
Defining resilience as bouncing back to normalcy is not suitable for cities”. Highfield
et al. (2014) describe “resilience implies not only the ability to bounce back after
being hit, but also the ability to absorb the forces of nature without suffering damage
and loss”. With this concept, the speed and strength of bouncing back is not the
priority of resilience. The concept of engineering resilience in the 1970s has shifted
into boarder terms, including evolutionary and social-ecological resilience. As
14

Davoudi (2012) points out “evolutionary resilience emphasizes inherent uncertainty
and discontinuities, and insight into the dynamic interplay of persistence, adaptability
and transformability”. Resilience is also the ability to adapt to adverse events and to
absorb the shock without causing huge losses. Teigão et al. (2011) indicate that
“resilient systems are more adaptable to change, are more able to learn and are less
vulnerable to disturbance and external shocks”. Moreover, Goldstein (2012) discusses
social-ecological resilience, explaining that resilience involves “an adaptive system
associated with self-organization, the capacity to integrate learning and adaption, and
an ability to restore system function”.

In summary, engineering resilience, focusing on return time, recovery, and
bouncing back, has shifted to evolutionary, adaptive, and social-ecological resilience,
emphasizing bouncing forward and robust function with adaptive capacity and
self-organization to disturbances (see Table 2-1). Adaptive resilience for “bouncing
forward” has become a core value of resilience. The more adaptive, persistent, and
transformable their system, the more resilient a city is. Urban resilience is a city that
is adjustable, adaptive, and flexible to evolve in the face of uncertainty or disasters.
Enhanced resilience also allows better anticipation of disasters and better planning to
reduce disaster losses (The National Academy of Sciences 2012).

15

Table 2- 1 Summary of the “bouncing back” vs. “bouncing forward” debate
Aspect

Bouncing back

Bouncing forward

Period

In the 1970s

In the 2000s

Core value

Return to normalcy; bounce
back quickly; recovery time
matters; engineering resilience;
resistance

Adapt, evolve, change, and
transform gradually into another
condition; prepare for change;
adaptive resilience; retreat

Definition

The ability of a system to return The ability of a system to adjust
to an equilibrium condition after and adapt in the face of
disturbance
changing conditions

Characteristic

Traditional, rigid, and
conservative
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Adjustable, adaptive, and
flexible

2.2

Resilience planning: a new focus in the planning field

Although diverse concepts of resilience were proposed after the 1970s, some
questions in the planning field remain uncertain. What is resilience planning? Can
resilience be planned? How is resilience implemented? How is resilience measured?
Resilience planning is still quite a new topic with lack of practice and implementation.
In city planning, resilience was not an emphasis until the sustainable development
movement and devastating natural disasters occurred in the twenty-first century. The
concept of sustainability helps resilience planning, but sustainability and resilience are
different. Sustainable development mainly focuses on equity and efficiency of
resource use.1 However, resilience planning concentrates mostly on the adaptive
strategies after disasters or preventive policies for disaster risk reduction. Although
sustainability and resilience are different in meaning, scope, and practice, they have a
relationship of integrative dependence. As Yuzva and Zimmermann stress “a
sustainable city must be a resilient city”. Increasing resilience also increases the
sustainability of a community (Association of Bay Area Governments 2013).

1

According to the World Commission on Environment and Development’s (the Brundtland

Commission) report Our Common Future (1987), sustainable development’s definition is
“Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs”.
17

2.2.1

The research and institution of urban resilience

Literature reviews indicate the lack of articles regarding urban resilience and
resilience planning. Few books and articles have promoted resilience planning since
2000. For instance, Vale and Campanella (2005), The Resilient City, explain how
modern cities recover from disasters, particularly after devastating earthquakes and
city fires; Birch and Wachter (2006), Rebuilding Urban Places after Disaster, written
after Hurricane Katrina, describes how to rebuild, prepare for disaster risk reduction,
and make cities less vulnerable by different levels of government in partnership with
the private sector and public will. Regarding journal articles, this study finds no
article pertaining to urban resilience and resilience planning in the Journal of
Planning Education and Research (JPER) in 1995-2014. The Journal of the American
Planning Association (JAPA) from 1999 to 2009 has published only one article with
urban resilience in the title: Campanella (2006) “Urban Resilience and the Recovery
of New Orleans”. This article argues that urban resilience involves much more than
rebuilding. He describes “urban resilience is largely a function of resilient and
resourceful citizens as well as a strong citizen involvement at the grassroots level”
(Campanella 2006).
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However, there are other articles related to urban resilience, such as rebuilding,
post-disaster planning, and natural hazard mitigation planning. There are 10 articles
with a title related to these topics in the JPER during the past twenty years, mostly
published after 2005. For instance, Berke et al. (2009) “Integrating Hazard Mitigation
into New Urban and Conventional Developments”; Birch (2009) “Response to
“Post-Disaster Planning in New Orleans: It Isn't as Simple as It Seems”; Mueller et al.
(2011) “Looking for Home after Katrina: Postdisaster Housing Policy and
Low-Income Survivors”; Berke et al. (2014) “Impacts of Federal and State Hazard
Mitigation Policies on Local Land Use Policy”; Highfield et al. (2014) “Mitigation
Planning: Why Hazard Exposure, Structural Vulnerability, and Social Vulnerability
Matter”. Hence, the research of urban resilience and resilience planning is still a new
focus in the planning field starting in the 2000s. In the Journal of the American
Planning Association (JAPA), there are 6 articles with a title of natural disaster,
rebuilding, resilience, or recovery. Before 2005, there are only 2 articles related to
rebuilding: Olshansky (2001) “Land Use Planning for Seismic Safety: The Los
Angeles County Experience, 1971–1994” and Nelson et al. (2002) “Plan Quality and
Mitigating Damage from Natural Disasters: A Case Study of the Northridge
Earthquake with Planning Policy Considerations”. Both articles adopt a case study on
earthquakes and mitigation planning. After devastating Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
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there are more articles discussing urban resilience. For example, there are 2 out of 9
articles in the JAPA’s Spring 2006 discussing urban resilience: Campanella (2006)
“Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans” and Olshansky (2006) “Longer
View: Planning After Hurricane Katrina”. Campanella argues that urban resilience
involves much more than rebuilding. Learning from the experience of population
replacement of urban renewal since the 1960s, he puts more emphasis on people than
on buildings. He stresses that urban resilience is largely a function of resilience and
resourceful citizens as well as citizen involvement. Olshansky argues that
post-disaster recovery is all about urban planning. The application of planning
knowledge and process in data, communication, participation along with funding and
coordination among the different levels of government will lead to urban resilience.

In addition to the JAPA and the JPER, a new journal focused on resilience was
released in 2010, the International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built
Environment (IJDRBE). There are more articles discussing urban resilience. In
particular, the IJDRBE’s Issue 1 of 2013: “Special Issue: Making Cities Resilient”.
Many articles discuss rebuilding experiences and disaster risk reduction, mainly
developing countries’ case studies. The IJDRBE has been an important journal for
promoting urban resilience research since 2010.
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In addition to articles regarding urban resilience, international organizations and
policies can help to understand the concept of resilience planning. Notable is the
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). The
UNISDR indicates that “a resilient city can be planned by a more proactive role in
applying land-use planning in natural disasters and hazard mitigation”. In general,
there are three major international policies for urban resilience: 1. Framework for
Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters
(known as HFA2) and the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (known
as HFA2); 2. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): the eleventh goal is to make
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; and 3.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. In sum, the HFA, SDGs, and IPCC have
provoked cities to play a proactive role in applying land-use planning strategies in
disaster risk reduction (see Table 2-2). Mitchell et al. (2014) argue that “integrating
these three frameworks of HFA, SDGs, and IPCC will provide a unique opportunity
to deliver a coherent strategy and implementation plan to reduce disaster risk”. They
also propose a global target of reducing 50% of deaths and 20% of economic losses
from all disasters by 2030 (Mitchell et al. 2014).
2

In January 2005, 168 Governments adopted a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural

hazards at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan.
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Table 2- 2 International policies regarding urban resilience
Framework for
Action 2005-2015:
International Building the
policies
Resilience of Nations
and Communities to
Disasters (HFA)

United Nations’
Sustainable
Development Goals
(SDGs)

Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)

Year

2005

2012

2014

•Promote a strategic
and systematic
approach to reduce
vulnerabilities and
risks to hazards

•The eleventh goal is
to make cities and
human settlements
inclusive, safe,
resilient and

•Manage future risks
and building
resilience
•Initiate effective risk
reduction and

Goals

•Involve
sustainable
adaptation strategies
community-level
•Target 2030 to
•Consider the
participation
reduce the number
dynamics of
•Target the most
of deaths and the
vulnerability and
vulnerable
number of affected
exposure and their
populations,
people and decrease
linkages with
•Integrate climate
by a certain percent
socioeconomic
change adaptation,
of the economic
processes,
development and
losses relative to
sustainable
disaster risk
GDP caused by
development, and
reduction,
disasters, including
climate change
•Strengthen
water-related
capacity-building of
disasters
financing, risk
assessment, and
preparedness

•Focus on protecting
the poor and people
in vulnerable
situations
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The HFA puts emphasis on the importance of city planning to achieve resilience
and reduce risks. The HFA’s “Making Cities Resilient Campaign”, launched in 2010,
has provoked local governments to play a role in urban resilience. The HFA2 suggests
that urban resilience focuses on community-level involvement, targeting the most
vulnerable populations, integrating climate change adaptation, strengthening
capacity-building of financing, risk assessment, and preparedness, and promoting
political will and leadership. Additionally, the UNISDR recommends some steps to
make cities resilient: 1. create and fund well-defined coordinated organizational
structures; 2. prepare risk assessments, develop and enforce risk-compliant building
codes and land-use planning tools; 3. strengthen critical infrastructure and upgrade
key facilities; 4. protect ecosystems and natural buffers; 5. test early-warning systems
and emergency management capacities; 6. sponsor education and training programs
on disaster risk reduction (UNISDR 2013). At the end of 2014, the United Nations
released two reports: Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: Zero Draft
(known as Zero Draft) and Suggested Elements for the Post-2015 Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction. The two reports provide suggestions for local governments
to implement a resilience plan, including: periodically estimate the probability of
disaster risks to the population and to economic and fiscal assets; ensure that national
and local plans prevent the creation of new risks, reduce existing risks and strengthen
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resilience; guide the public sector in addressing disaster risk; regulate and provide
incentives for actions by households, communities, businesses and individuals; review
existing financial and fiscal instruments; and stimulate the development of disaster
risk management (United Nations 2014). In March 2015, the Third United Nations
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was held in Sendai, Japan. This
conference stresses that disaster risk reduction inherently involves forward planning.
Investments in disaster risk reduction and urban resilience can advance both
sustainable development and climate action. This conference also stresses that help
must be given the poorest and most vulnerable people and countries to manage
disaster risk. The Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction over the next 15 years will require strong commitment and political
leadership. Several targets are to be achieved in this framework: a reduction of
disaster mortality, affected people, economic losses, and critical infrastructure; an
increase in the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction
strategies by 2020; enhanced international cooperation; and increased access to
multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments
(UNISDR 2015).
The SDGs’ eleventh goal is to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilient and sustainable. This goal is aimed to significantly reduce deaths, affected
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people, and economic losses caused by flood-related disasters by 2030. The goal
concentrates on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations. Additionally,
this goal aims to increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and
implementing integrated policies towards resilience to disasters (United Nations
2013). The IPCC’s report on Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability considers how the impact and risk related to climate change can be
reduced through adaptation and mitigation. Effective risk reduction and adaptation
strategies must consider the dynamics of vulnerability and exposure. This report
indicates that some low-lying developing countries and small island states are
expected to face very severe impacts. These low-lying areas must take actions to
address risks and impacts.

In addition to international policies, there are international organizations
promoting urban resilience: the United Nations’ International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (UNISDR), the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and
Recovery (GFDRR), the OECD’s Risk Management Division under the Directorate
for Public Governance and Territorial Development, the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), the European Flood Directive (FD), Global
Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), Asian Disaster Reduction Center
(ADRC), and Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), presented in Table 2-3.
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The World Bank mainly concentrates on the Asian nations’ case studies. The World
Bank (2013) report Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools, and Practice
stresses that resilience planning needs to be the focus for cities.3 This report indicates
that increasing population growth, urbanization and property development in urban
vulnerable areas will be the major factor of increased damages and losses from
disasters in the next decades. In East Asia, the urban population is expected to double
between 1994 and 2025 (Jha and Brecht 2011). Most cities, with their concentration
of assets, located along the coastline, in floodplains, or along seismic rifts, are
vulnerable to disasters. Rapid and unplanned urbanization in combination with poorly
constructed settlements and degraded ecosystems put more people and more assets in
harm’s way (The World Bank 2013). Building urban resilience relies on investment
decisions that prioritize spending on activities that offer alternatives that perform well
in different scenarios. The goal is also to formulate a strategy in which flexible and
low-regret measures can be cost-effective even when risks are uncertain. Integrating
risk-based approaches into urban governance and planning processes do matter in
implementing policies of urban resilience.
In Europe, two projects regarding urban flood resilience are underway: the EU’s
Collaborative Research on Flood Resilience in Urban Areas (CORFU) and Flood
3

By 2050, the United Nations expects 80% of the world’s population living in urban areas (United

Nations 2009).
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Resilience City (FRC). The CORFU project aims to map the potential floods,
vulnerability of the assets and humans at risk, and to take adequate and coordinated
measures to reduce flood risk. CORFU has ongoing case studies in Asia and Europe,
including in Barcelona (Spain), Beijing (China), Dhaka (Bangladesh), Hamburg
(Germany), Mumbai (India), Nice (France), Taipei (Taiwan), Incheon (South Korea),
and Seoul (South Korea). The FRC project is to assess the likelihood and
consequences of current and future flooding, and the costs and benefits of different
treatment options. There are eight ongoing case studies in Europe: Bradford (UK),
Brussels and Leuven (Belgium), Dublin (Ireland), Mainz (Germany), Nijmegen
(Netherlands), Orleans (France), Paris (France). In Asia, there are two disaster
reduction centers, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) established in
Bangkok in 1986, and the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), which was
established in Kobe in response to the 1995 Kobe earthquake in order to promote
international cooperation and collaboration for disaster risk reduction among 30 Asian
countries. These international institutions have promoted the research and policy
implementation of urban resilience in the world.
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Table 2- 3 International organizations regarding urban resilience and disaster risk
reduction
International
organizations Background and task
and projects
 Established UNISDR (International Strategy for Disaster

United
Nations
(UNISDR)

Reduction) in 1999
 UNISDR, the UN office for disaster risk reduction, is also the focal
point in the UN system for the coordination of disaster risk
reduction and the implementation of the HFA
 UNISDR reflects a major shift from the traditional emphasis on
disaster response to disaster reduction, and in effect seeks to
promote a culture of prevention
 Established GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and

World Bank
(GFDRR)

Recovery) in 2006
 GFDRR as a cooperative effort of the World Bank and the UNISDR
 GFDRR has evolved in size and strategic focus, and is establishing
a solid foundation for scaling up its operations for both ex-ante
support to vulnerable developing countries and ex-post assistance
for sustainable recovery and risk reduction in post-disaster
situations
 GFDRR is to help developing countries reduce their vulnerability to
natural hazards and adapt to climate change

 A risk management division under the Directorate for Public

Governance and Territorial Development of OECD
 Risk management analyzes the latest public policies, tools and
practices of governments to address major risks. Through the
OECD
sharing of country experiences, analyses are developed to draw-out
(Risk
criteria for the effective governance of large scale hazards and
Management)
threats
 The OECD reviews risk management policies in countries as a part
of its work on effective governance policies for risk management
 Lessons learned from OECD’s country experiences can be used to
develop criteria for managing large-scale hazards and threats.
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International
organizations Background and task
and projects
 European Commission’s Joint Research Centre established the

European
Commission
(Joint
Research
Centre)

concept and methodology of the composite Index For Risk
Management (INFORM) in 2012 as a convergence of interests of
UN agencies, donors, NGOs and research institutions to establish a
common evidence-base for global humanitarian risk analysis
 The INFORM model adopts some features of the models described
three dimensions of risk: hazards & exposure, vulnerability, and
lack of coping capacity dimensions
 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has

CRED

been maintaining an emergency events database, EM-DAT
 EM-DAT was created with the initial support of the WHO and the
Belgian Government. CRED’s EM-DAT is also supported by

EM-DAT (the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
international  CRED has a long history of standardized data compilation,
disaster
validation, and analysis
database)
 CRED provides free and open access to its data through its website.
One of CRED’s core data products is the EM-DAT, the
International Disaster Database.
 The European Flood Directive (FD) was proposed by the European

Commission in 2006 to reduce and manage the flood risk.
th
European
 EU’s 7 Framework Program for Research and Technological
Flood
Development (FP7) project: a collaborative research on flood
Directive (FD) resilience in urban areas (CORFU), ongoing case studies include:
and EU’s
Barcelona, Beijing, Dhaka, Hamburg, Mumbai, Nice, Taipei,
CORFU
Incheon, and Seoul
project

 CORFU is to map the potential floods, vulnerability of the assets

and humans at risk, and to take adequate and coordinated measures
to reduce flood risk
 FRC has enabled responsible public authorities in eight cities in

Flood
Resilience
City (FRC,
EU-funded
project)

North West Europe to better cope with floods in urban areas
 Ongoing eight case studies, including: Bradford, Brussels and
Leuven, Dublin, Mainz, Nijmegen, Orleans, and Paris
 FRC is assessing the likelihood and consequences of current and
future flooding, and the costs and benefits of different treatment
options
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International
organizations Background and task
and projects
 Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) is a
Global
cooperation framework under the United Nations umbrella
Disaster Alert
 GDACS includes disaster managers and disaster information
and
systems worldwide and aims at filling the information and
Coordination
coordination gap in the first phase after major disasters
System
 GDACS provides real-time access to web‐based disaster
(GDACS)
information systems and related coordination tools
 Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) was established in

Bangkok, Thailand, in 1986
 ADPC has country offices in Bangladesh, Lao PDR and Myanmar.
Asian Disaster ADPC deploys disaster risk management (DRM) information and
Preparedness
Center
(ADPC)

systems to reduce local, national and regional risk across
Asia-Pacific.
 ADPC has a team of approximately hundred experts from 19
countries. ADPC creates a department of Resilient Cities and Urban
Risk Management to assists cities and communities in managing
and mitigating urban disaster risks.
 Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) was established in Kobe,

Hyogo prefecture, in 1998, in response to the 1995 Kobe
Asian Disaster earthquake.
Reduction
 ADRC is to promote international cooperation and collaboration for
Center
the reduction of natural disasters in the Asian region. ADRC has 30
(ADRC)
member countries and works to enhance disaster resilience. ADRC
also addresses this issue from a global perspective in cooperation
with a variety of United Nations’ agencies including UNISDR.
2.2.2

The goal, content, and strategy of urban resilience

The goal of resilience planning is to reduce risks through planning. Grove (2014)
indicates resilience planning “ushers in new approaches to place-based and
community-based disaster management programming based on adaptive
co-management strategies”. Hence, a proactive role in local planning is needed. Cutter
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et al. (2013) argue for “moving from reactive to proactive disaster policies”. Moreover,
an integrated, multidisciplinary, and adaptive approach is also essential. Rodin (2014)
describes the five characteristics of resilience policy: awareness, diversity, integration,
self-regulation, and adaptiveness. She indicates that “in adaptive resilience, the
capacity to adjust to changing circumstance by developing new plans and taking new
actions, modifying behaviors is urgent to achieve resilience”. Nonetheless, sometimes
localities’ inability to act, adapt, and adjust decisively has put cities in vulnerable
situations. The higher levels of government have to direct or mandate local
governments to develop a coordinated resilience planning process and plans in
disaster risk reduction and integration of resources and functions for urban resilience.
The strategy of resilience planning are two types in general: traditional
engineering strategy and land-use planning strategy. The previous resilience discourse
indicates that the latter is more effective and efficient than the former. Deyle and
Butler (2013) identify 3 strategies for urban resilience on coastal hazards reduction:
protest, accommodate, and avoid/ retreat (see Table 2-4). The Association of Bay Area
Governments (2013) also describes some tools for resilience planning, including:
general plans and specific plans; zoning tools such as overlay districts,
nonconforming use regulations, special use permits; buyouts and financial incentives
for where to build or not build. Olshansky (2009) observes that acquisition of
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flood-prone properties and permanent conversion of those properties to open space
has become a leading federal strategy for solving serious flood problems since the
1993 floods in the Midwest of the U.SA. Further, Burby et al. (2006) point out that
resilience planning includes “preventive, protection, and emergency policies”. They
indicate a preventive policy to limit the exposure of new development; property
protection policy to retrofit buildings; and emergency services policy to reduce
damages (Burby et al. 2006). They emphasize that urban planners should play a key
role in preventive policies to reduce the exposure to disasters. However, with these
diverse strategies of prevention, protection, and retreat, the main problem is that local
governments often put a low priority on taking action unless the higher government
mandates it. Because of the pro-growth and pro-development of local governments,
resilient planning to reduce disaster risk is often ignored. For instance, in the U.S.A.,
local governments are not likely to pursue such measures vigorously without being
forced to do so through mandates imposed by state governments (Burby et al. 2006).
However, some state governments incentivize municipal scenario planning processes
for urban resilience. Take New York State for instance, the NYS 2100 Commission
(2012) suggests that the state can incentivize municipal scenario planning processes
for evaluating risk to human, environmental, and economic assets from coastal storms
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and sea-level rise. Hence, resilience policies also need a top-down method as well as
mandates and support from higher levels of government.
Table 2- 4 The content and strategy of resilience planning
Resilience planning
Core ideas

Scope

Content and strategy
 An alternative plan format, a policy plan, rather a
conventional plan
 Risk-based land use planning, instead of traditional
development ignoring the hazard characteristics of land
A regional approach for resilience planning; Long-term
regional resilience strategies must be developed
 Integrating risk-based land use planning approach into

Planning process

urban governance and process
 Scenario planning process: providing the information,
selecting complementary land use and hazard-mitigation
measures, and formalizing a long-term adaptation strategy
to effectively manage impacts

Prevention strategy

Preventive policies and actions, such as conservation zoning,
to limit the exposure of new development to losses from
hazards
 Elevate structures

Accommodation strategy  Erosion-based setback
 Room for the water
 Shore armoring; beach nourishment
 Property protection policies and actions, such as building

Protection strategy

standards and assistance to property to owners to retrofit
buildings to increase their resilience to hazards
 Structural protection policies and actions such as flood
control works to provide area-wide protection from
hazards
 Prohibit development plus transfer of development rights
 Prohibit development plus acquisition
 Post-disaster down-zoning planning with a tool of transfer

Retreat/avoid strategy

of development rights
 Post-disaster plus acquisition
 Rolling easements, initiated by U.S.A.’s EPA Climate
Ready Estuaries Program, which allow nature to take its
course
 A broader adoption of green infrastructure can minimize

Green infrastructure
strategy

local problems with flooding, contamination or erosion.
 Acquisition of flood-prone properties and permanent
conversion of those properties to open space.
33

In addition to resilience planning policies with cooperation among different
levels of governments, a regional approach and integration is needed for urban
resilience. Different cases show the importance. In New Orleans’ experience, Birch
and Wachter (2006) argue for a multidisciplinary approach for rebuilding after
Hurricane Katrina. They point out that “the absence of an integrated approach has
resulted in the pattern of ever increasing disasters and the need for cooperation across
multiple levels of government”. The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG
2013) also observes that there is no regional coordinating body currently in operation
to facilitate decision-making in the aftermath of a major disaster. The ABAG indicates
that “regional governance structures for coordination are well-established for disaster
response”. Hence, the ABAG created the Regional Resilience Initiative to build
resilience through collaborative planning and jurisdictional collaboration (Association
of Bay Area Governments 2013). In New York’s rebuilding after Hurricane Sandy, the
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force (2013) stressed “the long-term plan for
rebuilding is ensuring a regionally coordinated resilient approach to infrastructure
investment because natural disasters do not respect political boundaries”. Thus,
rebuilding plans cannot be limited by jurisdictional boundary. Klinenberg and Ovink
(2013) note this in the project Rebuild by Design which encourages plans on the
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regional scale, rather than the municipal or state level because many of the risks
related to extreme weather events require cooperating across political boundaries.
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2.3

Planning practices in flood resilience

The UNISDR (2013) observed that the number of climate-related disasters,
floods and storms, has soared significantly around the world since the 1980s.4 As
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) indicate, the 21st century has been termed as
“at war with the weather”. Floods become more frequent and severely damaging
because of rapid urbanization and extreme weather conditions.5 Djordjević et al.
(2011) indicate, “increased frequency and intensity of floods, combined with trends in
growing urban population, have led to the need for increased and internationally
coordinated policies”. In Asia, flooding is the most frequent natural disaster. The
urban poor live in more environmentally vulnerable areas in Asia’s developing
countries (The World Bank 2001; 2013; Sinh et al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2013). For
example, both Vietnam and the Philippines have more than 40% of their urban
populations living in informal settlements, where floods cause significant damages
(The World Bank 2013). At the same time, in the developed countries, urbanization
has brought higher vulnerability and damage from flooding. In U.K., Howe and White
(2010) indicate that “building on floodplains, the planning system not attaching

4

There are 3,455 floods and 2,689 storms in 1980-2011, an average of approximately 200 floods and

storms annually over the last three decades.
5

Rainfall intensity will increase in tropical and high-latitude regions that experience overall increases

in precipitation (IPCC 2007).
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enough weight to flooding issues, the pro-growth government, and the out-of-date
Victorian drainage system” are the main reasons of flooding damages. Swan (2010)
also notes that the increased urbanization has induced severe flooding problems. In
the Netherlands, Aerts et al. (2009) explain that “flood risks have increased over the
last 50 years by a factor of 7 due to urbanization in Randstad. Flood risk will increase
because residents and businesses continue to settle in vulnerable locations in
Randstad”. Therefore, in both developing and developed countries, urbanization is
causing change to the natural environment and threatens urban resilience. Several
practices being used to encourage urban flood resilience are: the engineering/structure
strategy, the non-engineering/non-structure strategy, the land-use and environmental
planning strategy, and the retreat planning.

2.3.1

Engineering/structure strategy against flooding

Most countries adopted the engineering/structure strategy to reduce flood risk
during the past century. This includes building costly dikes, dams, storm-surge
barriers and dunes. In the U.S.A., flood risk reduction has been dominated by the
engineering strategy since the Mississippi River flooded in 1927. The Flood Control
Act of 1930 supported national structural flood control works (Brody et al. 2007,
2009). It is estimated that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has spent
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more than $100 billion for structural projects since the 1940s (Stein et al. 2000). An
annual average of approximately $2 billion was spent on flood control structures.
However, these costly structural flood control projects often bring a false sense of
security and result in encouraging new developments in and around floodplains. Once
a flood event exceeds the capacity of the structure, it causes significant damage and
economic loss. For instance, after the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, the city of
Galveston, Texas built a seawall, 3 miles long and 17 feet high in 1902 to resist storm
surges up to 15 feet high. However, seawalls cannot guarantee safety from a future
storm. In 2008 Hurricane Ike’s storm surge and large waves came over the seawall in
Galveston. Severe losses occurred. Approximately 75% of all homes in Galveston
were damaged or destroyed.

Another U.S.A. example was the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 where the
flood proved that levee-dependence was an incontrovertibly failure. Prior to the flood,
the Mississippi River Commission held the position that levees were the appropriate
strategies for preventing floods. Powers (2006) describes that the 1927 flood altered
the underlying theory regarding humanity’s relationship with nature from one of
domination to one of accommodation. Additionally, the Great Flood of 1993 tore
through more than a thousand levees, causing almost $20 billion of damage. In
general, the average annual flood damage in the U.S.A. was estimated to have
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climbed steadily to $4 billion (Stein et al. 2000). The USACE’s annual $2 billion
investment on flood control structures can not reduce the increased annual flood
damage of $4 billion. In other words, although nationwide structural projects for
controlling water were completed in the U.S.A., urban flood resilience has not yet
been achieved.

A similar situation occurred in the Netherlands, a nation with 65% of GDP
produced below sea level. The well-known flood protection system, 53 dike rings,
along the main rivers and coastal areas is the highest standard of flood protection
facilities in the world. For example, Randstad, the economic heart of the Netherlands,
is designed to resist a storm that is estimated to occur once in every 10,000 years (a
probability of 0.01% annually). However, Wiering and Immink (2005) argue that the
engineering strategy to reduce flood risk creates a “flood control paradox” (see Figure
2-1). The paradox is that strengthening dikes encourages more intensive land use.
After a flood, dikes will be strengthened again. Then, higher density of land
development occurs. Another flood will occur, and damages will be much more
serious. This “flood control paradox” actually is a vicious cycle, and the measures to
reinforce the dikes do not take away the cause of the problem, but create new risks
(Wiering and Immink 2005). The Netherlands’ dike ring protection structures were
built with the highest standard after the devastating flood of 1953. However, severe
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floods still devastate Netherlands, such as the floods of 1993 and 1995. This explains
why the highest level of flood protection system in the Netherlands can not guarantee
absolute safety (Kolen et al. 2010).

Figure 2- 1 The flood control paradox in the Netherlands
Source: Wiering and Immink 2005

In the U.K., engineering structures to reduce flood risks are subsidized by central
government, and continue to be the primary flood mitigation strategy
(Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988). The costly facilities and repeated floods have
made governments rethink the urban flood resilience policy. Studies indicate that
“more money for flood defense would not be a permanent solution in the U.K.”
(Howe and White 2010). The costly engineering structures can not guarantee safety or
reduce flood damages efficiently and effectively. For instance, many flooding
problems continue to threaten London after the completion of the Thames Barrier in
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1982,6 the world’s largest movable flood barriers. According to the Great London
Authority (2002), the Thames tidal floodplain would have a 0.1% annual risk of
flooding (a probability of 0.1% annually, or a flood in every 1,000 years), which
amounts to a flood risk to property at a value of approximately $120 billion. After
numerous flood defense facilities in the U.K., floods occur in different locations,
shifting the flood waters downstream (Howe and White 2010). Hence, flooding does
not stop, but changes locations. In addition, the damage is worse when the defenses
are eventually breached.

2.3.2

Non-engineering/non-structure strategy

There are two types of non-structural strategies for urban flood resilience: the
financial strategy and the planning strategy. The financial strategy includes rental
incentives and insurance incentives. An example in Asia is Mumbai’s rent control
policy resulting in the lack of proper housing maintenance and severe damages from
flooding. Stecko and Barber (2007) indicate that “many apartment buildings are
subject to rent control which prohibits landlords from increasing rents in Mumbai.
The rent control has constrained the willingness and ability of landlords to maintain

6

According to U.K. Environment Agency, Thames Bar spans 520 meters across the River, and it

protects 125 square kilometers of central London from flooding. Main gates stand as high as a 5- story
building. The construction cost is approximately $796 million (535 million GBP) in 1982. This cost is
estimated at $2 billion (1.4 billion GBP) at today’s prices.
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rental accommodations, leading to inadequate housing”. More and more buildings are
dilapidated and crumbling due to the lack of proper maintenance (Stecko and Barber
2007). When a natural disaster occurs, the damage is severe. Thus, providing a
financial incentive for landlords to increase rental in Mumbai would improve building
maintenance and strengthen urban flood resilience. The financial incentive could
allow landlords to spend part of rent income for purchasing flood insurance.

Another financial strategy is flood insurance. Among flood insurance programs,
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is most widely implemented in the
U.S.A. and has been adopted by other countries. The NFIP was established in 1968
under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as an attempt to reduce
flood losses. The NFIP provides insurance to those living in vulnerable areas as long
as local jurisdictions adopt some minimum level of protection. FEMA creates the
community’s flood map and the flood insurance rate map (FIRM)7 to evaluate
potential flood risk. In addition, FEMA’s community rating system (CRS), adopted in
the early 1990’s, encourages communities to go beyond the NFIP’s minimum
standards for floodplain management by providing discounts of up to 45% on flood
insurance premiums for residents of participating communities. However, there are
some problems with NFIP, including increasing debt, out-of-date information on flood
7

According to FEMA, more recent flood map products include digital FIRMs, which are created using

digital methods and can be incorporated into a community's Geographic Information System (GIS).
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maps, and the encouragement of new developments in floodplains. Huber (2012)
states that “The NFIP insures approximately 5.6 million American homeowners and
has $1 trillion in assets. The premiums collected have not been sufficient to cover
losses, resulting in a current debt to the U.S.A. Treasury of more than $18 billion”. He
suggests adjusting premiums, improving flood mitigation measures, and preparing for
the catastrophic risk of events like Hurricane Katrina (Huber 2012). In addition,
out-of-date information on flood maps from FEMA affects which homeowners should
purchase flood insurance. After Hurricane Sandy devastated New York City in 2012,
New York City’s report, A Stronger, More Resilient New York (2013), indicates that
more than 50% of all buildings in the area flooded by Hurricane Sandy were outside
of FEMA’s 100-year floodplain map created in 1983. Another criticism is that the
effectiveness of the NFIP encouraged floodplain development and generated
repetitive losses with high financial costs (Brody et al. 2009). Discounting insurance
premiums by the CRS system makes it less expensive for people to live in a 100-year
floodplain, resulting in development in the most vulnerable areas to flooding (Brody
et al. 2007). Furthermore, the lack of public awareness of floods remains. In the case
of Hurricane Sandy, less than 50 percent of residential buildings in the pre-Sandy
100-year floodplain had flood insurance (The City of New York 2013). Therefore, the
effort of flood risk awareness and communication needs to be more emphasized.
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Non-engineering strategy such as NFIP, provide financial incentives for homeowners
to reduce their flood risks and losses. However, the incentive shouldn’t increase the
vulnerability of people living close to or in floodplains. Besides, flood insurance
transfers risk and reduces homeowners’ losses, but flooding risk doesn’t disappear or
ebb. Hence, another non-engineering strategy, land-use or environmental planning,
becomes necessary to reduce vulnerability.

2.3.3

Land-use and environmental planning strategy

In the last century, flood risk reduction around the world primarily relied on
engineering structures. However, historic floods indicate that flood resilience can not
be achieved completely without land-use and environmental planning strategies.
However, conventional land-use planning often ignores the hazard characteristics of
the land. How to enhance risk-based land-use and environmental planning will play a
role in reducing flood risk. Jha et al. (2013) emphasize “risk-based land-use planning”,
explaining that “integrating the risk-based land use planning approach into urban
governance and process can help to make more sustainable ways to increase resilience”
(Jha et al. 2013). However, flood risk reduction or water resource management is
often not integrated with land-use planning. Woltjer and Al (2007) indicate “most
water management decisions in the Netherlands are made without reference to spatial
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planning”.8 The Luino et al. (2012) case study in Italy also indicates that
“flood-prone areas have been conducted for years without considering land use” and
that “urban development has not been controlled by careful land management that
considers natural threats”. Nonetheless, after the failure of the engineering strategy
and the costly price of not integrating water management and land-use planning in
reducing flood risks, the land-use and environmental planning strategy becomes more
imminent. Hawkins (2013) stresses the importance of the connection between local
comprehensive planning and disaster management. When members of organizations
become more engaged in exchanging information among organizations within their
planning network, they are more likely to have a favorable perception of the
comprehensive plan in improving disaster resilience (Hawkins 2013).
In Europe, the European Commission’s Flood Directive (2007)9 indicates that
“flood risk management plans should focus on prevention, protection and
preparedness, with a view to giving rivers more space”. The European Commission’s
Water Framework Directive10 promotes a “river-basin approach” and “refers

8

Woltjer and Al (2007) suggest the water impact assessment (WIA) in municipal land use plans is a

strategy for linking water management and spatial planning.
9

The European Flood Directive (FD) was proposed by the European Commission in 2006 to reduce

and manage the flood risk.
10

The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) was established in 2000 as a policy platform in

both quantitative water issues (cross-border flood management, water-supply management, and
groundwater control) and qualitative aspects.
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explicitly to interrelations between water management and land use”. Flood
management in Europe is shifting from building dikes (separating water from land use)
to “space for the river” by land-use and environmental planning. Moreover,
expanding the floodplain is a necessary planning strategy. Bye and Horner (1998)
indicate “the defense flooding of a 1 in 100 year severity may only provide defense
against floods of up to 1 in 30 year severity in the future” because of frequent extreme
conditions and the global warming scenario. Woltjer and Al (2007) suggest “enlarging
the floodplain area available to accommodate Rhine River waters during floods by
converting land from urban and agricultural uses to a land use called water area."
Hence, floodplains needs to be adjusted and expanded to accommodate water, and
then reduce flood risk. Damages would also be decreased by allowing less
development density in or adjacent to floodplains.

In addition to planning more space for the river to increase urban flood resilience,
research indicates that wetland planning, polder and retention areas, and permeable
surface design matter in reducing flood risks. The disappearance of wetlands and the
increase in impervious surfaces due to rapid urbanization have increased the runoff
and flood risk around the world. Research indicates that wetlands have a significant
effect on flood risk reduction, and explains that basins with 5% lake and wetland area
may have 40% to 60% lower flood peaks than comparable basins without such
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hydrologic features (Novitski 1985). Brody et al. (2007) also studied the relationship
of alteration of naturally occurring wetlands and flood damage through analyzing 383
flood events across 54 coastal counties in Florida from 1997 to 2001, and found that
the alteration of naturally occurring wetlands significantly increases the property
damage caused by floods. They also found that “56% of all wetland alteration permits
in research samples were located in 100-year floodplains” (Brody et al. 2007). This
means more wetlands were converted into new developments in floodplains in Florida.
The disappearance of a large amount of wetlands as well as the occurrence of new
developments in floodplains cause a higher vulnerability to floods. Brody and Gunn
(2013) note that the percent of wetland loss matters in floods after examining
environmental factors contributing to resilience along the Gulf of Mexico coast.
Another example was Hurricane Katrina, as Dean (2006) indicates that the wetlands
east of the Mississippi River lost 25% of their land area, but after Katrina, people
finally understood the value of wetlands as a form of protection from hurricanes.
Costanza et al. (2008) studied 34 major hurricanes in the U.S.A. since 1980, and
found that “coastal wetlands reduce the damaging effects of hurricanes on coastal
communities”. They estimated that a loss of 1 hectare of wetland corresponded to an
average $33,000 increase in storm damage. Costanza et al. (2008) describe the coastal
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wetlands function as “horizontal levees for storm protection”, and their restoration
and preservation is an extremely cost-effective strategy (Costanza et al. 2008).

Polder systems and retention area planning also can reduce flood risks.
Engkagul’s Thailand case study indicates that planning for polder systems and
retention areas would help reduce flood risk in larger areas (Engkagul 1993). Further,
it is estimated that a 10–20% increase of impervious surface within a drainage basin
corresponds to doubling the runoff (Arnold and Gibbons 1996). The impermeable
surface causes higher flood risk because of the increased runoff. Reducing the
impervious surface would reduce flood risks. Therefore, land-use and environmental
planning concentrating on wetland areas, water retention areas, and permeable surface
design will provide a strategy for reducing flood risks. Woltjer and Al (2007) suggest
a 10% area in land use plans be for measures such as ponds and streams for
emergency conveyance and storage of rain water, and permeable surfaces and
grass-covered roofs to hold rain and allow soil infiltration.

Some case studies indicate that a significant flood risk comes from drainage
flooding. Notable is the London case study. The Great London Authority (2002)
evaluated London flood risks and identified three main types of flood risk: tidal, river,
and drainage flooding. The result shows that “the most immediate and significant
flood risk to London comes from drainage flooding” (Great London Authority 2002).
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Hence, integrating drainage systems with land-use planning provides another planning
strategy to create robust flood resilience. In the U.K., the Environment Agency (EA)11
is actively promoting the use of sustainable urban drainage systems (SUDS, see
Figure 2-2) to reduce levels of surface runoff. As Swan (2010) indicates “the SUDS
approach, including green roofs, soak-aways, swales, infiltration basins and ponds, is
intended to replace and/or augment an existing (combined or separate) drainage
system within a developed catchment” (Swan 2010). The use of SUDS within a
‘planning-based’ approach, seeks to progressively impose green-field runoff
restrictions to all new planning proposals (Swan 2010). Hence, SUDS can reduce the
flood risk through retaining the flood volume temporarily and releasing it slowly at a
lower flow-rate (Butler and Davies 2011). Howe and White (2010) also indicate that
SUDS can help to attenuate water flow and prevent surface run-off, which can reduce
flood risk. Swan (2010) stresses that urban planning has a key role to play in
delivering more integrated and sustainable urban drainage systems in further urban
regeneration over the next 50 years. He suggests that urban planning progressively
retrofitting sustainable drainage to existing urban catchments needs to be more widely
recognized. This will result in the reduction of flood risks and damages.

11

Environment Agency (EA) is one of the thirty-six agencies belong to the U.K. Cabinet’s Department

for Environment Food & Rural Affairs
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Figure 2-2 Sustainable urban drainage systems in U.K. to prevent flood risk
Source: The British Geological Survey

Another land-use and environmental planning policy, urban growth management,
directing developments and populations away from floodplains, could reduce flood
risks and damages. The U.S.A. case study in Florida indicates that urban growth
management is an appropriate policy to reduce damages from hurricane flooding.
Chapin et al. (2006) indicate that one of the main concerns of Florida’s Growth
Management Act in 1985 was to reduce damages from hurricane flooding. Since 1990,
comprehensive plans require coastal communities to include policies that limit
development in and direct populations away from coastal high hazard areas (CHHAs).
Chapin et al. (2006) indicate “the more stringent policies for directing population
concentrations away from CHHAs were associated with lower post-plan growth rates
and growth densities”. Hence, urban growth management to directing development
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away from floodplains and reducing its growth rate or density could provide a good
strategy to reduce flood risks and vulnerability.

2.3.4

Retreat and evacuation planning

Some research of urban resilience stresses retreat and evacuation to reduce flood
damage and its impact. A strategic retreat from hazardous coastal areas and
alternatives, such as voluntary property buyouts, relocations, and land swaps for less
risky areas should be explored to reduce flood risks and damages (Stein et al. 2000).
Deyle and Butler (2013) also suggest a retreat model for flood risk reduction. Some
strategies such as prohibiting development as well as the transfer of development
rights (TDR), land acquisition, and down-zoning can be implemented. Additionally,
an efficient evacuation plan is needed to reduce damages once severe floods do come.
However, Kolen et al. (2010) indicate that one major issue is people’s ability and
willingness to evacuate. A plan needs to address the issue of people who do not or can
not evacuate the area. In the U.S.A.’s case after Hurricane Katrina, it has been
estimated that between 100,000 and 300,000 people did not or could not be evacuated
from New Orleans. A large number of them were the city’s poor populations, with
112,000 people not having access to personal vehicles (Wolshon 2006). Hence,
helping the urban poor to evacuate demands the cooperation of government and
non-profit organizations. Another factor is traffic capacity. Traffic management
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reduces the time required for evacuation. A Netherlands case study shows that “at
least 20% of the people are still in the flooding area after 24 hours” (Kolen et al.
2010). Insufficient traffic capacity prevents the evacuation goal of 24 hours for coastal
areas. In the U.S.A.’s experience after Hurricane Katrina, transportation infrastructure
in New Orleans wasn’t designed to accommodate the evacuation-level demand, and
the traffic exit capacity is roughly 67%, meaning that if the evacuation goes smoothly,
the roads outside of New Orleans will only be able to take two-thirds of the people in
24 hours (Wolshon 2006). One-third of the people are in flooding areas. Hence,
efficient traffic management becomes an important part of retreat and evacuation
planning to reduce flood damage.
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES OF REBUILD, RETREAT, AND RESILIENCE

This chapter reviews historic catastrophes since the 17th century. The
chronology of catastrophes indicates that the 21st century can be termed the “new era
of catastrophes” (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). Few cities are immune to
natural disasters. However, some cities show more resilience. How can a city have the
ability to bounce forward, higher, and stronger after a flood or other catastrophe?
Case studies of rebuilding, retreating, and displaying resilience after a natural disaster
reveal that strong political support incorporated with non-government organizations
(NGOs), cooperation among the different levels of government, higher social capital
and higher GDP per capita, and an emphasis on social resilience and justice all help to
achieve successful rebuilding and resilience. In addition, this chapter also analyzes
urban flood resilience and strategies of flood risk reduction in five global cities: New
York City, London, Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai. Most research of global cities
concentrates on economic activity, capitalization, professional occupations, human
capital, financial institutions, and producer services (Sassen 1991). Few studies focus
on analyzing environmental vulnerability and flood resilience among these five global
cities.

New York City began developing a citywide resilience plan after Hurricane
Sandy in 2012 to prevent damage in the future. While Hurricane Sandy caused
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approximately $19 billion in losses in New York City, the projection of a storm like
Sandy with the rising sea level by the 2050s will cause an estimated $90 billion,
almost five times as much (The City of New York 2013). New York City also projects
that in 2050 the flooding areas of each neighborhood1 with an expected loss of $30
million will be five times greater than actual loss they experienced in 2012 from
Hurricane Sandy. By the 2050s a hurricane could leave approximately 25% of New
York City with severe economic losses.

In London, 15% of the land is located in flood-prone areas, and many new
housing developments were built in or adjacent to these floodplains after the 1980s.
London promotes an urban sustainable drainage system, increasing the capacity of its
drainage system and river restoration, to reduce its risks. Tokyo has the least
flood-prone area, approximately 10%, among these global cities. Tokyo’s model of
underground reservoirs, diversion systems, and channels reduced its flooding.
Randstad is well prepared for flood risk reduction by land-use and environmental
planning although it has 40% of its land areas in flood-prone areas, a relatively high
proportion.

1

Each neighborhood is defined by the zip code in New York City. There are a total of 176 zip codes in

New York City (41 zip codes in Manhattan, 37 in Brooklyn, 61 in Queens, 25 in the Bronx, and 12 on
Staten Island)
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In Shanghai, approximately 50% of its land is in flood-prone areas. Shanghai
has the highest vulnerability to floods of coastal cities when compared with Dhaka,
Manila, Calcutta, Buenos Aires, Casablanca, Marseille, Osaka, and Rotterdam (Balica
et al. 2011). However, Shanghai is still less prepared in land-use and environmental
planning for urban resilience. Shanghai mainly focuses on massive levees or other
flood control facilities with an inadequate protection standard for a flood once in
every 200 years. In 2010, Shanghai began to develop its flood risk map by using GIS
to map the flood-prone areas for different scenarios. The results indicate that more
than 50% of Shanghai is in flood-prone areas, the highest flooding depth would be 22
feet. The land-use planning strategy has seldom been considered in Shanghai for
urban resilience. In addition, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission
(2015) indicates that “a high GDP per capita has a positive effect on the government’s
effort to increase the resilience of the society”. Among case studies of New York City,
London, Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai, Shanghai has the lowest GDP per capita,
which also means that it has less effect on the government’s effort to increase urban
resilience.
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3.1

Historic review on natural disasters

Natural disasters include earthquakes, floods, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons,
tidal waves, droughts, and volcano eruptions. During the past century, floods, storms,
and earthquakes in particular have caused an immense amount of damages and
fatalities around the world (see Figure 3-1 and Table 3-1). However, natural disasters
can also provide opportunities for adaption and resilience. Many cities were rebuilt
with improved living conditions both for survivors and for future generations. “Cities
which have experienced catastrophic disasters have persisted and even flourished”
(Vale and Campanella 2005; Ramroth 2007). Notable examples include the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake, the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1953 North Sea flood in
Randstad, the 2007 London flood, and 2012’s Hurricane Sandy in New York City.
With adequate planning and policies, cities can become better able to reduce loss by
using adaptive rebuilding strategies. “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure”. A city’s disaster preparation, mitigation, adaption, and resilience plan can
reduce risk, vulnerability, and damage to achieve a sustainable, safer, and more
resilient city.
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Figure 3- 1 Natural disaster timeline since the 17th century
Table 3- 1 Severe natural disasters around the world in the past
Year

Disaster

1666
Great Fire of London
U.K.

Damage
Medieval London is destroyed. The 5-day Great
Fire destroyed approximately 80% of the city.
Over 13,000 houses and 87 churches were
destroyed, and 65,000 Londoners were left
homeless.

1737

Calcutta Cyclone
India

Killed 300,000 to 350,000 individuals.

1755

Lisbon Earthquake
Portugal

Magnitude in the range 8.5-9.0; killed 10,000 to
100,000 people.

1839

Coringa Cyclone
India

The port was destroyed (some 20,000 vessels
were lost) and 300,000 people were killed.

1871

Chicago Fire
U.S.A.

The fire killed up to 300 people, destroyed
roughly 3.3 square miles, and left more than
100,000 residents homeless.

1887

Yellow River Flood
China

Killed between 900,000 and 2,000,000 people.
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Year

Disaster

Damage

1900

Galveston Hurricane

Roughly 8,000 people were killed by this

U.S.A.

Category 4 hurricane, though some estimates put
the death toll as high as 12,000. The city were
destroyed as far as five blocks inland by a storm
surge up to 15 feet high.

1906

San Francisco
Earthquake
U.S.A.

About 3,000 people died and over 80% of the
city was destroyed.

1923

Great Tokyo
Earthquake
Japan

Estimated casualties totaled about 142,800
deaths, including about 40,000 who went missing
and were presumed dead.

1927

Great Mississippi
Flood

More than 23,000 square miles of land was
submerged. The flood caused over $400 million

U.S.A.

in damages and killed 246 people in seven states.

1928

Lake Okeechobee
Hurricane
U.S.A.

Roughly 2,500 were killed, but it is possible that
the number was as high as 3,000.

1931

Central China Floods
China

Caused between 800,000 and 4,000,000 deaths.

1953

North Sea Flood
Netherlands, Belgium,
U.K.

Killed 2,251 people in the Netherlands and
eastern England.

1970

Bhola Cyclone
Bangladesh

Up to 500,000 people lost their lives in the storm.

1976

Tanshan
Earthquake

The number of deaths initially reported by the
Chinese government was 655,000.

China
1989

Loma Prieta
Earthquake
U.S.A.

63 deaths and 3,757 injuries in the affected areas.

1993

Great Midwest Flood
U.S.A.

The 1993 flood even surpassed the 1927 flood, at
the time the largest flood ever recorded on the
Mississippi. Approximately 100,000 homes were
destroyed. The floods cost 32 lives officially as
well as an estimated $15-20 billion in damages.
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Year

Disaster

Damage

1994

Northridge Earthquake

The death toll was 57, with more than 5,000

U.S.A.

injured. In addition, earthquake-caused property
damage was estimated to be more than $20
billion.

1995

Kobe Earthquake
Japan

Approximately 6,434 people lost their lives. It
caused approximately $100 billion in damage,
2.5% of Japan's GDP at the time.

1999

Jiji Earthquake
Taiwan

2,415 people were killed, 11,305 injured, and
US$10 billion damage.

2003

European Heat Wave
France, Portugal,
Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, Germany.

European death toll at 70,000.

2004

India Ocean
Earthquake
Indonesia, Sri Lanka

The third largest earthquake recorded in history,
registering a moment magnitude of 9.1-9.3. The
huge tsunamis triggered by this earthquake killed
at least 229,000 people.

2005

Hurricane Katrina
U.S.A.

A total of 1,200 direct deaths. This resulted in an
inundation of 80 percent of New Orleans with
water depths up to 20 feet. Estimated damage of
$108 billion.

2005

Mumbai Flood
India

Killed about 5,000 people.

2007

England Flood

Total economic costs of the summer 2007 floods

U.K.

are estimated at about £3.2 billion in 2007 prices.

2008

Cyclone Nargis
Myanmar

84,500 people were killed and 53,800 went
missing. The UN estimates 2.4 million people
were affected.

2008

Sichuan Earthquake
China

The 7.9 magnitude earthquake in Sichuan
Province, China. Over 61,150 deaths.

2009

Typhoon Morakot
Taiwan

681 people dead and 18 missing, roughly
$3.3 billion USD in damages.

2010

Chile Earthquake
Chile

The 8.8 magnitude earthquake and tsunami
caused to 525 deaths.
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Year

Disaster

2010

Haiti Earthquake

Death toll estimates range from 100,000 to about

Haiti

160,000. Estimated that 250,000 residences and
30,000 commercial buildings had collapsed or
were severely damaged.

2010

Pakistan Floods
Pakistan

Directly affected about 20 million people, mostly
by displacement, destruction of crops,
infrastructure, property and livelihood, with a
death toll of close to 2,000.

2011

The Great East Japan
Earthquake,
Japan

Also known as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and
tsunami, registering a moment magnitude of 9.0.
It caused to 15,889 deaths; 6,152 injured; and
2,609 were still missing as of 2014.

2012

Hurricane Sandy

Estimated damage of $65 billion. 650,000 houses

U.S.A.

were either damaged or destroyed.

Typhoon Haiyan
Philippines

It is the deadliest Philippine typhoon on record,
killing at least 6,300 people.

2013

Damage

Among these natural disasters, the United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 2013) observed that the number of climate-related
disasters around the world has soared since the 1980s. In particular, the number of
floods and storms has increased to an annual average of approximately 200 events, as
is illustrated in Figure 3-2. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) describe the
situation since 2001 as “a new era of catastrophes”. As can be seen from the review of
natural disasters in the last four centuries presented in Figure 3-1 and Table 3-1, the
occurrence of disasters increased dramatically in the late 20th century. Many natural
disasters occurred after the 1970s, especially in Asia and North America. Europe also
suffered more than one hundred major floods between 1998 and 2004. Even with the
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highest standard of flood protection in the Netherlands, when the Danube and Elbe
rivers overflowed their banks in 2002, there were 700 fatalities and 250,000 people
left homeless. The extent of the damage stood at around $27 billion (The Minister of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007).

Figure 3- 2 Increased floods and storms (light and dark blue) since the 1980s
Source: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2013

Over the past 50 years, total rainfall has increased by 7 percent globally, much
of which is due to the increased frequency of heavy downpours (Huber and Gulledge
2011). Different countries and different cities have different levels of flood
vulnerability. Generally, the developing countries are less prepared for floods, both
for human loss and property damage. For example, the developing countries represent
11% of the population exposed to hazards but account for 53% of the casualties. On
the other hand, the developed countries represent 15% of human exposure to hazards,
but account for only 1.8% of all victims (Prduzzi et al. 2009). Since the 1970s many
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policy makers, planning experts, and citizens have therefore been faced with the
problem of how to rebuild a city and improve its disaster resilience. No city or
country is immune to natural disasters in the 21st century (Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan 2009), particularly the East Asia, South Asia, and North American (see
Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4). These regions have the most frequent occurrences of
natural disasters, and the highest rates of deaths and economic losses resulting from
these natural disasters. However, many Asian countries have not yet prepared well for
the war with weather, for climate change, and for natural disasters in a world
experiencing the fast-growing urbanization, which often leads to a huge number of
deaths and damages when a disaster does occur. How and what planners can do to
reduce the impact of natural disasters is an important consideration. Similarly, how
governments prepare and plan for a resilient city is a priority for many policy makers.
Resilience planning can provide a means for strengthening the planning agenda for
safer, sustainable, and more resilient cities.
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Figure 3- 3 Projection of cyclone hotspots by 2025, especially in the East Asia and
North America
Source: United Nations 2012

Figure 3- 4 Projection of flooding hotspots by 2025, especially in the East Asia, South
Asia, and North America
Source: United Nations 2012
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3.2

Lessons learned from rebuilding experiences

This section analyzes rebuilding cases around the world to understand how
cities can perform better in rebuilding, and how to increase urban resilience. Major
natural catastrophes of the twenty-first century include Asia’s Indian Ocean
Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004, the U.S.A.’s Hurricane Katrina of 2005, and
Japan’s Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. This section presents lessons learned
from these rebuilding experiences. Related to the previously discussed resilience
discourse, adaptive resilience provides a city with the ability and capacity to change,
adapt, and transform after a catastrophe. A successful rebuilding goal is to bounce
forward gradually to a different, better condition, rather than just bouncing-back to
normalcy. The evolution of disaster resilience opens up new opportunities for
development and improvement, for “doing it better”, but also for change and
innovation by “doing it differently” (Aldunce et al. 2014).

However, people often expect to rebuild and bounce back to normalcy quickly.
For example, with the rebuilding of Aceh, Indonesia after the Indian Ocean
Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004, the Acehnese people expected to return to
normalcy in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe. This did not happen. But, as
time progressed, government and the people learned to adapt their environment to
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reduce risks, provide a better quality of life, achieve sustainable livelihoods, and a
secure and peaceful city (Clarke et al. 2010). Aech’s bottom-up system helps to
increase the ability to rebuild. Another example is Sri Lanka’s rebuilding after the
Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami of 2004. Sri Lanka promoted the cooperation
of governments and non-government organizations (NGOs) in the rebuilding process.
A community’s ability to recover from a disaster is contingent on the level of social
trust among individuals and institutions. A resilient community requires trusting
relationships among its members, including the elected officials, planners, public
managers, industry, and general population (Ozawa 2012). Sri Lanka’s bottom-up
system with trust and cooperation promotes resilience in the process of rebuilding.
Additionally, Sri Lanka’s central government welcomed the NGOs and international
relief aid after the disaster. Flexible institutions help rebuild quickly. Daniels and
Steinberg (2006) indicate that “Sri Lanka’s national government served as a facilitator
in helping NGOs get on the ground quickly and in making land available for the
NGOs to build temporary and permanent housing. Additionally, permanent housing
followed closely behind the temporary housing. Residents felt a sense of security,
ownership, and community”. Hence, in this rebuilding case, the cooperation of the
public sector, international organizations, NGOs, communities, and the bottom-up
system do matter in rebuilding differently and resiliently.
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Moreover, the social aspect of resilience is especially important in rebuilding.
In the rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina of 2005, social resilience
should have been the focus as a large number of residents were in the lower
socio-economic status. As Edwards (2010) explains, “the challenge recognized for the
first time was the large number of people unable to provide proof of residency
because they did not have utility bills in their names, or any other form of
identification with an address”. Many people had no driver license. In addition,
property records were sparse in areas where homes are worth less than $75,000 and
not taxed. Therefore, people could not prove ownership to get Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) assistance for repairs and rebuilding. Hence, the social
aspect has to be considered in rebuilding and with the resilience approach. Social
resilience must be viewed as a part of rebuilding. However, Brown (2014) explains
that “there is still relatively little analysis on social resilience, and there are continuing
tensions between normative and analytical stances on resilience”. These
characteristics are mirrored in policy discourses and local level actions on resilience.
In the future, rebuilding policies should think deeply about social resilience, which
will help to bounce forward to a better condition.

Further, strong political support is a most important factor in rebuilding. Vale
and Campanella (2005) indicate that “narratives of resilience are a political necessity
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and disasters reveal the resilience of governments”. Because of the absence of state
planning and hazard mitigation requirements in the U.S.A., many localities ignore
hazards in planning for and regulating urban development. In other words, the
government’s minor role in resilience could result in the failure of adaptive resilience.
The U.K.’s experience shows that the government favors the developers to the
detriment of the local communities. The result is that 27% of new housing is located
in flood hazard areas (Bosher et al. 2007). Andrew (2014) argues that if public
agencies and local communities in the U.K. can work and plan together, then
proactive steps can be taken to build resilience that assists in both the response and
recovery stage of major incidents to minimize the direct impact of floods. Hence,
learned from Hurricane Katrina, social aspects and a proactive government role
should be promoted in rebuilding and resilience.

In Japan, triggered by a multi-disaster with an earthquake, tsunami, and
nuclear explosion, coordination among different levels of governments was the key to
rebuilding after the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. Japan established the
Reconstruction Agency (RA) immediately in February 2012, with a duration of 10
years, headed by the Prime Minister. This Agency is placed one rank higher than
other ministries, and has better coordination among different levels of governments. It
can integrate and coordinate all relevant functions of the individual ministries for the
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recovery and reconstruction from the disaster (Suzuki and Kaneko 2013). Japan also
engaged in proactive disaster risk management, legislation, enforcement, and
promoting cooperation among different levels of governments, multiple stakeholders,
and NGOs (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014). Gill et al. (2013) note that since these
coastal communities have been declared uninhabitable, return will never be possible.
The challenge for local authorities was to construct permanent housing of decent
quality and at an affordable price with low-interest loans to help victims buy them.
There has been a great deal of discussion in Japan on where people may live and work
in the future. Many recovery plans will remove people from their ancestral homes and
move them inland to higher elevations which are believed to be safer and more
resilient to floods and earthquakes. These rebuilding strategies call for turning large
coastal areas into natural barriers or buffer zones. Some neighborhoods would become
parks and green spaces, such as tsunami protection parks and disaster prevention
greening areas. These coastal communities will be banned from rebuilding in the
danger zone and forced to move elsewhere (Wilhelm & Delaney 2013). Relocation
and retreat became primary rebuilding strategies in Japan after the Great East Japan
Earthquake.

Moreover, Japan provided an example in the reform of land use adjustment,
the creation of a special zone system (SZS). Suzuki and Kaneko (2013) book Japan’s

68

Disaster Governance explains that the SZS was introduced to facilitate reconstruction
by taking into account all of the unique needs and special circumstances in each local
government afflicted by the earthquake. Under this system, the government decides
basic guidelines for the special zones for reconstruction at the cabinet level. There are
about 227 municipalities and 11 prefecture governments afflicted by the earthquake
that are required to prepare these plans: Reconstruction Acceleration Plan (RAP);
Land Restructuring Plan (LRP); and Reconstruction Grant Projects Plan (RGPP).
RAP is a proposal of special measures and arrangements involving deregulation,
reduced procedures, and tax incentives to accelerate the reconstruction undertakings.
LRP is a proposal for special arrangements involving various approvals and
procedures for land restructuring and conversion. The conditions of land
restructure-related permits by governments can be relaxed, and create “one-stop”
approval procedures for land restructuring. RGPP is for securing various subsides, 40
grant projects at different ministries, to implement. In addition, there are 58 new laws
enacted as of August 2012 to cope with the rescue, recovery, and reconstruction after
the earthquake (Suzuki and Kaneko 2013). Japan’s rebuilding after the Great East
Japan Earthquake demonstrated the importance of coordination of different levels of
government, proactive and flexible plans, and the reform of land-use planning and
related regulations.
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3.3

Flood resilience policy and practice in the global city

Very few studies of global cities analyze environmental vulnerability or
disaster resilience. Because floods and storms around the world have soared since the
1980s, this section analyzes global cities’ disaster resilience to flooding: New York
City, London, Tokyo, Randstad, and Shanghai. These global cities are not included in
EU’s collaborative research on flood resilience in urban areas (CORFU) and flood
resilience city (FRC).2 Hence, case studies of those global cities will assist cities
world-wide to prepare for the future. Results indicate that a hurricane could leave
approximately 25% of New York City with severe economic losses by 2050. In
London, 15% of the land is located in flood-prone areas. In Tokyo, 10% of its land in
flood-prone areas, the lowest proportion among the listed global cities. Randstad has
40% of its land areas in flood-prone areas, but Randstad is also well prepared for
flood risk reduction by land-use and environmental planning. In Shanghai,
approximately 50% of its land is in flood-prone areas. Shanghai is the most vulnerable
to floods of the coastal cities. Shanghai is still not well prepared in land-use and
environment planning for urban flood resilience.
2

CORFU’s ongoing 9 case studies, including: Barcelona (Spain), Beijing (China), Dhaka (Bangladesh),

Hamburg (Germany), Mumbai (India), Nice (France), Taipei (Taiwan), Incheon (South Korea), and
Seoul (South Korea).
FRC’s ongoing 8 case studies, including: Bradford (UK), Brussels and Leuven (Belgium), Dublin
(Ireland), Mainz (Germany), Nijmegen (Netherlands), Orleans (France), Paris (France).
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3.3.1

A resilience plan in New York City

Every neighborhood in New York City, defined by a zip code, is experiencing
the economic losses after Hurricane Sandy in 2012 (see Figure 3-5). New York City
also projects that in 2050 the flooding areas of each neighborhood3 with an expected
loss of $30 million will be five times greater than the actual loss they experienced in
2012 from Hurricane Sandy. By the 2050s, the number of neighborhoods facing
severe economic losses will account for approximately 25% of all neighborhoods in
New York City (The City of New York 2013). The Regional Plan Association
projects an estimated 2.2 million people in the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut
region will be at high risk of flooding from sea level rise and storm surge by 2050.
Critical facilities will face inundation in the next few decades, including 59% of the
region’s power generating capacity, 21% of public housing and four out of the
region’s six airports (Regional Plan Association 2015).

3

Each neighborhood is defined by the zip code in New York City. There are a total of 176 zip codes in

New York City (41 zip codes in Manhattan, 37 in Brooklyn, 61 in Queens, 25 in the Bronx, and 12 on
Staten Island)
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Figure 3- 5 Flooding in New York City caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012
Source: The City of New York 2013

In New York City, devastating Hurricane Sandy caused 43 deaths, $19 billion in
damage, destroyed 90,000 buildings in the inundated zone, left 2 million people
without power, 11 million travelers affected daily, and 1.1 million children unable to
attend school for at least a week. The cooperation of the federal, state, and local
governments aimed to achieve resilience. The U.S.A. Federal Government report
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (2013) was to establish guidelines for the
investment of $50 billion in Federal funds, made available for recovery and set the
region on the path to being built back more resilient and stronger. The New York
State Government report Recommendations to Improve the Strength and Resilience of
the Empire State’s Infrastructure (2013) concentrated on regional coastal resilience.
Resilience strategies integrate restoration and enhancement of natural systems, hard
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structures, and land use controls to achieve multiple benefits. Another report NYS
2100 Commission recommended the inclusion of natural mitigation methods as well
as traditional engineering solutions. Finding and implementing natural and green
methods for protection creates a crucial complement both to existing and new
structural defenses. A broader adoption of green infrastructure can minimize local
problems with flooding.

New York City Government report Climate Risk Information 2013: Observations,
Climate Change Projections, and Maps (2013) provides new climate change
projections and future coastal flood risk maps for New York City. This climate risk
information is designed to assist with community rebuilding plans, and help to
increase resilience of communities. There are two important parts: climate projections
and future coastal flood risk maps. This report also gives average climate change
projections for the year 2050. The temperature projection for New York City is an
increase of 4.0°F to 5.5°F. The precipitation projection is an increase of 5% to 10%. A
sea level rise of 11 to 24 inches is projected. Additionally, because of FEMA’s
out-of-date floodplain map from 1983, the general population is not aware of flood
risk and the need for flood insurance. When Hurricane Sandy hit New York City, it
was estimated that more than 50% of all properties flooded by Hurricane Sandy were
outside of FEMA’s 100-year floodplain. Even among those in the floodplain, less than
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50% of residential buildings in the pre-Sandy 100-year floodplain had flood insurance
(The City of New York 2013). However, Huber and Gulledge (2011) also indicate that
“what used to be a 500-year flood event may become a 100-year or 10-year event, so
that most people will experience such events within their lifetimes”. Aerts et al. (2009)
predict that “sea level rise alone in New York City may cause the current 1 in 100 year
flood to occur approximately four times more often than by the end of the century.
Moreover, by then, the current 1 in 500 year flood event may occur approximately
once every 200 years” (Aerts et al. (2009). FEMA and New York City are updating
their flood risk maps within the 100- and 500-year flood zones. These up-of-date
flood risk maps should help to make people aware of their flood risks and thus have
better risk communication and resilience planning strategies.
The purpose of another New York City report A Stronger, More Resilient New
York (2013) is to: 1. analyze the impact of Hurricane Sandy on the city’s buildings,
infrastructure, and people; 2. assess the risks the city faces from climate change in the
2020s and 2050s; 3. outline ambitious and comprehensive, yet achievable strategies
for increasing resilience citywide. This report examines the economic losses: $19
billion in 2012; $35 billion by the 2020s; and $90 billion by the 2050s (see Figure
3-6). By the 2050s, with rising sea levels and more intense storms, a once-in-70-year
loss event would cause an estimated $90 billion of damage, or almost five times the
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asset damage and economic loss caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Furthermore,
the expected annual losses in New York City of $1.7 billion today will grow to $4.4
billion in current dollars by the 2050s (The City of New York 2013).

Figure 3- 6 The possible cost of $90 billion of a flooding in New York City by 2050
Source: The City of New York 2013

Expected losses will be concentrated in more areas of the city than were
impacted during Hurricane Sandy, such as the East and South Shores of Staten Island,
Southern Brooklyn, South Queens, the Brooklyn-Queens Waterfront, and Southern
Manhattan (see Figure 3-7). The total flooding areas with the neighborhood
experiencing losses of $30 million account for 5% of its land in New York City in
2012. New York City also projects that in 2050 the total flooding areas and damages
will be five times greater than actual loss they experienced in 2012 from Hurricane
Sandy. By the 2050s a hurricane could leave approximately 25% of New York City
with severe economic losses (see Figure 3-8).
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Figure 3- 7 Future flood simulation for New York City by 2020 and 2050
Source: The City of New York 2013

Figure 3- 8 New York City’s flood damage simulation by 2050
Source: The City of New York 2013
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In order to address flood damage, New York City Government had to develop a
resilient plan for citywide hard and soft infrastructure, coastal protection, insurance,
utilities, transportation, parks, water, and revise building codes. Besides, the City
Government also developed five community rebuilding and resilience plans: the
Brooklyn-Queens Waterfront; the East and South Shores of Staten Island; South
Queens; Southern Brooklyn; Southern Manhattan. Although New York City has a
good resilience plan, how to pay for rebuilding will be an issue. The resilience plan
consists of 250 initiatives which will cost nearly $20 billion, including a ten-year plan
of Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency of $14 billion. There is a funding
gap estimated to be approximately $4.5 billion. However, from New York City’s
experience, it is clear what strategies are important in resilience planning: 1. engaging
in climate change projection and disaster assessment; 2. examining fiscal losses and
cost-benefit analysis; 3. developing space scenario planning; 4. developing
community rebuilding and resiliency plans; 5. identifying and funding key initiatives.
Further, the Regional Plan Association’s Fourth Regional Plan is undertaking to
address the region’s natural disasters and to strengthen regional resilience. According
to the Regional Plan Association (2015), the Fourth Regional Plan will take a
comprehensive and long term look at the role of resilience in the region’s
development. There are five broad categories of spatial resilience strategies: resist,
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rebuild, restore, retain, and retreat (see Table 3-2). The fifth “R”, retreat, must
inevitably be singled out from the other four. Retreat is not an engineered solution.
Retreat is also often the last tool chosen from the resilience toolbox. However, there
are many areas in the region where engineered strategies are expensive or cannot
address the particular risks of communities. “Retreat strategies will have to be
implemented in some places, and ignoring retreat as an option entirely will limit the
opportunities to successfully implement a resilience plan” (Regional Plan Association
2015).
Table 3- 2 Resilience strategies of the 5Rs: rebuild, resist, retain, restore, and retreat
Project/Policy/Proposal

Rebuild

Resist

Bay Barriers

X

Coastal Barriers, Hard

X

Coastal Barriers, Soft

X

Retain

Restore

X

Buyout Programs

X

Rolling Easements
Building Retrofit, Zoning

X
X

Resist, Delay, Store,
Discharge
Wetlands Restoration
Green Infrastructure

Retreat

X

X

X
X

X

X

Living Shorelines

X

Source: Regional Plan Association 2015
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X

X

3.3.2

London’s flooding vulnerability and risk reduction practice

There are three main flood risks facing London: tidal surges, river water, and
surface water. The largest concentrations of risk are around rivers, especially the
Thames River, where flooding is often the result of heavy rainfall (Greater London
Authority 2002). Notable was the flooding of autumn, 2000, inundating England and
Wales, where the Association of British insurers estimated that the cost to insurers
was approximately $2 billion (or £1.3 billion).4 London’s rapid growth, floodplain
development, land-use modifications, the increase of impermeable surfaces, and an
intensification of rainfall led to an increasing flood risk. The population grew from
6.8 million in 1986 to 8.4 million as of 2014 in Greater London (U.K. National
Statistics), which gave it higher exposure to floods. More and more people and
properties are vulnerable to flooding, leading to increased damages. The value of
property at risk is approximately $120 billion (or £80 billion), resulting from the
Thames tidal floodplain with a probability of 0.1% annual risk of flooding (Great

4

The flood levels in many places were the highest on record. In many locations there had been no

previous record of flooding. 10,000 properties were flooded at over 700 locations and there was
widespread disruption to road and rail services. The total costs are of the order of £1 billion (The
Environment Agency)
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London Authority 2002). Fifteen percent of London is located in flood risk areas
where flooding is probable (see Figure 3-9, Great London Authority 2009).5

Figure 3- 9 Approximately 15% of London is located in flood-prone areas
Source: Great London Authority 2009; 2012

The Greater London Authority (2012) also notes that up to 680,000 properties,
approximately 19% of housing is at risk of surface water flooding in a rainstorm with
an annual probability of 0.5%. There is a 20% probability of a home being flooded in
a 40 years span. There are 24,000 properties which are at significant risk of river
flooding (London Assembly Environment Committee 2014). When analyzing the
different locations of housing built in different periods, the result indicates that the
newer housing was built in the more flood-prone areas around the Thames River,
particularly after the 1980s (see Figure 3-10).6 This has resulted in a higher
vulnerability in London.
5

Greater London Authority (2012) estimates that over half a million people are at risk of flooding in

London from tidal and fluvial sources. 70% of those at risk are at risk of tidal flooding, 29 % are at risk
of fluvial flooding, and 1% are at risk of flooding from both sources.
6

Greater London Authority (2014) report Housing in London 2014: The evidence base for the Mayor’s

Housing Strategy.
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Figure 3- 10 A large amount of housing built in/after the 1980s around flood-prone
areas in London
Source: Great London Authority 2014

The Thames Barrier, the world’s largest movable flood barriers, began to operate
to protect London from flooding in 1982. However, this encourages housing
development closer to the river because people assumed the Barrier could stop
flooding. However, Wiering and Immink (2005) indicate the flooding control facilities
creates a “flood control paradox” or “flood vicious cycle”, strengthening dikes or
barriers encouraged more intensive land use. When a flood event does happen, more
damage occurs. Then, barriers or dikes will be strengthened again, which results in
more developments. Thus, a large amount of housing developments in London after
the 1980s are located in the flood-prone areas. In addition to the Thames Barrier,
London’s policy to prevent flooding in the future primarily focuses on increasing the
capacity of drainage systems and of river restoration. London will create more space
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for flood waters to be held in the upstream river catchment and soak back into the
ground. London Assembly Environment Committee (2014) indicates that allowing
low-lying areas to flood safely at times of high water flow should protect homes,
roads and businesses. Hence, engineering structures and barriers, improvement of the
drainage system, and river restoration are major strategies to reduce flood risk in
London.

3.3.3

Tokyo’s flooding vulnerability and risk reduction practice

Tokyo is the most populous urban agglomeration in Asia, with a population of
over 37 million as of 2014. The Greater Tokyo Area is home to approximately 26% of
Japan’s total population (The World Bank 2009). Extensive urbanization in Tokyo has
reduced the water storage capacity of the land, causing rapid runoff into rivers during
rainfall events. Due to its highly concentrated population and assets, Tokyo suffers
from severe damages once flooding occurs. Furthermore, the eastern delta region has
1.5 million people living under the high-tide level, making it necessary to implement
measures against storm surges. Tokyo’s most severe flooding was caused in 1958 by
the Kano River Typhoon. The 76 millimeters (or 3 inches) rainfall within an hour
broke the record. The 1958 flooding caused more than 200 deaths and damaged half a
million houses within the inundation areas of 82 square miles, approximately 10% of
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the total area of Tokyo (see Figure 3-11). This was the largest submerged area and
largest proportion of land area in flooding from 1910 to 2014.

Figure 3- 11 Tokyo’s most severe flood, 10% of the total land was inundated in Tokyo
Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government

In order to reduce the 10% of Tokyo in a flood-prone area, the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government is engaged in river improvement projects so as to enable
the rivers to safely drain a flood of an hourly rainfall of 50 millimeters (or 2 inches) by
expanding the river width or digging down into the riverbed. Additionally, numerable
flood control programs were constructed after the 1980s. Notable are two projects: the
Kanda River underground regulating reservoir (1988-2008) and the metropolitan area
outer underground discharge channel (also known as G-Cans Project from 1992-2009).
The Kanda River underground regulating reservoir was completed in 2008 at a cost of
approximately $0.8 billion ($100 billion Japan Yen). This is the largest flood control
reservoir in Tokyo with a 12.5 meter inner diameter and 4,500 meters in length with a
83

storage capacity of 540,000 cubic meters. It utilizes the underground space to prevent
flooding of the Kanda River, where many buildings stand adjacent to the river on both
sides.

The second major project in flood risk reduction, the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
Outer Underground Discharge Channel (known as G-Cans Project), is the world's
largest underground flood water diversion facility (see Figure 3-12). This project aims
to protect the city of Tokyo itself from floods during heavy rainfall and typhoons. It
was completed in 2009 after 17 years of construction, at a cost of approximately $2
billion. The facility is capable of withstanding a flood of once in every 200 years. The
project includes five huge silos, a 6.3 kilometers connecting tunnel, a storage tank and
78 pumps. The five concrete containment silos are 65 meters deep and 32 meters in
diameter. They are located within certain limits from the rivers. The five silos act as
flow regulators. The silos are connected to a 10.6 meters diameter tunnel. The tunnel
is constructed 50 meters underground, passing through the silos. The tunnel sends the
water to the storage tank when the silos reach their capacity. The water storage tank is
25.4 meters high and 177 meters long. It is supported by 59 pillars which are 20
meters tall and weigh 500 tons.
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Figure 3- 12 Underground discharge channels in Tokyo
Source: Trends in Japan 2013

3.3.4

Randstad and the Netherlands’s experience
With about half the population at flooding risk, the Netherlands built a complex

system of dams, dikes, and movable floodwalls. The policies and practices of flood
protection are highly centralized in the Netherlands. The Ministry of Infrastructure and
Environment (MIE)7 is in charge of effective water management to protect against
flooding. Two primary Directorate-Generals are the most important: the
Directorate-General for Spatial Development and Water Affairs (DGRW) and the
Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat). The
DGRW of the MIE coordinates policies of spatial and water resource planning. The
7

The Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (MIE) was created in 2010 following the merger of

the former Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and Environment. The MIE includes 7 authorities: Directorate-General for Mobility
and Transport (DGB), Directorate-General for Spatial Development and Water Affairs (DGRW),
Directorate-General for the Environment and International Affairs (DGMI), Rijkswaterstaat, Human
Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT), Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL),
and Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI).
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Rijkswaterstaat, an executive agency of the MIE, is responsible for protecting the
Netherlands against flooding. The Netherlands has been managing flood risks since
the twentieth century. There are approximately 9 million people residing below sea
level; some areas lie at 7 meters below mean sea level, making them the lowest areas
in Europe (Aerts et al. 2009). OECD (2014) indicates that the Netherlands is a country
where 55% of the territory is below sea level or flood prone. Approximately 65% of
the Netherlands’ GDP is produced below sea level (see Figure 3-13). Over the last 100
years, more than 10,000 hectares of land have been elevated to several meters above
sea level using fill materials. However, flooding has threatened the Netherlands
throughout history (Aerts et al. 2009). Effective protection of this low-lying land is
important. Many low-lying parts have been reclaimed from former lakes, referred to
as polders, and are protected by 53 levee rings along the main rivers and coastal areas
(Aerts et al. 2009).
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Figure 3- 13 Most of Randstad, the area between Rotterdam and Amsterdam, lies
below sea level (in light blue areas)
Source: Aerts et al. (2009)

Hence, the construction, reconstruction, and the strength of these levee rings has
become the most important strategy for flooding resilience in the Netherlands. Kolen
et al. (2010) note that the Netherlands has focused primarily on flood prevention,
resulting in a flood defense system with the highest safety standards in the world. For
example, the protection system, levees and barriers, around the Randstad8 and the
economic heart of the Netherlands is designed to resist a storm that is estimated to
occur once in every 10,000 years (a possibility of 0.01% annually). This is the highest
standard of structural defenses in the world, compared with New York City’s one
flood in every 100 years (a possibility of 1% annually) before Hurricane Sandy,

8

Randstad is the Netherlands’ most densely populated conurbation (urban agglomeration), including

Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and the Hague. The population is more than 7 million, accounting for
44% of the national population.
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London’s Thames Barrier for once in every 1,000 (a possibility of 0.1% annually),
and Shanghai’s ongoing system with once in every 200 years (a possibility of 0.5%
annually).
However, even the highest standard of flood control structures can not guarantee
“zero flooding”. In the history of floods in the Netherlands, the 1953 flood was the
most severe, and caused 400,000 hectares to flood, 40,000 buildings were damaged,
more than 1,800 people killed, and 70,000 people had to be evacuated. Woltjer and Al
(2007) note that after the flooding from the violent North Sea storm in 1953 killed
nearly 2,000 people, the Netherlands undertook a vast engineering program called
Deltawerken, the Delta Plan, which included building a system of dams, barriers, and
higher dikes. The Delta Plan was formulated in 1954 and was complete in 1997.
During the four decades, massive structures were built to prevent flooding. An
example would be the construction of large closure dams across the mouths of the
four main coastal inlets southwest of the Netherlands. Also, increasing the strength
and raising the height of the dikes and dunes along the rest of the coast and along the
coastal inlets was completed. The four types of flood safety standards under Dutch
national law,9 the 1996 Flood Defense Act, are based on one flood once in 1,250

9

In 1996 the government incorporates these standards in the Flood Defenses Act, which applies to the

coast, estuaries, rivers and the transitional zones (The Dutch government 2008).
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years, 2,000 years, 4,000 years, and 10,000 years (see Figure 3-14).10 The highest
level of resistance to flooding is the protection system constructed in the 1990s. For
the river region, the standards are based on an exceeding frequency of one flood in
1,250 years. For the transitional zones between the rivers and the coast, the standard is
on an exceeding frequency of one in 2,000 or 4,000 years. The coastal area is once in
every 10,000 years.

Figure 3- 14 Dike protection from floods with the frequency of one flood in 1,250 to
10,000 years
Source: Kolen et al. 2010

The Netherlands’ traditional technical approach towards water management aims
to ensure safety and protect land by blocking out water. Aerts et al. (2009) indicate
that the Dutch flood protection system consists of 10,550 miles of levees (1,800 miles
designated as primary levees and 8,750 miles as secondary levees), 300 structures

10

Since 1978, the level of flood protection has been set in legislation at that once in 1,250 years flood

risk level for riverine flooding.
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such as sluices and bridges, shortening coastline to reduce the length of the levees
exposed to the sea by approximately 400 to 450 miles. The Dutch flood protection
system is one of the most extensive engineering undertakings in the world. However,
despite the highest level of protection, absolute safety cannot be guaranteed. Climate
change, economic growth, the increase in the population and new insights into the
probability of flooding and the probable consequences of dike failure are forcing the
Dutch government to rethink their policies of blocking out water. After heavy floods
in 1993 and 1995, the Dutch government began to realize that the traditional defense
and dike were no longer sufficient. Wiering and Immink (2005) indicate that floods in
1993 and 1995 were due to excess local rainfall, and have accelerated the current
developments of water management discourse between the existing “battle against
water” discourse versus the new discourse of “accommodating water”. However, a
new approach to rebuild, retreat, or resilience to flooding is necessary after floods in
the 1990s following the failure of the highest level of structural protection systems.

In 2001, the Dutch government initiated a project of Flood Risks and Safety in
the Netherlands (Floris) to analyze and simulate flooding in the 16 out of 53 dike
rings with conservative assumptions and a worst-case scenario. This means that
flooding risks may possibly be overestimated and that the probability of flooding is
greater relative to the situation than if the uncertainty had not been taken into account.
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The results show that more that 40% of land areas are in flood-prone areas with a
depth from 0 to 6.5 meters (see Figure 3-15).11 Additionally, the flooding depth in the
coastal region of North and South Holland is much higher than the polders behind this
coastal area. This means that a city like the Hague is much less vulnerable than
Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

Figure 3- 15 Flood-prone areas in the Netherlands, 40% of total land in hotspots
Source: The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (MTPWM) 2005

Furthermore, the Dutch Cabinet outlined a radically different water management
approach in 2000. Using a strategy referred to as “retain, store and drain”, the policy
makers break with the traditional approach which is to “pump and drain as fast as
possible”. This new approach will help to ensure that water problems are not simply

11

There are 13 different levels of flooding depth from 0 to 6.5 meters.
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passed on to lower-lying areas of the Netherlands. The Dutch government began to
rely more on planning than on the engineering structures for urban resilience to
flooding of the 21st century. City and regional planning plays a key role in flood
prevention. For example, this project spent approximately $2.5 billion (or 2.3 billion
euro) from 2007 to 2015 to lower and broaden floodplains, to create river diversions
and temporary water storage areas, and to restore marshy riverine landscapes (see
Figure 3-16). By 2015, the branches of the Rhine River will cope with a discharge
capacity of 16,000 cubic meters of water per second without flooding. The new
planning method, Spatial Planning Key Decision: Room for the River, for urban
resilience to flooding coordinates land-use, environmental planning, and water
management to make cities resilient in the Netherlands.12 Dikes will only be
improved where other measures are either inappropriate or unaffordable (The Minister
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007). Hence, Dutch flood
prevention is shifted from rebuilding or dike reinforcement to river relief, retreat and
resilience.

12

Woltjer and Al (2007) indicate that water management and spatial planning are inherently

disconnected. Most decisions regarding water are made without reference to spatial planning.
Conversely, decisions about the location of new housing areas, business parks, or highways are also
made with little consideration of their effects on water systems.
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Figure 3- 16 Planning more room for rivers to accommodate water in the Netherlands
Source: The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (MTPWM) 2007

3.3.5

Shanghai’s flooding vulnerability and risk reduction practice

China’s economic development has made Shanghai, its largest city by population
with 23 million people, a global financial center. However, Shanghai is located in
low-lying areas at an average of thirteen feet above sea level, and at the mouth of the
Yangtze River.13 The Huangpu River flows through the heart of Shanghai. Because

13

The Yangtze River, known as Long River in Chinese, is the third longest river in the world, with a

length of over 3,900 miles. Its watershed drains 20% of China’s total land area. 30% of China’s
population lives within this watershed, and the river is the country’s commercial spine. The Yangtze
also carries a huge amount of sediment each year, over 600 million tons of mud and silt are discharged
at the mouth of this tidally-dominated delta to the East China Sea.
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of Shanghai’s topology, land subsidence problem, and sea level rise threat, Shanghai
is more vulnerable to flooding. Shanghai’s recent floods were mainly caused by
typhoons. For example, Typhoon Winnie of 1997 brought the highest recorded water
level, 5.72 meters higher than the normal water level. This typhoon caused the deaths
of 3,500 people and economic losses of $3.2 billion in total. Another typhoon,
Typhoon Haikui of 2012, affected approximately 3.2 million residents, inundated up
to 2,900 houses, and suspended the operation of 30,000 businesses. Typhoon Haikui
eventually forced Shanghai to raise its highest-level alert and prepare for flooding (Li
2005).

Shanghai has the highest vulnerability to floods among coastal cities. Balica et al.
(2011) analyze nine large coastal cities’ flood vulnerability index (0~1), based on
exposure, susceptibility and resilience to coastal flooding. Results show that Shanghai
has the highest flood vulnerability index, meaning that Shanghai is the most
vulnerable city in comparison with these coastal cities: Buenos Aires, Calcutta,
Casablanca, Dhaka, Manila, Marseille, Osaka, and Rotterdam (see Figure 3-17).
Regarding Shanghai, Balica et al. find that “the prosperous Chinese metropolis was
more vulnerable than poorer cities such as Dhaka”. Additionally, they indicate that
Rotterdam and Osaka were the least vulnerable to floods, and the poorest cities, most
exposed socially and with weak institutional organizations, have a very low resilience
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to floods (Balica et al. 2011). However, Cai (2012) notes that Shanghai officials
express skepticism about the result. Shanghai’s flood control authority indicates that
“the city is capable of resisting typhoons and floods, rejecting claims that it is the
most vulnerable city” (Shanghai Municipal Government 2012). Shanghai Flood
Control Headquarter explains that 523 kilometers of coastal levees have been built
according to the city’s flood control standard, designed to withstand a
once-in-200-year flood. Additionally, the evacuation plan is the priority, the city’s
ability to quickly evacuate people in coastal areas during extreme weather conditions.
For instance, when Typhoon Haikui of 2012 came, Shanghai evacuated 374,000
people from their makeshift houses in coastal areas, or construction new sites within
one and a half days (Shanghai Municipal Government 2012).

Figure 3- 17 Shanghai, the highest flood vulnerability index among coastal cities
Source: Balica et al. 2011

Since the 2010s, Shanghai has developed its flood risk map by using the merged
topographic and bathymetric GIS datasets to map the flood-prone areas with different
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scenarios, once in 250-year, 500-year, and 1000-year floods. The map indicates that
approximately 50% of Shanghai would be in flood-prone areas, the highest flooding
depth would be 6.7 meters (see Figure 3-18). The Yin et al. (2013) study also indicates
that in the absence of adaptation measures, storm flooding will cause up to 40% more
inundation, particularly upstream of Huangpu River (see Figure 3-19). Thus,
Shanghai could possibly have the largest proportion of any city located in flood-prone
areas among the other mentioned global cities.

Figure 3- 18 More than 50% of Shanghai is located in flood-prone areas
Source: Seavitt 2013

Figure 3- 19 Inundation areas and depths in different scenarios in Shanghai by 2050
Source: Yin et al. 2013
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CHAPTER 4: TAIWAN VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

Asian nations have inadequate risk and vulnerability information, weak transition
from policies and legislation into actions, insufficient budget allocations for disaster
risk reduction, and insufficient implementation capacities (UNISDR 2013). Asia is the
highest loss region, accounting for 70% of the world’s losses in 2011. Additionally,
the insured losses in Asia account for only 17% of its losses in comparison with
America’s 51% (Munich RE 2012). Taiwan, is an Asian country with successful
economic development,1 but is also an environmentally vulnerable country. Major
natural disasters include cyclones, typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and landslides.
Taiwan was hit with 3.6 typhoons each year from 1898 to 2010, resulting in annual
economic losses of $667 million (NAPHM 2011). The economic losses are expected
to increase accordingly because the typhoons have doubled since the 1970s.
According to the World Bank (2005), Taiwan, ranked as the country most exposed to
multiple hazards, has 73.1% of its population, or 16.8 million people exposed and
living in vulnerable areas. On the World Bank’s list of the top 10 countries exposed to
multiple hazards, Taiwan has double the percentage of its population exposed to

1

Taiwan has had successful economic development between the early 1960s and 1990s with high

annual GDP growth rate in excess of 6% sustained over a 30-year period (Sarel 1996; IMF 1997). The
GDP per capita has been increasing from $432 in 1970 to $21,141 in 2013 (IMF), and is expected to
target above $30,000 in 2016.
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natural disasters as does the Philippines with 36.4%; approximately 5 times that of
Japan’s 15.3%; and 15 times that of Vietnam’s 5.1%.

This chapter first studies natural disasters in Asia, explaining the context of
natural disasters in general in Asia. Second, this research creates a natural disaster
density indicator (NDDI) to conduct a comparative study among seven countries from
1985 to 2014, including Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the
Netherlands. The international comparison will help to understand Taiwan’s damages
from natural disasters. The results indicate that Taiwan had the highest density of
natural disaster occurrence and the highest density of death toll rate among these
seven countries over the past three decades. China had the highest density of affected
people from natural disasters, 362 people affected per km² in 1985 to 2014. This is
100 times that of the U.K. and U.S.A.’s 3 affected people per km². Regarding
economic loss from natural disasters, Japan had the highest density of economic
losses, $1.158 million in losses per km² in 1985 to 2014. Taiwan’s $0.65 million
losses was about half of that in Japan. In Europe, France has the lowest number of
natural disasters and economic losses per km² in comparison with the Netherlands and
U.K.
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4.1

Natural Disasters in Asia

Storms, floods, and earthquakes are the three major natural disasters in Asia.
Asian countries have suffered from natural disasters for the past century. From the
EM-DAT’s database from 1900 to 2014, the results indicate that the Philippines, India,
China, and Indonesia are the countries with the most frequent disasters (see Table 4-1).
China has the largest death toll, with 6.6 million people dying from floods (see Table
4-2). Each catastrophic event could possibly cause more than a thousand deaths. For
instance, the China Floods of 1931 was estimated to have caused up to 3.7 million
deaths. Peduzzi et al. (2009) also discover that “least developed countries represent
11% of the population exposed to hazards but account for 53% of casualties. On the
other hand, the most developed countries represent 15% of human exposure to
hazards, but account for only 1.8% of all victims”. In the Philippines and Vietnam,
more than 40% of the urban poor population live in informal settlements with the
highest flood risk (The World Bank 2013). Also, Thailand’s car manufacturing plants
were located on floodplains. Flooding caused serious damage to the car industry’s
global supply chains in 2011, and GDP in Thailand fell by 9% in the last three months
of 2011 compared with the same quarter in 2010 (Wahlström 2015).
In Japan, a developed country, natural disasters did not cause as many deaths as
in China, India, Philippines or Bangladesh. However, Japan is the country with the
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greatest amount of economic loss and damage from natural disasters, especially due to
earthquakes (see Table 4-3). Wahlström (2015) indicates GDP declined in Japan in
2011 after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, which generated direct
losses of over $200 billion. Hence, Asian countries have suffered greatly from natural
disasters during the past century. Natural disaster statistics in Asian also indicate that
disasters have increased dramatically since the 1980s, particularly floods (see Figure
4-1).
Table 4- 1 Countries with most frequent natural disasters in Asia
Country

Natural disaster

Occurrence
(5,190 disasters in total
from 1900 to 2014)

Philippines

Storm

316

India

Flood

254

China

Storm

241

China

Flood

237

Indonesia

Flood

167

Bangladesh

Storm

167

India

Storm

165

Japan

Storm

157

China

Earthquake

143

Philippines

Flood

136

Source: EM-DAT
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Table 4-2 Countries with largest amount of deaths caused by natural disasters in Asia
Death toll (persons)
Country

Natural disaster

(26 million deaths in total
from 1900 to 2014)

China

Flood

6.6 million

India

Epidemic

4.5 million

India

Drought

4.2 million

China

Drought

3.5 million

Bangladesh

Drought

1.9 million

China

Epidemic

1.56 million

China

Earthquake

0.9 million

Bangladesh

Storm

0.6 million

China

Epidemic

0.4 million

Indonesia

Earthquake

0.2 million

Source: EM-DAT

Table 4- 3 Countries with largest damage from natural disasters in Asia
Country

Natural disaster

Damage (US dollars)
($1.2 trillion in total from
1900 to 2014)

Japan

Earthquake

360 billion

China

Flood

201 billion

China

Earthquake

105 billion

China

Storm

64 billion

Japan

Storm

57 billion

Thailand

Flood

45 billion

India

Flood

37 billion

China

Drought

26 billion

Turkey

Earthquake

24 billion

China

Extreme temperature

21 billion

Source: EM-DAT
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Figure 4- 1 The trend of natural disasters in Asia since the 1980s
Source: Munich RE 2012

Research has found that every dollar invested into disaster preparedness would
save $4 to $7 dollars in post-disaster damages (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005;
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP 2012; The National Academy of
Sciences 2012). However, Asia is not well enough prepared or invested in prevention
for natural disasters. The UNISDR (2013) observed issues in Asia: 1. weak transition
from policies and legislation into actions; 2. inadequate risk and vulnerability
information; 3. insufficient budget allocations for disaster risk reduction; 4.
insufficient implementation capacities. Additionally, most properties are not covered
by insurance. According to Munich RE (2012), there were overall world losses of
$380 billion in 2011, 70% of all losses were in Asia. However, the insured losses
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accounted for only 17% in comparison with America’s 51% of losses being insured.
In European countries, a significant proportion of economic losses are insured. For
example, in the July 2013 hailstorms in Germany and France, an estimated $3.8
billion of the total losses of $4.8 billion were insured, almost 80% (Swiss Re 2014;
United Nations 2015). In Asian countries, the high exposure to natural disasters and
extreme damage as well as being less prepared and having less insured property has
made it more vulnerable.

Urban development in Asia has also made it more vulnerable to natural disasters.
This is due to the high urban density, mega-city development, the fast urban growth
with inadequate infrastructure, the urban poor living in slums, and the lack of critical
infrastructure. Some mega-cities in the coastal area could be more vulnerable to
natural disasters when considering climate change and sea level rise. These coastal
mega-cities include Tokyo (population of approximately 37 million), Shanghai
(population of approximately 20 million), Mumbai (population of approximately 19
million), Manila (population of approximately 12 million), Osaka-Kobe (population
of approximately 11 million), Guangzhou (population of approximately 11 million),
Shenzhen (population of approximately 11 million), Jakarta (population of
approximately 10 million), and each needs to strengthen its natural disaster policy to
achieve urban resilience. Moreover, Asia is a region that has the fastest growing
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urbanization in the world. Asian cities are experiencing annual urbanization rate of 2
to 3 percent. The urbanization is estimated to increase from today’s 45% to 65% in
2050. Mitchell (1999) also indicates, “Natural disaster potential of the biggest cities is
expanding at a pace which far exceeds the rate of urbanization”. Fast urbanization and
high population density in Asian cities cause increased disasters and damages.

There is a significant association between the increase in natural disasters and
population exposure, represented by population densities (Thomas et al. 2013). Most
population growth is in the developing countries that are disproportionately affected
by natural disasters. Because of the rapid urban growth, a great number of the
population live in squatter settlements, which are generally more prone to the impacts
of natural disaster in Asia. For example, cities in China, India, Indonesia, and
Bangladesh demonstrate these impacts. In Vietnam and the Philippines, the urban
poor, more than 40% percent of the urban population, live in informal settlements,
where floods associated with sea-level rise and storm surges carry significant risks for
the urban poor (The World Bank 2013). Sinh et al. (2012) also indicate that the
vulnerability of urban systems and communities to climate change can be extremely
high in Asian cities, particularly for the poor and other marginalized groups residing
in these cities. In the developed countries of Asia, increasing exposure of wealth in
existing hazardous locations is a primary driver of escalating disaster losses. For
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example, cities in Japan experienced a huge amount of loss from natural disasters
after the Kobe earthquake of 1995 and the earthquake and tsunami of 2011. In general,
damages from natural disasters will increase in correlation with increasing
urbanization, risk, exposure, and vulnerability in Asia (see Table 4-4).
Table 4- 4 Asia’s context and its characteristics of vulnerability to natural disasters
Natural disaster

Exposure

Vulnerability

Damage

Preparedness

Level

High

High

High

Low

Insured
property
Low

Low level of
Highly
frequent
tropical

Characteristics

storms, floods,
and
earthquakes;
high level of
exposure

Rapid

High proportion

urbanization; of urban poor
mega-cities;

living in

high

vulnerable

population

environment;

density; high

high vulnerable

settlement

for the low

concentration socio-economic
status people

resilience
adaption; less
engagement in
environmental
and resilience
policy; low
adaptive
capacity; low
hazard
mitigation
policy
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Low
awareness and
perception of
risks; low
accessibility
and
affordability
for risk
diversification

4.2

Taiwan vulnerability analysis
Taiwan has been successful with economic development between the early 1960s

and 1990s with a high annual GDP growth rate in excess of 6% sustained over a
30-year period (Sarel 1996; IMF 1997). In 2010 Taiwan still had a double-digit annual
GDP growth rate. The GDP per capita has been increasing from $432 in 1970 to
$21,141 in 2013 according to the International Monetary Fund, and is expected to
target above $30,000 in 2016. According to Taiwan’s Central Bank, as of September
2014, the foreign exchange reserve was $420.7 billion, making Taiwan the 7th in the
world in reserves capacity. In addition, Taiwan ranks 14th in the Global
Competitiveness Report released in 2014 by the Geneva-based World Economic
Forum. Therefore, Taiwan has performed well economically with its effective
economic planning and policy during the past four decades. However, economic
development can be profoundly hampered by natural disasters. Examples around the
world have proven this. Hurricane Sandy devastated the Northeast region of U.S.A. in
2012.2 The direct economic losses were estimated at between $78 and $97 billion.
This storm event damaged 3% of total GDP in the Northeast region of U.S.A.
(Regional Plan Association; The World Bank; Kunz et al. 2013). Hence, sustainable
economic development requires environmental resilience.
2

According to the Regional Plan Association, the Northeast region is a powerhouse of economic

output, producing 20% of the nation's GDP. Based on this, this region has approximately GDP of
$3,232 billon in 2012.
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Taiwan is an environmentally vulnerable Asian nation. Taiwan ranked as the
country most exposed to multiple hazards with 73.1% of the population or 16.8
million exposed to and living in vulnerable areas (The World Bank 2005). Taiwan is
at the top of the World Bank’s 10 countries most exposed to multiple hazards. Taiwan
has double the percentage of its population exposed to natural disasters compared to
the Philippines’ 36.4%; about 5 times that of Japan’ s 15.3%; and 15 times that of
Vietnam’s 5.1% (see Figure 4-2).

Figure 4- 2 Taiwan is at the top of the World Bank’s 10 countries most exposed to
multiple hazards
Source: The World Bank 2005

Taiwan is exposed to cyclones, typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and landslides
(see Figure 4-3). According to the Taiwan Central Weather, an average of 3.6
typhoons have hit Taiwan every year from 1898 to 2010. This has resulted in $667
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million of economic losses annually (NAPHM 2011). However, typhoons have
increased since the 1970s. On average 6 typhoons have hit Taiwan every year from
1975 to 2014. The economic losses are expected to increase by double, reaching at
least $1 billion. Also, the number of earthquakes being felt annually is approximately
500 (Taiwan’s Central Weather Bureau). Typhoons, floods and earthquakes impact
Taiwan profoundly.

Figure 4- 3 Taiwan natural disaster risk map
Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Regional Office for Asia
and the Pacific (OCHA ROAP) 2007
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4.2.1

A comparative study in Taiwan and six other countries by creating a natural
disaster density indicator (NDDI)
In order to analyze Taiwan’s vulnerability and damages from natural disasters,

this research creates the natural disaster density indicator (NDDI) based on the
EM-DAT dataset to conduct a comparative study among seven countries from 1985 to
2014, including Taiwan, Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. The
NDDI model explains Taiwan’s vulnerability and actual damages from natural
disasters in comparison with six other countries.
Other disaster risk index models have been developed by the United Nations and
the U.S.A. In the United Nations’ disaster risk index (DRI) model and U.S.A.’s
existing models, identifying a country’s disaster risk primarily focuses on these key
factors: hazard frequency, exposure of population, vulnerability, and consequences. In
the United Nations’ DRI model, hazard frequency, exposure, vulnerability and risk are
the major components (risk=hazard frequency*expected population
exposed*vulnerability). However, some variables are not easily calculated. For
example, the variable of vulnerability is based on socio-political-economical context
of a country, it is a non-dimensional number between 0–1 (Peduzzi 2009). Thus,
identifying human vulnerability is a problem in the DRI model. Other models used to
evaluate risk and resilience have been promoted in the U.S.A. in the twenty-first
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century, including: Coastal Resilience Index (CRI), Argonne National Laboratory
Resilience Index (ANLRI), Social Vulnerability Index (SVI), Baseline Resilience
Indicator for Communities (BRIC), Community Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI).
The CRI model is a community-based or bottom-up approach to developing an index
of low, medium, and high resilience ratings to storm events through self-assessment
and a questionnaire survey. However, the CRI model relies heavily on the
communities’ subjective opinions and evaluations. The ANLRI model is a top-down
and hierarchical approach by experts to collect data of critical infrastructures, do
interviews, and justify weights to create a resilience index that ranges from 0 (lowest
resilience) to 100 (highest resilience). Nonetheless, how to determine adequate
weights is an issue. The SVI model attempts to measure the susceptibility of a
population to harm from a natural disaster, and examines the characteristics that
influence their resilience. This model concentrates on measuring the inequalities and
varieties of socio-economic status in disaster impacts. The BRIC model attempts to
measure community resilience based on social, economic, institutional, infrastructural,
ecological, and community components. To evaluate community resilience, the CDRI
model uses four phases of a disaster management cycle (preparedness, response,
recover, and mitigation) and the combination of these with a community’s five capital
assets (social, economic, physical, human, and natural resources) (The National
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Academy of Sciences 2012). Both the BRIC and CDRI models need comprehensive
datasets to evaluate resilience. They are both costly and time-consuming in data
collection and analysis.
This research’s NDDI model is a simplified and appropriate model based on the
historic analysis of natural disaster damages in different countries. The NDDI model
helps to identify a country’s vulnerability and damage. The NDDI model is suitable to
do international comparison. In order to conduct an international comparison, this
research collects countries’ reported natural disaster data from the EM-DAT, the
international disaster database, during the past three decades (1985-2014). This study
compares natural disasters in Taiwan to other counties in Asia, North America and
Europe, including Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K., France, and the Netherlands. These
countries are chosen because all of them have a large population, high economic
growth, and frequent occurrence of natural disasters. The reported damages from the
EM-DAT can be lower than reports from other organizations. For example, the United
Nations report, The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2015),
indicates that in 2012, EM-DAT reported economic losses of $157 billion, an estimate
that is lower than those published by Swiss Re ($186 billion), Munich Re ($160
billion) and Aon ($200 billion). Nonetheless, the EM-DAT database has been adopted
worldwide by international organizations, including the UNISDR.
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This research’s results of country comparisons indicate that China and U.S.A.
both had the highest number of natural disasters, with more than 20 disasters each
year. The death toll of 4,934 persons each year in China is about 15 times that of
U.S.A.’s 349 persons per year. The natural disaster occurrence of 108 in France is
only one-fifth that of U.S.A.’s 677, but the French death toll of 21,563 persons is
about 1.5 times that of U.S.A.’s 10,476 persons. In summary, China had the highest
occurrence rate and death toll; the U.S.A. and Japan had the highest occurrence rate
but a lower death toll; France had a lower occurrence rate but higher death toll; U.K.
had the lowest occurrence rate and lowest death toll (see Table 4-5).
Table 4- 5 Taiwan’s natural disasters in comparison with Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K.,
France, and the Netherlands
Natural
disasters in Taiwan
1985-2014

Japan

China

U.S.A.

U.K.

France Netherlands

Occurrence 70

158

658

677

74

108

30

Death toll

3,747

27,961

148,027

10,476

1,471

21,563

2,016

People

3,799,228 3,679,603

3,043,299,378 27,429,994 702,563

4,096,733 265,321

affected
Economic
damage ($ in 20,457,390 422,299,400 409,943,750 715,208,660 32,731,180 38,657,200 4,530,700
thousands)
Source: EM-DAT

Different countries have different amounts of territory and population sizes.
There is no surprise that the raw number killed by disasters in China, India, or U.S.A.
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would be on the top of the list. On the contrary, if the comparison of the percentage of
population killed by disasters is used, then the small islands and less populated
countries will always be ranked first (Peduzzi 2009). Hence, in order to enable
relevant comparisons among different countries, this research’s NDDI model adjusts
historic raw data to produce an adequate comparative study. The NDDI model
attempts to analyze the disaster damage per square kilometer among different
countries.
The results of the NDDI model indicate that Taiwan had the highest number both
in occurrence rate and death toll among the seven examined countries in the past three
decades (see Figure 4-4 and 4-5). The occurrence rate of the NDDI model during the
past three decades in Taiwan is 0.002 per km² or 2 natural disasters within 1,000 km²
land area. This is 5 times that of Japan’s 0.0004, and 10 times that of France’s 0.0002.
The death toll of the NDDI model during the past three decades in Taiwan is 0.1 per
km² or 100 deaths within 1,000 km² land area. This is 100 times that of U.S.A.’s 0.001,
and is 10 times that of China’s 0.01.
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Figure 4- 4 Natural disaster occurrence in the NDDI model in 1985-2014

Figure 4- 5 Death toll in the NDDI model in 1985-2014

114

China has the highest affected population density, 362 people affected per km² in
1985-2014. This is 3.5 times that of Taiwan’s 104 affected people per km²; 36 times
that of Japan’s 10 affected people km²; and 100 times that of the UK and U.S.A.’s 3
affected people per km² (see Figure 4-6). In terms of economic loss from natural
disasters, Japan has the highest density of economic losses in the NDDI model,
$1.158 million losses per km² in 1985-2014 (see Figure 4-7). Taiwan’s $0.65 million
losses is about half of that in Japan. However, Taiwan’s is 15 times that of China’s
$43,950 losses; 9 times that of France’s $70,599; and 8 times that of U.S.A.’s $78,186
losses.

Figure 4- 6 Affected people in the NDDI model in 1985-2014
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Figure 4- 7 Economic damage (US Dollars) in the NDDI model in 1985-2014
In Europe, the Netherlands has the highest density of occurrence, death toll, and
affected people. The U.K. has the highest density of economic losses. On the contrary,
France has the lowest number of natural disasters and the lowest economic losses in
the NDDI model in comparison to the Netherlands and U.K. France has less flooding
damage, one destructive flood in Paris in 1910. However, according to OECD (2014)
estimation, a Seine flood in the Ile-de-France region could affect 5 million people.
The economic impact from such a catastrophe has been estimated up to $33 billion in
damage, together with a significant reduction of 0.1 to 3% of total GDP (OECD
2014).
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In summary, in the NDDI model, China has the highest amount of affected
people; Japan has the highest economic losses; Taiwan has the most frequent natural
disasters and highest death toll. In Europe, the Netherlands has the most frequent
natural disasters, highest death toll, and largest number of affected people, but the
highest density of economic losses is in the U.K., presented in Table 4-6.
Table 4- 6 An international comparison by the natural disaster density indicator
(NDDI)
Natural
disaster
density

Taiwan

Japan

China

U.S.A.

U.K.

France Netherlands

inicator
1985-2014
Occurrence
per km²

0.002

0.00043 0.00007 0.000074 0.000306 0.0002

0.0009

Death toll
per km²

0.1

0.07

0.01

0.001

0.006

0.039

0.06

People
affected
per km²

104

10

362

3

3

7

8

78,186

135,292

70,599

134,362

Economic
damage ($) 565,230 1,158,571 43,950
per km²

Note: Land area of a country is based on the World Bank: Taiwan (36,193 km²), Japan (364,500 km²),
China (9,327,489 km²), U.S.A. (9,147,420 km²), U.K. (241,930 km²), France (547,561 km²),
Netherlands (33,720 km²)
Source: EM-DAT; the World Bank.
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4.2.2

Taiwan’s rebuilding experience

Taiwan’s recent natural disasters included the Jiji earthquake of 1999, Typhoon
Nari of 2001, and Typhoon Morakot of 2009. The Jiji earthquake, 7.3 on the Richter
scale, devastated central Taiwan, caused approximately 2,500 deaths and $10 billion
in damage. Typhoon Nari of 2001 flooded the Taipei City subways, and service was
suspended for months. Typhoon Morakot of 2009 swept away villages in southern
Taiwan, caused 681 deaths (most were Taiwanese aboriginal people in the mountains)
and $3.3 billion in damage. Different rebuilding policies and strategies were adopted
in Taiwan after each of these catastrophes.
The Jiji earthquake of 1999 and Typhoon Morakot of 2009 demonstrated the
difference between the policy of rebuilding to normalcy and adaptive resilience. After
the Jiji earthquake of 1999, the Taiwan central government chose to rebuild quickly to
normalcy. In the rebuilding process, the Taiwanese government responded quickly
and emergency rescue operations worked well in providing medical care, temporary
shelter, and relief after the earthquake. Governments quickly rebuilt schools and
hospitals back in the same or adjacent location. They were rebuilt using better
earthquake-resistant designs by strengthening their structures. In general, this is an
example of using the engineering resilience strategy. Taiwan central government
considered little of retreating from the existing fault risk areas. For example, 293
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public schools collapsed in central Taiwan, 70% of them located in Taichung City.
They were rebuilt within 4 years, replaced by stronger structures, but still located in
the same earthquake-prone areas. Moreover, people also preferred to rebuild their
homes in the same location because of the community network, their job location, and
their lifestyle. Another example was a 12-story residential building, known as
Tungsing, which collapsed in Taipei City, and caused 87 deaths. Eventually, it was
completely rebuilt on the same site in 2009. During the 10th anniversary of the Jiji
earthquake, people celebrated Tungsing’s rebuilding and viewed the new building as
an earthquake-resistant structure. However, rebuilding in the same risk-prone location
without retreat and adaptive resilience strategies from the risk should be considered as
far less resilient in the long-term.
Typhoon Morakot of 2009 devastated southern Taiwan, mainly Kaohsiung City.
This was the deadliest typhoon in Taiwan’s disaster history. The record-breaking
heavy rain, 93 inches (2,361 mm) within 48 hours, caused mudslides that destroyed
many towns. A mountain village, Xiaolin, was buried and suffered more than 500
deaths. Many villages were swept away or flooded severely. After this disaster,
Taiwan’s central government began to rethink rebuilding in a safer location, moving
toward resilience after the repeated damage caused by natural disasters. The rural
areas adopted a policy of relocation. After a comprehensive survey of environmental
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vulnerability, Taiwan’s central government decided to relocate communities from
rural areas to safer places for rebuilding. The government adopted an eminent domain
policy for the pre-disaster private properties and lands that were devastated by this
disaster. Private properties were compensated according to market prices of those
properties. The pre-disaster private properties and lands were left for open spaces.
Families whose homes were damaged by Typhoon Morakot to the extent that the
structures had become uninhabitable were eligible to take part in the comprehensive
resettlement plan. There were 2,493 people who applied for resettlement. However,
building new communities and the creation of new jobs and lifestyles was difficult.
The public sector invested in infrastructure while the private sector and NGOs
invested in these communities to provide job opportunities, particularly in organic
agriculture, in an innovative handcraft industry, and aboriginal culture products. The
rebuilding process ensured that retreating from the landslide-prone areas would
provide a safer place for people to live. Rebuilding accompanied by new job
opportunities would secure a new life for the affected aboriginal people in Taiwan.

4.2.3

Organization, coordination, and policy in rebuilding and resilience

There are some drawbacks in Taiwan’s recent rebuilding experiences. First, there
was no organization or mechanism of disaster risk reduction before the devastating Jiji
earthquake in 1999. In 2000, the Taiwan Congress passed the first fundamental law
120

regulating disaster management, the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (DPPA).
The DPPA regulates disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery in an
all-hazard approach. A three-level government hierarchical management system was
established: central, municipal (county and city), and township. Because of the
centralized disaster management system, local governments in general have been
passive in disaster prevention and preparedness. In Taiwan’s central government, the
Executive Headquarter,3 the highest-ranking executive government, has more
authority, resources, and responsibility for disaster response and recovery. The
Executive Headquarter’s Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Council
(hereinafter referred to as “Council”) was established in 2000 to define the basic
guidelines, to authorize plans and policies of the central regulating authorities, to
supervise and evaluate the performance of disaster prevention and protection of the
central administration, municipalities, and county governments. The Taiwanese
Premier chairs the Council. The Vice Premier is vice chairperson. There are 32
members, including the Cabinet’s 25 ministers and 7 academic professors in civil
engineering and meteorology. However, there are no city or regional planning experts.
Another task force was established in 2010, the Executive Headquarter’s Central
Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission (hereinafter referred to as

3

In Taiwan, the official entity of this highest-ranking executive government is the Executive Yuan
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“Commission”) to implement the Council’s decisions. The Vice Premier chairs the
Commission. The Minister of Interior is the deputy Commissioner and Chief
Executive Officer. There are 20 deputy ministers as members. However, the Executive
Headquarter’ s Council and Commission task force is to provide guidelines, policies,
and delegated authority for disasters. The Executive Headquarter’s permanent office,
the Office of Disaster Management, was established in 2012. The purpose of this
office is to implement policies and decisions from the Council and Commission. This
office is also the highest executive division. The office also plays a role in
coordinating the different authorities. However, this office is still newly established.
The function, mission, and effectiveness remain uncertain. Additionally, coordination
has to be improved between the different levels of government.
At present, Taiwan’s National Fire Agency (NFA), under the Ministry of the
Interior, is the agency for disaster rescue and response. Taiwan’s NFA plays a role
similar to that of the U.S.A.’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, the NFA focuses more on the disaster rescue, in particular in fire disasters,
rather than disaster prevention and preparedness. The NFA is in the third level of
Taiwan’s central executive government, and is lacking authority for coordination with
other higher level ministries. Therefore, when a severe natural disaster occurs, the
Executive Headquarter often establishes a single post-disaster commission to respond.
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For example, the Typhoon Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Commission was
established to respond, recover, and reconstruct after Typhoon Morakot in 2009.
However, the post-disaster commission needs to have an established relationship with
the Executive Headquarter’s ministries, which are central authorities in floods,
earthquakes, and other hazards, in order to cooperate, communicate, and coordinate
for disaster respond, protection, and prevention.
Further, little integration of natural disaster management and spatial planning
exists. Natural disaster prevention is not closely connected with spatial planning. The
Executive Headquarter’s National Development Council (previously known as
Council of Economic Planning and Development until 2014) is responsible for
national spatial guidelines, policies, and planning. Natural disaster risk reduction and
prevention can not be achieved without integration with national spatial planning. At
present, the National Development Council is responsible for national spatial policy.
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for drafting the National Spatial
Development Act. In the future, the national disaster preventive planning task force
can be co-chaired by two ministers of the Interior and National Development Council
to coordinate disaster management and spatial planning in Taiwan. Additionally,
natural disaster focuses on technological- and engineering-oriented issues. For
instance, the Executive Headquarter’s National Science Council is responsible for the
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Professional Advisory Committee of Disaster Reduction. The National Science and
Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (NCDR), a quasi-government organization,
was created to implement technology-related research in 2003 under the supervision
of the National Science Council.
Today in Taiwan, disaster resilience is part of the country’s major policy plans.
For example, one goal of the Four-Year (2013-2016) National Development Plan
concentrates on green energy and carbon reduction, ecology, and disaster prevention
and response. Moreover, in the Strategic Plan for National Spatial Development, one
of the objectives is managing environmental hazard risk. This plan announced that the
government must place emphasis on responding to global environmental changes, and
promoting a safer environment; carrying out comprehensive governance of river
basins, building green infrastructure, and enhancing disaster-prevention capabilities in
urban and rural areas. Furthermore, in 2012, Taiwan began to implement the
Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change. The main strategies for disasters include:
surveying, evaluating, and identifying the high disaster risk areas; enhancing the
integration of environmental monitoring and disaster warning systems; reviewing and
evaluating the vulnerabilities and prevention capacities of current critical public
construction facilities; carrying out comprehensive river basin management;
strengthening capacities for responding to the impact of extreme climatic events.
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However, these top-level plans do not play a proactive role in directing development
towards disaster resilience because budgets, plans, and projects are implemented in a
bottom-up way among different central and local agencies. In the future, these
top-level plans related to disaster resilience should become spatial development
guidelines to direct plans and projects in the central and local governments. Also,
management for natural disaster prevention and response needs to be restructured and
integrated with national spatial planning. Meanwhile, national spatial planning
strategies should be based on assessment and vulnerability analysis of natural
disasters.
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4.3

Vulnerability in Taiwan’s five major cities

Taiwan has five major cities, Taipei City (population of approximately 2.7
million), New Taipei City (population of approximately 3.95 million, previously
known as Taipei County), Kaohsiung City (population of approximately 2.77 million,
merged with Kaohsiung County in 2010), Taichung City (population of approximately
2.7 million, merged with Taichung County in 2010), and Tainan City (population of
approximately 1.8 million, merged with Tainan County in 2010). These five major
cities account for 61% of the total population of Taiwan (see Figure 4-8 and Figure
4-9). Most people live in these five major cities in the western part of Taiwan.
Taiwan’s overall urban areas account for only 13.16% of the country’s total land areas
in 2013, but 80.37% of the total population of 23.37 million live in urban areas
(National Development Council 2014). This has resulted in major cities having very
high population density. For example, Taipei City, a 100% urbanized area, had a
density of 9,884 persons per square kilometer in 2013. The increasing and
highly-concentrated population in urban areas particularly require the reduction of
risk and vulnerability and improving the prospect of resilience.
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Figure 4- 8 Population in Taiwan’s five major cities

Figure 4- 9 Taiwan’s five major cities as percentage of total population
Each major city of Taiwan faces environmental vulnerability at different levels
of risk. According to The United Nations report, World Urbanization Prospects: The
2011 Revision (2012), Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Taichung were on the list of the top 10
urban areas with a population of 750,000 or more inhabitants exposed to three or
more natural hazards (see Table 4-7). Taipei is at high risk of cyclones, floods,
landslides, and earthquakes. Kaohsiung is at high risk of cyclones, earthquakes, and
landslides, but relatively less for floods. Taichung is at high risk of cyclones,
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earthquakes, floods, but relatively less for landslides. In the past two decades, no
major city of Taiwan has been immune to natural disasters. Taiwan’s major cities have
been experiencing severe natural disasters. Notable cases include: Typhoon Herb of
1996 roared across Taipei City and New Taipei City; the Jiji earthquake of 1999
devastated Taichung City; Typhoon Nari of 2001 flooded Taipei City; Typhoon
Morakot of 2009 swept away villages in Kaohsiung City.
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Table 4- 7 Three cities of Taiwan on the list of the UN’s top 10 most exposed cities
Risk decile
Ranking

City

1

Manila,
Philippines

2

3

Cyclones Droughts Earthquakes Floods Landslides Volcanoes

8-10th

1st-4th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

8-10th

No hazard

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

Santiago,
No hazard
Chile

Taipei

Quito,
4

Ecuador

5

Davao,
Philippines

8-10th

1st-4th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

6

Kaohsiung 8-10th

No
hazard

8-10th

5-7th

8-10th

No hazard

7

Taichung

No hazard

8-10th

8-10th

5-7th

No hazard

8

Guwahati
(Gauhati), No hazard
India

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

9

Managua,
Nicaragua

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

10

Valparaíso,
No hazard
Chile

8-10th

8-10th

8-10th

No hazard

No hazard

8-10th

1st-4th

Note: a city with 750,000 or more inhabitants in 2011 to three or more natural hazards (8-10th deciles
of natural disasters)
Source: The United Nations (2012)
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After these natural disasters, different cities developed different resilient policies
and practices. Taipei focused on overall river improvement, flooding diversion, public
sewer systems, and green infrastructure to reduce its flooding risk. Taichung
strengthened buildings and structure design to reduce damage from earthquakes.
Tainan and Kaohsiung adopted retreat from landslide risk areas and improved
flooding diversion and sewer systems to reduce flooding risk, presented in Table 4-8.
After disasters, local governments spent a huge amount of their budgets for natural
disaster assistance in these five major cities. In terms of natural disaster assistance
budget, the bigger the city is, the larger the natural disaster assistance budget needs to
be, especially in the Taipei Twin Cities (see Figure 4-10). For example, Taipei City’s
$17 million of natural disaster assistance in 2001 was needed due to floods caused by
Typhoon Nari. New Taipei City’s $12 million of natural disaster assistance in 2004
was due to Typhoon Aere’s destruction of river levees and the flooding in New Taipei
City. In summary, the major cities of Taiwan are still vulnerable to natural disasters
and need to promote urban resilience to reduce their risks, particularly in Taipei City,
the capital city as well as the economic, political, and cultural center of Taiwan.
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Table 4- 8 Severe natural disasters devastating Taiwan’s five major cities
New

Taipei City

Population
(million)

2.7

3.95

2.7

1.8

2.77

Percentage
of total
population

12%

17%

12%

8%

12%

Natural
disaster

Typhoon Nari

Typhoon
Herb

Jiji
Earthquake

Typhoon
Morakot

Typhoon
Morakot

Year

2001

1996

1999

2009

2009

Taipei City

Overall river
improvement;

River
Post-disaster flooding
management;
resilience diversion;
green
strategy public
infrastructure
sewage; green
infrastructure

Taichung City Tainan City

Kaohsiung

City

City

Schools and
buildings
improvement; Retreat from Retreat from
strengthening risk and
buildings;
housing
earthquake-re relocation
sistant
buildings

risk and
housing
relocation

Figure 4- 10 Natural disaster assistance of local government expenditure in Taiwan’s
five major cities
Source: Taiwan’s Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics
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CHAPTER 5: A CHRONOLOGY OF POLICIES TO PREVENT FLOODING
IN TAIPEI

Taipei City is the capital as well as the economic, political, and cultural center of
Taiwan. Floods caused extensive damage during the 1960s while Taipei was
experiencing fast urbanization. This chapter first reviews the history of Taipei City’s
development in order to help understand the relationship between urbanization and
flooding. The topographic characteristics of the Taipei Basin and the increasingly
extreme weather events, such as more rainfall occurring over shorter periods and
increasingly more intense precipitation, have resulted in more floods. Moreover,
urbanization has led to increased flooding since the 1960s. For instance, Taipei’s
irrigation systems were converted into roads during the 1970s, which increased runoff
and led to more floods. Additionally, highway and expressway construction through
Taipei in the 1970s and 1980s removed some of the branches of the Keelung River.
This resulted in less flood retention space and more stormwater runoff, which also
caused more floods. Further, the lower reaches of the Keelung River were reshaped
and replaced by a man-made river which was intended to reduce floods. Instead, the
history of flooding in Taipei from 1991-2012 indicates that this area, known as Shezi
Island of Taipei’s Shilin District, was the most flood-prone area. After the reshaping
of the river, more development along the man-made river resulted in an even higher
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potential for flood damages.
This chapter also analyzes a chronology of steps implemented to prevent floods
in Taipei. After the 1960s, Taiwan’s central government and Taipei city government
implemented flood control projects, including floodways, levees, flood diversion
systems, flood control gates and pump stations, and storm sewer systems. In the early
1970s, Taiwan’s central government planned a new town, the Linkow New Town, to
move people from Taipei’s area of high risk for flooding. The idea of Ebenezer
Howard’s “Garden City” was realized in Taipei not only to accommodate population
growth, but also to prevent flooding damage. However, the engineering strategy of
using flood control facilities such as levees, dikes, flood control gates, and pumping
stations created a “flood control paradox” (Wiering and Immink 2005). Strengthening
levees encouraged more intensive land use and development which resulted in higher
damage when floods did occur. Numerous levees and dikes, flood pumping stations,
and gates have been built since the 1970s. High density development occurred along
the flood-prone areas of Taipei’s major rivers after the completion of major flood
control facilities in the 1990s. Flash floods, along with the failure of pumping stations
along the Keelung River, caused by Typhoon Nari in 2001 flooded downtown Taipei.
This study also finds that coordination problems between different governmental
agencies hampered the effectiveness of flood prevention policies. For instance, a river
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and its watershed management in Taipei is divided into at least three sections, and
each section has three different central government agencies primarily in charge of
river management, soil and forest conservation of watershed, and flood prevention
policy. This has resulted in inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
Starting in the 1970s, the construction of engineering structures has been the
primary strategy for flood prevention, rather than land-use planning. Urban planning
played less of a role in flood risk reduction than in the past. However, historic floods
indicate that the existing hydraulic facilities were unable to provide adequate flood
protection. Hence, a new method combining non-structural measures, land-use and
environmental planning, along with retreat planning in order to reduce risk should be
gradually adopted in Taipei. Land-use and environmental planning should play a
proactive role in reducing Taipei’s flood risk and damage.
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5.1

Brief history of Taipei City development

There are three major development periods in Taipei City (See Table 5-1):
China’s Qing Dynasty (1683-1895), the Japanese Colonial Period (1895-1945), and
the Taiwan Retrocession (ongoing since 1945). During the period of China’s Qing
Dynasty, the first governor of Taiwan1 developed Taipei as a political, military and
commercial center by building railways connecting Taipei with other cities of Taiwan.
In order to protect the city from invasion, walls and gates were constructed in 1884.
Taipei city development was mainly concentrated on the area within these walls. The
population was under 50,000 in 1895, and Taipei was still a small, underdeveloped
city (see Figure 5- 1).

Figure 5- 1 Taipei city development within walls in 1900 (left) and an underdeveloped
city in 1901 (right)
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica
1

Taiwan was under China’s Qing Dynasty rule from 1683 to 1895, officially established as China’s

province in 1887. Ming-Chuan Liu was the first governor of Taiwan.
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Table 5- 1 Taipei city’s major historical phases and their legacies
Major historic phases

Legacy
 A growth boundary within walls to protect

invasion
 Taipei railroad station development

China’s Qing Dynasty
(1683-1895)

 Settlements in the west side along the Tamsui

River
 Taipei was still a small, underdeveloped city;

the total population was under 50,000 as of
1895
 The walls of Taipei was torn down in order to

expand city development
 Taipei’s first city planning plan in 1905; a

revised city planning plan of 1932
The Japanese Colonial Period
(1895-1945)

 “City Beautiful Movement” in Taipei, planning

for boulevards, parks, and sanitary systems
 Taipei became the dominant political,

economic, cultural center of Taiwan
 The population increased to 335,397 in 1945
 The first city plan developed by the KMT was

in 1951 to accommodate 300,000 veterans and
expand to the east, north, and south side
 Taipei attracted enormous rural migrants from

southern Taiwan in the 1970s because of
economic bloom
The Taiwan Retrocession
(ongoing since 1945)

 Taipei polycentric development pattern since

the 1980s
 Population of Taipei grew from 1 million in

1966 to 2.72 million in 1990
 Taipei mass rapid transit system began

operation in 1996. The daily ridership
increased from 82,678 in 1996 to 2 million in
2014
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During the Japanese colonial period,2 Taipei became the dominant political,
economic, and cultural center of Taiwan (Huang 2008). The Japanese government
established the Governor-General Office of Taiwan in Taipei in 1895. The goal of the
Japanese government was to develop Taipei into a modern city in order to
demonstrate the strength of the Japanese. At the time, the Japanese were influenced by
the western planning theory of the “City Beautiful Movement” in the early years of
the twentieth century. Large urban parks, wide boulevards, a newly developed grid
road system, and administrative buildings were planned and built in Taipei (Huang
2008). Plans for urban development began to be issued in 1899. In 1905, Taipei’s first
city plan was implemented to expand its boundary in order to accommodate the goal
of 150,000 people living within 1,800 hectares (see Figure 5- 2).

Figure 5- 2 Taipei’s first city plan in 1905 (left) and a revised plan in 1910 (right)
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica

2

Japanese occupied Taiwan from 1895 to 1945.
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The construction of roads, parks, and sanitary systems was the primary focus of
Taipei’s first city plan of 1905. The walls of Taipei built during China’s Qing Dynasty
were torn down in 1905 and replaced by roads to expand development. Taipei city
expansion went beyond the wall boundary to develop a new functional area of
markets, schools, and shrines in today’s Xi-Men-Ting (Japanese West Gate District)
and a new residential area outside the south gate. This transition also merged the three
settlements of Man-Ka, Da-Dao-Cheng, and the Taipei walled-city into one modern
city (Tzeng 2009, see Figure 5- 3). In addition, the building of the Governor-General
Office of Taiwan3 was built during 1912-1919. Most of Taiwan’s high-ranking central
government agencies were developed around this core area of Taipei, known as Bo-Ai
special district. The population was 164,329 at the end of 1920. The population
increased quickly in the 1930s. In the revised city plan of 1932 (see Figure 5- 4), the
goal was to accommodate 600,000 people within 6,676 hectares. In 1945, the last year
of the Japanese colonial period, the population increased to 335,397. During the five
decades of the Japanese colonial period, the population grew approximately
seven-fold. The city expanded to the east, north, and south to the borders of two major
rivers, the Keelung River and Xindian River (see Figure 5- 5).

3

This building is now the Taiwan’s White House, the Presidential Hall.
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Figure 5- 3 Taipei’s expansion beyond walls boundary in 1895 (left) and in 1920
(right)
Source: Tzeng (2009)

Figure 5- 4 Taipei’s city plan in 1936 (left) and in 1939 (right), urban expansion began
to the east, north, and south to the borders of major rivers
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica
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Figure 5- 5 Taipei city development in 1945, the last year of the Japanese Colonial
Period
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica

The Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945 terminated the Japanese occupation
of Taiwan, which was handed over to the Kuo-Min-Tang (KMT), the Nationalist Party
led by General Chiang, and the ruling party of the Republic of China. Approximately
300,000 Japanese departed from Taiwan, one-third of them from Taipei, (Huang 2008).
Taipei was designated a provincial city after Taiwan’s retrocession in 1945. However,
after the KMT lost control of Mainland China to the Communist Party in the Chinese
Civil War in 1949,4 approximately two million political refugees relocated to Taiwan,
with 300,000 of them settling in Taipei (Huang 2008). Taipei was declared the

4

The Chinese Civil War fought between forces loyal to the KMT’s (‘Kuo-Min-Tang’, Nationalist

Party in Chinese) Republic of China and forces loyal to the Communist Party of China from 1927 to
1949.
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provisional capital of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) in 1949 and became the political
and economic center of Taiwan in the 1950s. The first city plan developed by the
KMT was in 1951 (see Figure 5- 6), based on the Japanese planning for parks,
boulevards, and expansion to the east, north, and south side of Taipei to accommodate
veterans following General Chiang.

Figure 5- 6 Taipei’s city plan in 1951, the first plan in the Taiwan Retrocession Period
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica

In the 1960s, the KMT gave up the idea of returning to Mainland China, and the
central government changed its national policies and adopted economic
development-oriented strategies in Taiwan. In 1973, Taiwan’s Premier Ching-Kuo
Chiang, a son of General Chiang, announced “Ten Projects for National Construction”,
aiming to complete major infrastructure to pave the way for Taiwan’s industrialization
(Huang 2008). As part of Taiwan’s industrialization and economic miracle from the
1960s to the 1980s, most companies and headquarters were located in Taipei, which
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became a gateway to the international market and was described as an interface city in
the global economy (Huang 2008; Chou 2005; Hsu 2005). Because of the economic
boom, Taipei also attracted an enormous number of rural migrants from southern
Taiwan in the 1970s. Consequently, the population of Taipei grew from 1 million5 in
1966 to 2 million in 1974, and reached its peak of 2.72 million in 1990. In addition,
planning for Taiwan’ first mass rapid transit system, known as Taipei MRT or Taipei
Metro, began in 1975 to solve the traffic congestion accompanying the economic
growth of the 1970s. The initial network design was approved in 1986 and
construction began in1988. The first line, 10.5-kilometers with 12 stations, began
operation in 1996. In less than 20 years, the total length increased twelve times, from
10 kilometers with 12 stations to 121 kilometers with 109 stations, and the daily
ridership increased from 82,678 in 1996 to 2 million in 2014 (see Figure 5- 7). During
this period, the transit-oriented development of Taipei MRT helped make Taipei a
modern and convenient city.

5

Because the population of Taipei city broke through 1 million in 1966, Taiwan central government

elevated Taipei’s status to special municipality in 1967, and made Jingmei, Muzha, Nangang, Neihu,
Shilin, and Beitou townships subordinate to Taipei in 1968 (Taipei City Government 2014).
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Figure 5- 7 Taipei mass-rapid transit system in 1986 (left) and in 2013 (right)
Source: Taipei City Government

143

5.2

Urbanization as a result of potential floods in Taipei Basin

The Taipei Basin (see Figure 5-8) belongs to the two administrative entities of
Taipei and New Taipei City (previously known as Taipei County). Geologists believe
that the Taipei Basin was once a large lake in ancient times and eventually formed a
basin after long years of sedimentation. Development of the Taipei Twin Cities has
been inseparable, especially now with the extension and development of traffic
networks (Taipei City Government 2014). Taipei City, currently with a population of
2.7 million and 100% of them living in urban areas, is the capital city as well as the
cultural, economic, and political center of Taiwan. New Taipei City, with a population
of 3.95 million and 94% of them living in urban areas, is the most populous and
fastest-growing city in Taiwan (see Table 5-2 and Figure 5-9).
Taipei Twin Cities grew fast. The population of the Twin Cities was only 2.3
million in 1965. However, the total population tripled during the past four decades.
Taipei Twin Cities, with 6.7 million people and continuing to grow, now accounts for
30% of the total population in Taiwan. The GDP of the Taipei Twin Cities accounts
for more than half of Taiwan’s GDP of $489 billion in 2013.6 The GDP per capita in
Taipei City is approximately $48,400, more than double that of Taiwan’s GDP per
capita $20,952. Taipei Twin Cities are also the economic core of Taiwan. However,
6

The GDP in Taipei metropolitan area is approximately $300 billion in 2012.
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this fast development may cause environmental vulnerability. Case studies around the
world have found that as a city becomes more urbanized, the city also becomes more
prone to flooding due to reduced wetlands and infiltration, and increased impermeable
areas and surface runoff (Brody et al. 2007; Swan 2010; Howe and White 2010; De
Roo et al. 2001; Weng 2001).

Figure 5- 8 Topography of Taipei Basin: Taipei (left) and New Taipei City (right)
Source: Taipei City Emergency Operations Center; Taiwan Water Resources Agency
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Table 5- 2 Population and urban development in Taipei Twin Cities

Population
Taipei
Population Land area
Housing
density
Twin Cities (million) (km²)
units
(persons/km²)

Urban
planned
area as %
of total
area

Taipei City 2.68

271

9,884

935,535

100

New Taipei
3.91
City

2,052

1,927

1,546,874 60

Population
in urban
planned
area as %
of total
population
100

94

Note:
1 Taipei City’s population of 2,686,516; New Taipei City’s population of 3,954,929 as of the end of
2013.
2. Most housing units are condominiums in the Taipei Twin Cities
Source: Taiwan National Development Council’s 2014 Urban and Regional Development Statistics;
the Ministry of the Interior’s 2014 Housing Stock Statistics.

Figure 5- 9 Population growth in Taipei Twin Cities from 1975 to 2014
Source: Taiwan National Development Council’s 2014 Urban and Regional Development Statistics
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5.2.1

The disappearance of irrigation water tunnels and rivers

Since Taipei’s rapid urbanization and development, most of the farm lands have
been converted into residential and commercial zones. Consequently, the
impermeable land areas increased. As Swan (2010) indicates, increasing a catchment’s
impermeable surface area will generally lead to higher levels of runoff and a
subsequent increase in peak storm flows. In Taipei, the irrigation systems, with the
combined functions of irrigation and flood control, were converted into roads after the
1970s (see Figure 5-10). The resulting increased runoff also led to increased flooding.
This situation also happened in other Asian countries. For instance, as Engkagul (1993)
indicates, the disappearance of the irrigation system in the Chao Phraya Plain of
Thailand caused severe floods because of the decrease in water storage areas.
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Figure 5-10 The disappearance of Taipei’s irrigation systems, clockwise from top left:
the original irrigation systems (in red); the vanished irrigation systems in 1962, and in
1982
Source: Kuo Hsi-Liu Foundation; Taipei Liugong Irrigation Association
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In addition to the farms and irrigation systems being converted into development
lands and roads, the displacement of rivers with a man-made river and highways in
Taipei increased floods. The highway construction, Sun Yat-Sen Highway, through
Taipei in the 1970s removed some of the branches of the Keelung River (see Figure
5-11). This development resulted in less flood retention space and more stormwater
runoff which caused more floods. Further, because of the frequent flooding along the
curving downstream of the Keelung River, the lower reaches of the river were
reshaped and replaced by a man-made river, with the length of 1,828 meters, width of
150 meters, and depth of 5 meters. The reshaping of the river also resulted in more
intensive and impermeable land developments in floodplains along the man-made
river, which led to even more potential for flood damage. The reshaping of the river
was intended to reduce floods. However, the history of flooding in Taipei from
1991-2012 indicates that this area, also known as Shezi Island of Taipei’s Shilin
district, was a most flood-prone area (see Figure 5-12).
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Figure 5- 11 From a river to a man-made water tunnel and highway, clockwise from
top left: the Keelung River in 1956; a man-made river in 1965; the vanished river,
existing highway, and intensive urban development in floodplains after reshaping and
removing parts of the river in the 1990s (aerial photograph was taken in 2013)
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica
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Figure 5- 12 Taipei city expansion adjacent to rivers and floodplains, clockwise from
top left: aerial photographs of urban development in 1985, and 2003 (in red areas);
locations of floods (in blue areas) from 1991 to 2012
Source: GIS Center, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences (RCHSS), Academia Sinica;
Taipei City Government

5.2.2

Extreme weather and rainfall threaten Taipei more frequently

Taipei’s topographic characteristics also make it more vulnerable. Taipei is
situated at the center of the Taipei Basin in Northern Taiwan. Geologists believe that
the Taipei Basin was once a large lake in ancient times and eventually formed a basin
after long years of sedimentation (Taipei City Government 2014). Nowadays, there
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are four main rivers in the Taipei Basin: Tamsui River, Keelung River, Dahan River,
and Xindian River. Tamsui River is formed by the confluence of the Keelung River
from the northeastern side, the Xindian River from the southeastern side, and the
Dahan River from the south. The topographic characteristics of the floodplain and the
growing frequency of extreme weather events, such as more rainfall occurring over
shorter periods and increasing precipitation intensity, have resulted in Taipei
becoming increasingly threatened by typhoons and floods (Chang et al. 2013). The
extreme rainfall associated with tropical cyclones is expected to increase by up to a
third, reaching 2 to 3.15 inches (or 50 to 80 millimeters) per hour, indicating a higher
level of flood risk in South East Asia (The World Bank 2013).
During a thirty-five year period 1971-2006, eleven severe typhoons caused
flooding problems in Taipei, presented in Table 5-3. These floods mainly resulted
from the overflowing of the Keelung River and the failure of the drainage system. The
highest flooding reached 8.5 meters caused by Typhoon Nari in 2001. The amount of
the 24-hour duration rainfall and damage have increased during the past three decades.
Hence, Taipei has experienced fast-growing urbanization as well as increased
vulnerability to flooding. If the current trends of global climate change are to continue
unchecked, Taipei could be completely flooded by the end of the 21st century. Wang
(2009, 2013) predicts that more than 50% of the Taipei area will be flooded and
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suggested the relocation of the capital city and evacuation of at least one-third of the
population to safer places (Wang 2009; 2013).
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Table 5- 3 Severe flood events caused by typhoons in Taipei
Flood
events
caused by
typhoons

Rainfall
(millimete
rs within
24 hours)

Flooded
area
(hectare)

Highest
flood
depth (m)

1971 Bess

150-200

6,500

3.4

1972 Betty 200-300

7,053

3

1977 Vera

150-200

1,998

1.6

1978 Ora

200-300

2,602

2.2

Spatial distributions and
characteristics

Flooded areas were mainly in
downstream areas where the
Tamsui and Keelung Rivers
converge and with low flood
protection. The flood occurred in
area of low development. These
events caused damage and loss to
agriculture and affecting flood
prices. The flood type is river
overflow and inundation by the
sea.
Location of flooded areas changed
from low flood protection area to
mid-stream. The flooded areas
with medium development. The
total flooded areas declined, but
the urban areas flooded increased.
The flood was caused by river
overflow and drainage failure.

1987 Lynn 500-700

3,332

7.5

1996 Herb

200-300

1,000

1.2

These flooding events were
located in the high density areas of

1997
Winnie

150-200

-

1.1

1998 Zeb

400-500

291

7.5

1998 Babs

200-300

286

3.8

2000
Xangsane

Taipei. The damage and losses
were huge and affected all major
urban activities such as
transportation and commerce.
These floods were due to drainage
failure and river overflow.

400-500

441

7.5

2001 Nari

500-600

6,640

8.5

Source: Chang et al. 2013; Typhoons Affecting Taiwan 2010
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5.3

A Chronology of policies implemented to protect Taipei from flooding

This section surveys current practices, developing a chronology of various steps
implemented by national and local governments to protect Taipei from flooding.
Flooding is a major threat to Taipei because Taipei is developed in a basin, a river
mouth, and low-lying topography in a coastal zone. Flood inundation along riversides
caused by the heavy precipitation that is associated with rainstorms and typhoons
frequently occurs in lowlands and floodplains (Shih et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2006;
Hsieh et al. 2006 ; Pan et al. 2012). Typhoons often flood Taipei. According to Taiwan
Central Weather Bureau, 75% of heavy rainfall events, caused by typhoons from 1975
to 2014, resulted in drainage failure and river overflowing. In order to reduce flood
risk, some projects have been done by the Taiwan central government. However,
some coordination problems remain among various agencies. For instance, Taiwan’s
Soil and Water Conservation Bureau, the Water Resource Agency, and the
Construction and Planning Agency manage different sections of each river and its
watershed. Coordination problems for flood prevention and control exist among these
central governmental agencies and local governments (see Table 5-4). Over the past
four decades, a lack of resilience policy in flooding prevention has remained. The
engineering strategy for flood prevention prevailed over the retreat and land-use
planning strategy for reducing the risk of flooding (see Figure 5-13 and 5-14).
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Table 5- 4 Various polices implemented by national and local governments to protect
from flooding
Central and Ministry of
local
Economic
governments Affairs

Ministry of
the Interior

Agency or
Department

Construction Soil and
Department of Urban and
and Planning Water
Urban
Rural
Agency
Conservation Development Development
Bureau
Department

Water
Resource
Agency

Central and Central
local
governments
Flood
prevention

Central

Taipei City New Taipei
Government City
Government

Local

Local

Taipei flood Taipei storm Taipei
Ecological
Creating a
control and sewer
watershed
environmental green city;
river
construction management planning;
city of rivers;
management

Project

Central

Council of
Agriculture

and erosion
control of
sleep land in
the upstream

Riverside
Storm sewer Upstream
levees;
watershed
strengthening
conservation
of rivers;
flood
diversion
system
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waterfront
planning;
conservation
of floodplain

expanding
riverside
parks and
green spaces

Riverside
Riverside
park and open park and open
space
space
planning
planning

Figure 5- 13 A chronology of policies implemented to protect Taipei from flooding

Figure 5- 14 From fortification to retreat, the lack of land-use planning remains
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5.3.1

The risk awareness of floods in the 1960s

Taipei has experienced the fastest urbanization and development since the 1960s.
However, the devastating floods caused by typhoons has occurred during the same
period. In 1962, more than 41 square miles (10,712 hectares) in Taipei were flooded
by a typhoon event. In 1963, more than 56 square miles (14,588 hectares) in Taipei
were flooded by Typhoon Gloria (see Figure 5- 15). These devastating floods resulted
in raised awareness of flood risk, and made the Taiwanese central government aware
of Taipei’s flood risk. In order to balance the fast urbanization with prevention from
flood damage, two strategies were adopted: moving people from floods to Linkou
New Town and building a man-made floodway to divert floods. The latter was more
emphasized initially. Building a floodway was adopted for flood risk reduction. Dikes,
flood prevention gates, pumping stations, and storm sewer systems are the major
elements for reducing the flood risk in Taipei. However, these structural measures and
hard infrastructure have their limitations when floods exceed the design standards.
The rapid urbanization without sufficient floodplain management resulted in highly
developed and densely populated zones along riverbanks. The existing hydraulic
facilities were thus unable to provide adequate flood protection (Shih et al. 2014).
Land-use planning and retreat from risk needed to be gradually adopted (Huang 1989;
Chang et al. 2013; Wang 2003).
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Figure 5- 15 Taipei flooded areas (orange) caused by typhoons, clockwise from top
left: Typhoon Amy in 1962 (approximately 41 square miles); Typhoon Gloria in 1963
(approximately 56 square miles); and Typhoon Bess in 1971 (approximately 26 square
miles)
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau; Taiwan Water Resources Agency
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5.3.2

The retreat planning in the early 1970s

The retreat policy was adopted in the early 1970s in Taipei, most notably in the
development of Linkou New Town. This was designed to move people from Taipei’s
areas of flooding. The Linkou New Town plan was initiated in the late 1960s by the
Urban and Housing Development Committee (UHDC)7 and the United Nations’
Advisor Group8 working together in Taipei to implement the idea of Ebenezer
Howard’s “Garden City”. The policy of the Linkou New Town plan was to relocate
population to outer Taipei to prevent flood damage and to accommodate its population
growth. This major national project, with its planned goal of relocating 200,000
people within 72 square miles (18,750 hectares), was implemented in the 1970s. The
goal of the plan was not only to accommodate Taipei’s population growth, but also to
reduce flooding risk and damage as well as the expense of costly flood control
facilities. Hence, Linkou New Town in the late 1960s and early 1970s was a retreat
model to prevent or reduce damages from flooding in Taipei (see Figure 5- 16).
However, the lack of adequate facilities, public transportation, water supply, clear
water, decent public schools, and cultural activities has discouraged people from
7

Previously UHDC is now the Department of National Spatial Planning and Development, National

Development Council, Executive Yuan
8

Unite Nations’ Advisor Group in urban planning and housing in Taiwan includes Mr. Donald.

Monson, Mr. Karl J. Belser, Mr. Edmund T. Ames, Mrs. Astrid Monson, Mr. Samuel S. Zadik, and Mr.
Eric R. Gold.
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living in Linkou New Town. Additionally, the Taipei real estate market did not soar
until the 1990s. Linkou New Town did not gain much comparative advantage in
housing market in the 1970s. Moreover, the windy and cold weather also discouraged
people from living there. Thus, the development of Linkou New Town in the 1970s
was not viewed as a successful case to accommodate Taipei’s population.

Figure 5- 16 Linkow New Town plan of retreat from Taipei’s flooding
Source: Taipei City Government

Since the 1970s, there is still a lack of a retreat and resilience policy in flooding
prevention. The engineering strategy for flood prevention prevailed over the retreat
and land-use planning strategy for reducing the risk of flooding (see Figure 5-14 and
5-15). Furthermore, the existing hydraulic facilities were unable to provide adequate
flood protection. A new strategy combining non-structural measures, land-use
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planning, and retreat from risk needed to be more emphasized in Taipei (Huang 1989;
Chang et al. 2013; Wang 2003; Sui 2011; Shih et al. 2014).
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5.3.3

Numerous investments in engineering structures in the 1980s
Due to the devastating floods in the 1960s and 1970s, constructing a man-made

floodway was initiated and approved in 1979. The Erchung Floodway, which is 7.7
kilometers long, 450-700 meters wide, was completed in 1984 to reduce Taipei flood
risk (see Figure 5- 17). This man-made floodway helped to reduce flood areas along
the Dahan River in New Taipei City. However, flooding did not stop; the water just
went elsewhere. Although flooding around the Dahan River was reduced after the
construction of the Erchung Floodway, the flooding was shifted and concentrated in
different locations, mainly along the Keelung River. For example, the flooding areas,
13 square miles, caused by Typhoon Lynn in 1987 were located along the Keelung
River (see Figure 5- 18).

Figure 5- 17 A man-made floodway to reduce Taipei flood risk in 1984
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency
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Figure 5- 18 Floods along the Keelung River by Typhoon Lynn in 1987 (top),
approximately 13 square miles, and Typhoon Xangsane in 2000 (lower)
Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau; Taiwan Water Resources Agency
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Taiwan’s Water Resources Agency is the major authority for the construction of
Taipei flood control facilities. Taipei’s comprehensive flood control project began in
1982, the biggest flood control measure in Taiwan (see Table 5-5). To present, five
major flood control projects have been completed in Taipei including: Keelung River
Overall Improvement Project; Yuansantze Flood Diversion Project; River and Sea
Dikes Construction Projects; Taipei Area Flood Control Project; and Keelung River
Control Project. In general, these flood control projects have adopted the
200-year-flood frequency (a flood with the probability of 0.5% annually or once in
every 200 years) as protection criteria. This has resulted in developing dikes as high
as 9.5 meters along major river banks. In Taipei City, river levees have been extended
from 31 kilometers in 1968 to 117 kilometers in 2013 (Taipei City Government 2014).
Taipei’s flood control projects lasted from 1982 to 1996 with a total budget of
approximately $3.49 billion.
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Table 5- 5 Major flood control projects in Taipei since the 1980s
Year

1982 ~ 1996

1998 ~ 2001

2002 ~2005

Project

Taipei Area Flood
Control Project

Keelung River Flood Keelung River
Control Early Stage Overall
Project
Improvement Project
$1.05 billion
(including $250

Budget

$3.49 billion

$407 million

million for the
Yuansantze Flood
Diversion Project)

Flood control criteria 200-year Flood

10-year Flood

200-year Flood
Yuansantze flood

Structure
construction

diversion;
construction of
River dredging; bank dikes, water gates
Construction of
protection; dike & and pumping
Dikes, pumping
water gate
stations;
stations, water gates;
constructions;
reconstruction of
straightening of
reconstruction of
bank protection
channel curves;
pumping station
bridges; water & soil
flood forecast
bridges.
conservation; flood
system.
forecast and
inundation alarm
system
establishment.

Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency

Since the 1980s, numerous dikes, pumping stations, and water gates have been
constructed to prevent flooding, with huge public expenditures associated with this.
The latest phase of the Taipei flood control project, Keelung River Flood Control and
Overall Improvement Project, spent approximately $1.46 billion from 1998 to 2005 to
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improve river dredging, bank protection, dike and water gate construction, and
reconstruction of pumping station bridges. The scope of flood control facilities has
increased dramatically during the past three decades. The total length of dikes was
tripled from 1977 to 2006 to approximately 117 kilometers. There are only a few
unprotected places remaining for the extension of dikes (see Figure 5- 19).

Figure 5- 19 Flood control facilities (levees, pumping stations, gates) in Taipei
Source: Taipei City Government
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Since the 1980s, flood protection efforts have mainly focused on river levees and
flood diversion systems (see Table 5-6). There are still huge public expenditures for
engineered hard infrastructure to prevent floods. Rather than increasing adaptive
capacity or retreating from flood risk, Taipei has done flood control projects and
engineered infrastructure to diminish the flood risk. Numerable levees, flood pumping
stations, and gates have been constructed since the 1970s. However, flash flooding
with the failure of Yu-Chun pumping station along the Keelung River, caused by
Typhoon Nari in 2001, flowed from a levee gap and flooded downtown Taipei. Many
pumping stations were submerged and paralyzed by flooding water. The flooding
areas were estimated at approximately 26 square miles. This flood was one of the
most severe floods ever in Taipei (see Figure 5- 20). The lowlands along the Keelung
River were almost entirely inundated. The Taipei rail transit system and the
mass-rapid transit system were filled by the deluge. The hard infrastructure failed to
control this major flood. Because of this flood, the Yuansantze flood diversion system,
costing $250 million and starting in 2002, was constructed with a water tunnel 2.45
kilometers long and two meters in diameter to let the overflow run through the tunnel
into the ocean (see Figure 5- 201). This engineering system project was constructed in
2005 to help mitigate flood risk in Taipei.
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Table 5- 6 Major steps taken to prevent floods since the 1980s
Storm Water

Flood protection

Levee

Starting year

1982

2000

Content

River dike
construction

Yuansantze flood
Storm sewer system
diversion
construction
construction

Measurement
(as of 2013)

116 kilometers

Management

522 kilometers

Flood Diversion
2005

81% flood from
upper Keelung River
is diverted into the
tunnel;
1,310 cubic meters
per second (CMS)

Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency

Figure 5- 20 The most severe flooding (purple) caused by Typhoon Nari in 2001,
approximately 26 square miles
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency
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Figure 5- 21 The Yuansantze underground flood diversion system: flood water in
Keelung River runs through the underground tunnel directly into the ocean
Source: Taiwan Water Resources Agency
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5.3.4

The improvement of storm sewer systems in the late 1990s

Building storm sewer systems is another strategy used to address flood risk in
Taipei (see Figure 5- 22 and Table 5-7). However, because storm sewer improvement
is not obvious to the public, the political leaders delayed its implementation. Until
1998, the percentage of completed storm sewers in Taiwan was less than 50%. It is
estimated that every 1% of storm sewer improvement will cost approximately $67
million. Taiwan’s Construction and Planning Agency has improved storm sewer
systems as a strategy to reduce flood risks. In Taipei City, the goal is a total length of
540 kilometers of storm sewers. Currently, Taipei City is at 96% completion. New
Taipei City is at 79% completion (National Development Council 2014).

Figure 5- 22 Storm sewer improvement in Taipei City
Source: Taipei City Government
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Table 5- 7 Improvement of storm sewer systems in Taipei Twin Cities
Storm sewer improvement Taipei City

New Taipei City

Total planning area
(hectare)

26,182

58,326

Planning length (km)

540

767

Constructed length (km)

522

608

Percentage of completion
(%)

96

79

Source: Taiwan Construction and Planning Agency, as of the end of 2012

The improvement of storm sewer systems has reduced the flood risk since the
late 1990s. However, some storm sewer systems were designed to use the principle of
gravity, allowing the water to flow from higher to lower places. Downtown Taipei is
the low-lying area of the Taipei Basin. Hence, the effectiveness of storm sewer
systems in downtown is diminished because of the gravity design and Taipei’s
topology. Drainage depending on pumping stations at outlets of the storm sewer
system has been implemented. Many pumping stations were built along the Keelung
River and Tamsui River. Currently, there are 65 permanent and 21 provisional
pumping stations in Taipei City (see Figure 5- 23). However, the design of the storm
sewer system in Taipei was based on a 5-year flood frequency. The maximum
capacity of full operation of the storm sewers is rainfall of 3 inches (or 78.8
millimeters) per hour. The radius of the storm sewers ranges from 0.7 to 1.5 meters.
When a severe typhoon hits, these storm sewers and pumping stations do not function
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well. Since the inflow discharge is greater than the sewer capacity, inundation usually
occurs (see Figure 5-24).

Figure 5- 23 Storm sewer systems and pumping stations in downtown Taipei
Source: Hsu et al. 2000

Figure 5- 24 Taipei storm sewer with its pipe radius of 0.7-1.5 meters: discharge
below sewer capacity (top) and greater than sewer capacity, function failure (lower)
Source: Hsu et al. 2000
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Notable historic floods in Taipei caused by typhoons, and then the failure of
pumping stations, were caused by Typhoon Zeb of 1998 and Typhoon Nari of 2001.
Typhoon Zeb made the storm sewer system and pumping station dysfunctional and
resulted in serious inundation in Taipei. (Hsu 2000). Nari Typhoon also flooded Taipei,
26 square miles inundated. Strengthening the early-warning system is another option
to reduce damage. An automatic remote surveillance system has been used to
strengthen the early-warning system of storm sewers. The early-warning system for
flooding is improving in Taipei. However, there are still many pumping stations along
the rivers without the automatic remote surveillance system. According to Taipei's
Hydraulic Engineering Office, these 86 pumping stations were allocated into 6 zones
to be managed in groups, with an automated monitoring system set up for each zone.
The first automatic remote surveillance system was established in 2007. At present,
there are still 26 stations along the Keelung River bank and 50 stations alongside the
Tamsui River that have not been implemented completely. Storm sewer systems and
pumping stations will help reduce flood risks when they are in full function. However,
flash floods and the heavy rainfall caused by typhoons can still cause the systems to
fail. In addition, storm sewer improvement and flood control improvement belong to
two different central governmental agencies and the absence of full integration of
these agencies still remains an issue.
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5.3.5

Accommodation of flood by environmental planning strategy in the 2000s

In addition to these structural measures used to prevent Taipei from flooding,
some non-structural policies have been included since the 2000s. For instance, there is
increasing green space in Taipei. Taipei promoted the adoption of green space to
improve the quality of life and provide the city more permeable surfaces to retain
water. It is estimated that each citizen in Taipei City shares a park or green field area
of 5 square meters, a 6-time increase compared to 0.72 square meters in 1968.
Currently, each resident shares an average of 51 square meters of green space
including the parks, green fields, plazas, sport locations for children, athletic
complexes, educational squares, riverside parks and scenic areas under the control of
Taipei City Government, in addition to reserved areas and national parks (Taipei City
Government 2014). However, it is increasingly difficult to plan more parks and green
spaces because Taipei’s urban planning focused on meeting the demands of
socioeconomic growth (Chang et al. 2013). Also, there is little space left for it in
Taipei.
In order to have a more comprehensive flood prevention policy, Taipei City has
changed the strategy of flood control and fortification since the 2000s. Taipei’s
Comprehensive Flood Control Project was initiated in 2003 to include conserving
upstream water flow, minimizing mid-stream flooding, and controlling downstream
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flooding. Hence, the policy of Taipei’s Comprehensive Flood Control Project mainly
concentrates on its objective of launching a new water management mechanism for
“retaining upstream water resources, minimizing midstream flood risks, and
preventing downstream flooding” (Taipei City Government 2013). In addition,
Taipei’s Hydraulic Engineering Office, under the Department of Public Works, began a
plan of water control and environmental protection in 2001 to reduce flood risks. For
example, the ecological and flood control of Dagoi Stream Park was implemented in
Taipei’s rapidly urbanized district of Neihu.9 The combination of park development
and flood mitigation planning is an example of an integrative strategy to reduce
flooding. In addition, in 2005 the project’s committee gathered experts and officials
from various government agencies to discuss working together on incorporating
watershed conservation upstream, flood mitigation midstream, and flood defenses
downstream into a comprehensive flood management system in Taipei City (Sui
2011). Hence, since the 2000s, land-use and environmental planning has gradually
become a major strategy for flood risk reduction in Taipei. The Comprehensive Water
Control Management Commission was established under the Taipei City Government
in 2006 as an integrative organization to coordinate with different departments for
flood prevention and reduction.

9

Neihu means “Inner Lake” in Chinese. Nowadays, the Neihu Science Park is located here.
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CHAPTER 6: FLOOD SIMULATION, VULNERABILITY, AND
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN TAIPEI
Most research in flood simulation is done by mapping with the Geographic
Information System (GIS) (Brody et al. 2007; Berke et al. 2009; Suriya and Mudgal
2011; Luino et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2012; Hsu et al. 2013). Notable application is the
U.S.A.’s Hazus flood model using GIS for estimating potential losses from riverine
and coastal floods (FEMA 2013). The technology of GIS simulation performs better
at identifying flooding locations, whereas the generalized regression model or disaster
risk index doesn’t allow for this analysis. GIS also helps to map socio-economic,
land-use, building, and facility datasets that can improve the analysis. In the case of
Taipei, some research has used GIS to simulate flooding. Hsu’s simulation of the
central area of Taipei indicates that if the rainfall reaches between 15 inches and 21
inches (374 mm to 550 mm) within 24 hours, then the inundated area will cover from
1% to 3% of the total area of Taipei. The damage is estimated at up to $388 million in
the central area of Taipei (Hsu et al. 2013). Other research analyzes flood impact
assessment under climate change scenarios in the central Taipei area. Hsu’s study
concludes that the flooding area could cover up to 40% and the damage would be
37.5% to 45% more due to the increased rainfall associated with climate change (Hsu
et al. 2013). However, previous studies focus mainly on a limited central Taipei area,
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rather than a city-wide simulation. Additionally, these studies lack scenarios and
likelihood analysis in flooding vulnerability. Further, these studies don’t identify the
impacts on population, land values, residential properties, and critical facilities
through GIS mapping.
This chapter includes flood simulation, physical vulnerability, and cost-benefit
analysis in different scenarios and likelihoods in Taipei. It will analyze the impact on
population, households, land values, residential properties, GDP, buildings, and
infrastructure at different levels of flooding in Taipei. In order to do flooding
simulation in three scenarios, this chapter collects datasets from Taiwan’s Water
Resource Agency (WRA), the central government authority for responding to floods.
This agency established the latest flood GIS maps in 2010. These flood maps consider
a variety of factors, particularly flood locations, the spatial and time distribution of
rainfall, the normal function of reservoirs, flood control faculties, and levees, and
average tide patterns. Most researchers, organizations, and authorities studying floods
use these datasets for flood analysis. For example, Taiwan’s National Science and
Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (NCDR)10 is also based on the WRA’s
datasets for academic research and policy-making. Hence, this chapter concentrates
on flood simulation and vulnerability analysis using a similar method of GIS mapping
10

A quasi-government organization responds to disaster risk reduction under the Taiwan’s Ministry of

Science and Technology.
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in Taipei.
First, this chapter simulates Taipei City’s flooding in different scenarios: 1. heavy
rainfall (24 hour duration/14 inches or 350 millimeters). 2. extreme weather rainfall
(72 hour duration/47 inches or 1,200 millimeters) and 3. typhoon conditions (48 hour
duration/24 inches or 600 millimeters). Second, in order to analyze the impacts in
flood-prone areas, this study collects datasets and GIS-based maps (known as shape
files) in socio-economic, land value, land use plan, building, and critical facilities in
the 12 districts of Taipei. These datasets come from Taipei City Government (TCG),
Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the National Development Council (NDC),
and the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS). Third,
this study also collects typhoon and rainfall datasets for 1975-2014 from the Typhoon
DataBase in Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB) because 75% of heavy rainfall
events (24 hour duration/14 inches) are caused by typhoons. This dataset helps to
calculate the likelihood of a typhoon and the possibility of different rainfall scenarios
in analyzing Taipei’s vulnerability.
This chapter concludes that Taipei’s flood-prone areas account for approximately
41% of its total land area, which is higher than that of Tokyo’s 10%, London’s 15%,
and New York City’s 25%, but lower than Shanghai’s 50% (see Chapter 3). Among
Taipei’s flood-prone areas, it is estimated that 10% would be flooded above 0.5 meter
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in an extreme weather scenario. The vulnerable population is estimated at 200,000
people, or 7% of the total population. Eight percent of the total households, or 83,000
households, and 10% of the buildable land are vulnerable to flooding depths above
0.5 meter. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion, accounting for 8% of Taipei
City’s GDP. More than $67 billion worth of property is vulnerable. Moreover, the
future flood locations will be different than with historic floods. Many flooding
hotspots will be located in downtown Taipei, where the higher population density,
higher land and property values, and more intense critical facilities are located. It is
estimated that approximately 26% of residential zoned properties are located in flood
hotspots in the extreme weather scenario. This implies that neither land-use plans nor
housing development policy have considered vulnerability to flooding. When it looks
at one severe flood hotspot of 1.2 square miles in Zhongshan district, it is estimated
that commercial zones account for 25.78% of the flood-prone areas with a flood depth
between 2 and 3 meters compared with residential zones’ 26.7%. The high proportion
of commercial zones in the city that are located in flood-prone areas shows the need
to reduce risk in the future. Further, there is no tendency toward different household
income levels living in different levels of flood-prone areas. Little evidence exists that
the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to floods in Taipei City. On the contrary, the
high income households face a higher risk of floods. In addition to private properties,
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a large amount of Taipei City-owned properties are also located in flood hotspots. At
least 5% of City-owned properties, $12.5 billion worth, are located in the flood-prone
areas. The lack of awareness of flood risks for City-owned properties exists. In
addition, the highest density of building permit approvals are located in flood-prone
areas between 1 and 2 meters in depth. This implies that the process of building permit
approval may not consistently consider the issue of vulnerability to flooding. This may
be a result of the lack of accurate flood-prone area simulation and analysis in Taipei.
Last but not least, the critical facility vulnerability analysis indicates that there is no
evidence showing that Taipei’s major medical centers, electric power substations, and
gas/oil stations are located in flood-prone areas. However, many public schools,
administrative buildings, and major subway stations are located in severe flood-prone
areas. In the future, flood prevention strategies need to be reinforced for these public
administrative buildings, schools, and subway stations.
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6.1

Flooding along the riverside areas of Taipei

Keelung River is a major river in Taipei City. The riverside levee was designed
to resist a flood with a 200-year return period (a probability of 0.5% annually) to
protect from flooding. Nowadays, the total length of the dike has extended up to 117
kilometers. However, Hsu et al. (2013) simulated flood risk among different districts
of Taipei using the 200-year return period, and found that Zhongshan, Songshan, and
Xinyi districts, areas along the Keelung River, are the areas most likely to experience
increased flooding due to climate change (see Figure 6-1). The flood areas are likely
to increase by 79% in the Zhongshan district, 59% in the Songshan district, and 16%
in the Xinyi district.

Figure 6- 1 The increased flood areas due to climate change in the central Taipei area
Source: Hsu et al. (2013)
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What if the 200-year-frequency flood occurs in Taipei? Do riverside levees work?
How can Taipei prepare for flood resilience? This study analyzes the 24-hour duration
rainfall when the 200-year-frequency flood occurs. The result shows that most areas
along the Keelung River will be flooded above 1 meter (see Figure 6-2). Some areas
will be flooded above 2 meters. However, luxury condominiums, with one
three-bedroom unit exceeding $1 million,11 have been planned and built next to
riverside levees along the Keelung River since the 2000s. There is a 20-meter wide
road called Ming-Shui, which means “tomorrow flooding” in Chinese, between these
residential buildings and the levees. In this simulation, these luxury condominium
areas along the river and Ming-Shui Road could be flooded about 1 to 2 meters (see
Figure 6-3). Property developers do not necessarily bear the additional costs related to
floods and water management. This ongoing housing development will eventually
increase exposure and vulnerability to flood risk. Hence, reducing the density of
housing along the riverside area or a retreat of residential development from the river
could reduce flooding vulnerability in the future.

11

According to Taiwan Sinyi Realty’s actually selling price, the average price for a 3 bedrooms

condominium along Ming-Shui Road exceeds $1 million. Retrieved from
http://tradeinfo.sinyi.com.tw/itemList.html?a1=104&a2=199&c8=500&s2=10308_10401&s4=2&s5=2
(In Chinese)
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Figure 6- 2 Flooding along Keelung River in 200-year-frequency flood simulation

Figure 6- 3 Riverside levees and high density development along Keelung River
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014)
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6.2

Taipei flood simulation and hotspot analysis in three scenarios

Most research simulates Taipei’s floods with rainfall in a 24-hour duration. This
research includes the extreme weather situation with rainfalls in a 72-hour duration.
This research develops three scenarios to gauge the vulnerabilities: 1. heavy rainfall
(24 hour duration/14 inches or 350 millimeters).12 2. extreme weather rainfall (72
hour duration/47 inches or 1,200 millimeters) and 3. typhoon conditions (48 hour
duration/24 inches or 600 millimeters) in Taipei. The results show that the highest
flooding depth will reach 4.1 meters in the heavy rain scenario, 5.16 meters in
typhoon conditions, and 8.34 meters in the extreme weather scenario (see Figure 6-4,
6-5, 6-6). Some flooding areas are along the Keelung River, however, there are many
flooding hotspots located in downtown Taipei, where there is a higher population
density, higher land and property value, and more intense critical facilities (see Figure
6-7).

12

Taiwan Central Weather Bureau officially defines rainfall exceeding 350 millimeters/14 inches in 24

hours as extremely torrential rain.
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Figure 6- 4 Taipei flooding area and depth in the heavy rain scenario

Figure 6- 5 Taipei flooding area and depth in typhoon conditions
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Figure 6- 6 Taipei flooding area and depth in the extreme weather scenario

Figure 6- 7 Taipei flood hotspots in downtown in red and yellow and with areas in
high density, land value, and critical facilities
In order to analyze the impacts of different flooding depths, this study
categorizes 5 different flooding levels through GIS. This is a similar way with the
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Netherlands’s flood simulations. The 5 categories of flooding are: 0-0.5 meter, 0.5-1
meter, 1-2 meters, 2-3 meters, and above 3 meters (see Figure 6-8, 6-9, 6-10). The
results show that the total potential flooding area is 43 square miles at different levels
of flooding, which is approximately 41% of Taipei City.13 Most of the flood-prone
areas are located in downtown Taipei City. If we exclude the land area of
Yangmingshan National Park, flood-prone areas include 70% of Taipei City. This
result is higher than Wang’s prediction that more than 50% of Taipei would be
flooded (Wang 2009; 2013). Among these flooding areas, more than 90% would be
flooded below 0.5 meter in depth. However, it is estimated that 10% would be flooded
above 0.5 meter in an extreme weather scenario (see Table 6-1). Rainfall duration
matters in the results of flooding scenarios. The rainfall causing flooding within a
72-hour duration will be 5 times more than within a 48-hour duration.

In an extreme weather condition, Taipei City could possibly have 3% to 4% of its
total area flooded above 1 meter. The result is different with other research of flooding
in Taipei’s central area indicating that the inundated area covers from 1% to 3% of the
total area (Hsu et al. 2013). There are seven major hotspots with severe flooding of
more than 2 meters. Many critical facilities are included or adjacent to these areas

13

The total area of Taipei City is 104.9 square miles, including Yangmingshan National Park 44

square miles.
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such as Taipei’s most important transportation hub, the Taipei Main Station.14
Moreover, there are 3 hospitals adjacent to the flood-prone areas: the Taipei
Municipal Chronic Disease Hospital, Children’s Hospital of National Taiwan
University Hospital, and Jen-Chi Hospital. Additionally, many public administrative
buildings are included. For example, Taiwan’s highest-ranking central government
buildings, such as the Executive Headquarter, the Legislative Center, and the
Investigative Center,15 are located adjacent to the flood hotspots. Furthermore, there
are more than 10 public schools that would also face flooding in the future. Hence,
most of the Taipei flood hotspots are consistent with the current locations of
highly-developed, high density, high property value, and major facilities.

14

Taipei high speed rail station, Taipei railway station, and Taipei subway station are all located in the

Taipei Main Station.
15

In Taiwan, these central governmental branches are officially known as the Executive Yuan, the

Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan.
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Figure 6- 8 The 5-category flooding depth and hotspot areas in the heavy rain scenario

Figure 6- 9 The 5-category flooding depth and hotspot areas in typhoon conditions
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Figure 6- 10 The 5-category flooding depth and hotspot areas in the extreme weather
Table 6- 1 The flooding area, depth, and scenarios in Taipei City

Flood depth

Extreme weather
flooding areas:
Square miles (%)

Typhoon
flooding areas:
Square miles (%)

Heavy rain
flooding areas:
Square miles (%)

0-0.5 meter

39.3 (90.46%)

42 (98.1%)

43 (99.1%)

0.5-1 meter

2.4 (5.56%)

0.6 (1.38%)

0.3 (0.75%)

1-2 meters

1.5 (3.45%)

0.23 (0.51%)

0.05 (0.11%)

2-3 meters

0.2 (0.49%)

0.01 (0.02%)

0.001 (0.002%)

above 3 meters

0.02 (0.04%)

0.002 (0.004%)

0.0003 (0.0007%)
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6.3

Taipei flood simulation in comparison with floods of the past

This study collects data describing Taipei’s historic floods from 1991 to 2012
to analyze differences and similarities with earlier flood simulations (see Figure
6-11).16 Results show that historic floods were mainly located in the Taipei outer area,
the south-side of the upper and lower reaches of the Keelung River. Some floods were
located in downtown Taipei. However, in the simulations, few floods occurred in the
south-side of the upper and lower reaches of the Keelung River. Most of the
flood-prone areas are predicted to occur in downtown Taipei, where some historic
floods were located.

One of the largest areas impacted by historic flooding is composed of
Taipei’s Songshan, Nangang, and Xinyi districts in the south-east side of the upper
reaches of the Keelung River. A high density of housing development is adjacent to
the river and levees, causing significant economic losses in the past two decades.
Historic floods in the upper reaches of the river mainly resulted from heavy rainfall as
well as the failure in the operation of pumping stations and flood gates.17 Rainfalls in
a heavy rain event, more than 2.4 inches per hour, often went beyond the design

16

Taipei City Government collects locations of historic floods with 5-400 centimeters in depth in

1991-2012.
17

The failure of Taipei Yu-Chan pumping station with its limitation of 42.5 mm r a inf all p er hour .
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standard of pumping stations and stormwater sewers. For example, one of Taipei’s
major pumping stations along the middle and upper reaches of the Keelung River is
the Yu-Chan pumping station (see Figure 6-12): it can function completely when the
rainfall is below 1.7 inches per hour. The failure of pumping stations caused mass
floods in this area in 2001. In 2005, the completion of Taipei’s Yuansantz flood
diversion system helped reduce floods. It is estimated that the underground tunnel can
divert 1,310 cubic meters per second (CMS) from the upper Keelung River, with 80%
of flood water in the upper Keelung River diverted through the diversion tunnel into
the East China Sea. Therefore, assuming the normal functioning of pumping stations,
flood diversion, and the stormwater sewer system, the massive flooding areas in the
Songshan, Nangang, and Xinyi districts will be reduced.

Another historic flooding area was in the south side of the lower reaches of the
Keelung River. This area is known as Shezi Island in Taipei’s Shilin district, and it is
surrounded by the Keelung and Danshui rivers. Historic floods mainly resulted from
the low-lying topography. However, this area is not the most severe flood-prone area
in simulations in spite of some flooding in the north and south of the Shezi Island.
The simulations indicate that the main and severe flood hotspots would be located in
downtown Taipei, where some historic floods were located. In the future, the extreme
rainfall associated with tropical cyclones is expected to increase by up to a third,
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reaching 2 to 3.15 inches per hour, indicating a higher level of flood risk in South East
Asia (The World Bank 2013). The threat of increasingly intense and extensive
rainfalls to the high density development in downtown Taipei exists.

Figure 6- 11 Taipei flood simulation, in yellow and red areas, in comparison with
floods from 1991 to 2012, in blue areas

Figure 6- 12 The failure of operation in Yu-Chan pumping station in 2001 and its
nearby high density development
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014)
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6.4

The vulnerability analysis in three scenarios

In order to analyze the vulnerability in each of the three scenarios, this study
collects datasets of demographic, social, economic, land-use plan, land value,
property value, housing, and critical facilities from Taipei City Government, Taiwan’s
Ministry of the Interior, National Development Council, and Directorate-General of
Budget, Accounting and Statistics. However, because different datasets were produced
originally by different agencies, inconsistencies occurred. For example, the mismatch
between the land-use map and the flood map requires adjustment to overlap with the
land-use or property maps. In order to overcome the limitation of different dataset
inconsistencies in mapping, one can use the technology of GIS through ArcMap
10.2.2 software. For example, functions of “Define Projection” and “Geo-referencing”
can help to adjust different coordinates, projections or mismatch maps to overlap
accurately. After solving the problems of dataset inconsistency, this study identifies
four vulnerability analyses in flood hotspots, including: 1. population and households;
2. land value, buildings and housing; 3. gross domestic product (GDP); and 4. critical
facilities such as subway station, hospital, public school, electric power substation
(see Figure 6-13). In summary, it is estimated that the flooding depth above 0.5 meter
is about 10% of flooding areas in an extreme weather scenario. The vulnerable
population is estimated at 200,000 people, or 7% of the total population. Eight percent
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of total households, or 83,000 households, are vulnerable to flooding depth above 0.5
meter. The GDP impact will be more than $28 billion, accounting for 8% of Taipei
City’s GDP.18 More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable (see Table 6-2).

Figure 6- 13 The analysis of Taipei flood vulnerability in different scenarios
Table 6- 2 The vulnerability analysis in an extreme weather scenario in Taipei City
Flooding depth
in an extreme
weather scenario

Vulnerable
people

Vulnerable
households

Vulnerable
GDP

Vulnerable
land value

0.5-1 meter

111,575

44,096

$15 billion

$39 billion

1-2 meter

69,820

27,776

$12 billion

$25 billion

2-3 meters

9,718

3,945

$1.4 billion

$3.4 billion

18

According to Taipei City Government, the total GDP is $354 billion (10,636.634 billion New Taiwan
Dollar) by the end of 2011.
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6.4.1

How vulnerable are people and households in Taipei?

This section indicates that approximately 60% of the total city population lives in
flood-prone areas. 7% of the population, about 200,000 people, living in potential
flooding areas with above 0.5 meter in depth. Additionally, a highly-dense
development is located in severe flood-prone areas, which implies that land-use plans
and housing development policy have not considered vulnerability to flooding. Also,
8% of total households, 83,000 households, live with potential flooding depth above
0.5 meter. In the Taipei City case study, unlike other case studies with the urban poor
living in more environmentally vulnerable areas (The World Bank 2001; 2013; Sinh et
al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013), the urban poor in Taipei are not
concentrated in the flood-prone areas. On the contrary, the high income households
also face the high risk of floods.

6.4.1.1 Vulnerable population and employment

In order to gauge the vulnerability of the population, this study collects
population distribution and density in Taipei’s 12 districts.19 Through mapping flood
hotspots and population datasets in GIS, the total number, percentage, and density
distribution of population (see Figure 6-14) were calculated in the three scenarios.

19

The total population of Taipei City is 2,702,315 as of 2014
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Figure 6- 14 Taipei’s 12 districts’ population and its density distribution (the darker,
the denser)
Results show that there are about 1.5 million people, almost 60% of the total
city population, living in flood hotspot areas.20 Assuming that flooding with depth
below 0.5 meter can be prevented through flood control faculties and other
fortification structures, there is still 7% of the population, about 200,000 people,
living in potential flooding areas with above 0.5 meter in depth, and 3% of the
population, 80,000 people, living in flooding areas above 1 meter in depth (see Table
6-3).

20

According to The World Bank (2005), there are 73.1% of the total population exposed to multiple

hazards in Taiwan
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Table 6- 3 Vulnerable population and its density distribution in three flooding
scenarios
Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Flood depth

Employee
impact

1,367,162

50.59%

13,440 (+)

1,145,244

0.5-1 meter

111,575

4.13%

17,865 (+)

70,343

1-2 meters

69,820

2.58%

18,000 (+)

43,691

2-3 meters

9,718

0.36%

17,851 (+)

6,204

9,014 (-)

518

meters

Heavy Rain

Population

Population
density
(person/km2)

0-0.5 meter

above 3

Typhoon
Conditions

Percentage
of total
population

389

0.01%

0-0.5 meter

1,525,823

56.46%

13,813 (+)

1,242,009

0.5-1 meter

24,072

0.89%

15,729 (+)

17,251

1-2 meters

8,618

0.32%

14,976 (+)

6,447

2-3 meters

217

0.01%

13,892 (+)

248

above 3
meters

34

0.001%

8,583 (-)

45

0-0.5 meter

1,544,926

57.17%

13,860 (+)

1,255,132

0.5-1 meter

11,933

0.44%

14,219 (+)

9,445

1-2 meters

1,766

0.06%

14,425 (+)

1,387

2-3 meters

33

0.001%

13,928 (+)

27

above 3
meters

7

0.0003%

8,771 (-)

9

Note: (+) means the density is higher than Taipei’s average density of 9,942 persons/ km2 in 2014;
(-) means the density is lower than Taipei’s average density.
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Moreover, the vulnerability analysis looks at the density distribution to see if a
higher density population lives in flood-prone areas. When the population density data
is mapped, the result shows that most flood hotspot areas have very high population
density. For instance, the population density in the flood hotspot with 1-2 meter in
depth is 18,000 persons per square kilometer, which is double that of Taipei City’s
average density of 9,942 persons per km2 as of 2014. This means the higher the
density population, the more severe and vulnerable to flooding it can be. Therefore,
highly-dense development is located in severe flood-prone areas, which implies that
land-use plans and housing development policy have not considered vulnerability to
flooding.

Further, this study looks at the impact of employees in flood hotspot areas
since flooding affects economic activities. However, because Taipei City Government
does not collect districts’ employment data, this study can only use city-level
employment data and assumes that the employment density is evenly distributed in
downtown Taipei. There are 1.266 million people employed in Taipei as of 2013. The
impact will be 126,000 employees within the 10% of flooding areas with a depth
above 0.5 meter in an extreme weather scenario, including 5,040 employees affected
by flooding depth above 1 meter.
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6.4.1.2 Vulnerable households

This section studies vulnerable households, household income distribution, and
low-income population and its distribution in different flood hotspot areas. The results
indicate that there are more than 600,000 households, 58% of total households,21
living in flood hotspot areas. Although most households in flood-prone areas are at a
depth of below 0.5 meter, there are 8% of total households, 83,000 households, living
with potential flooding depth above 0.5 meter. If we analyze the distribution of
household income and low-income population22 in the flood hotspot areas, the
average annual household income in any flood hotspot area is about $54,000 in the
extreme weather scenario. There is no relationship between household income and
living in different levels of flood-prone areas.
Vulnerability analysis also looks at the low-income population in Taipei’s 12
districts.23 The result indicates that the lowest density of low-income population is in
the severe flooding area with the depth of above 3 meters in the extreme weather and
typhoon scenarios. This also implies that there is little poverty concentration in the
most severe flooding areas with more than 3 meters in depth. (see Table 6-4).

21

The total household of Taipei City is 1,037,402 as of 2014

22

The household income and low income population data is based on Taipei City Government’s Statistics

by Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.
23

Taipei low income standard is personal monthly income below $355 (or $10,656 New Taiwan dollars).
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Therefore, there is little evidence that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to
floods in Taipei City. This result is different with some Asian case studies on floods
indicating that the urban poor live in more environmentally vulnerable areas, that
poorer people are more adversely impacted by a disaster (The World Bank 2001; 2013;
Sinh et al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013). For instance, studies of
Vietnam and the Philippines show that the urban poor, with 41 percent of the urban
population of Vietnam and 44 percent of the urban population of the Philippines live
in informal settlements, where floods associated with sea-level rise and storm surges
carry significant risks for the urban poor (The World Bank 2013). These Asian case
studies also show that the urban poor population is less able to deal with
environmental crisis and suffer most in natural disasters. In the Taipei City case study,
the urban poor are not concentrated in the flood-prone areas. On the contrary, the high
income households also face the high risk of floods.
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Table 6- 4 Vulnerable household and its income in three flooding scenarios
Three

Flood

scenarios

depth

Extreme

Percentage
Household

of total
household

Househol
d income

Low

Average Low

income

income

population

(person/ km )

2

0-0.5 meter

529,512

50.59%

57,607

21,565

212

0.5-1 meter

44,096

4.13%

52,618

2,548

408

1-2 meters

27,776

2.58%

53,433

1,451

374

2-3 meters

3,945

0.36%

51,951

231

425

148

0.01%

55,489

8

186

0-0.5 meter

592,351

56.46%

56,548

25,262

229

0.5-1 meter

9,602

0.89%

56.593

402

263

1-2 meters

3,427

0.32%

55,242

139

244

2-3 meters

84

0.01%

59.243

3

297

13

0.001%

54,656

1

196

0-0.5 meter

599,996

57.17%

57,036

25,638

230

0.5-1 meter

4,765

0.44%

54,256

238

284

1-2 meters

700

0.06%

59,108

20

166

2-3 meters

14

0.001%

53,863

1
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3

0.0003%

47,831

1

248

Weather

above 3
meters

Typhoon
Conditions

above 3
meters

Heavy
Rain

above 3
meters

6.4.2

How vulnerable are land and property values?

The value of vulnerable property is approximately $40 billion in a flooding depth
between 0.5 and 1 meter by an extreme weather scenario. This study observes that the
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most valuable land area is also in the most vulnerable location. Meanwhile, a high
proportion of commercial zones in the city are located in flood-prone areas. In a flood
hotspot in the Zhongshan district of Taipei, it is estimated that commercial zones
account for 25.78% of the flood-prone areas. In the Taipei City-owned property, the
lack of risk awareness and management of potential floods for City-owned property
remains high. Regarding housing vulnerability, this research finds the vulnerable
housing units flooded will be approximately 14% of the total units, or 130,000 units.
Regarding building permit approvals, this study notes that the highest density of
building permit approvals is located in flood hotspot areas with flooding above 0.5 meter.
The process of building permit approval has consistently not considered the issue of
vulnerability to flooding.
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6.4.2.1 Vulnerable land value

This section analyzes flood hotspots and the impact on land values. First, it
extracts a map of government-announced current land values24 from the original
Taipei property map through the function of a conversion tool from “Polygon to
Raster” in the ArcMap 10.2.2 software. This produces a raster map of the
government-announced current land values in 2011. Then, this section maps land
values and flood hotspots through GIS to analyze the vulnerable land values (see
Figure 6-15).
The results show that the value of vulnerable land is approximately $40 billion25 in a
flooding depth between 0.5 and 1 meter. The value is estimated at approximately $25 billion
in the flooding depth between 1 and 2 meters in the extreme weather scenario (see Table 6-5).
Additionally, this study finds that the highest land value per square meter is located in the
flood hotspot with 1-2 meter in depth for all three of the scenarios. This also provides
awareness that the most valuable land area is also the most vulnerable location. This could
possibly result from the unawareness of flood risk in past land-use planning and polices.

24

Government-announced current land value is the basis for the land value increment tax. The current

land value of 2014 in Taipei City is about 89% of the market price of land according to Taiwan’s
Ministry of the Interior’s statistics.
25

Currency exchange is based on $1 US dollar=$30 New Taiwan dollars
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Figure 6- 15 Taipei current land value created by a raster-based map (top) and
vulnerable land value in flood hotspots (lower)
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Table 6- 5 Vulnerable land value in three flooding scenarios

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Typhoon
Conditions

Heavy Rain

Flood depth

Average land
value per unit
(US dollar/m2)

Area
(m2 )

Total
vulnerable
land value
(million)

0-0.5 meter

101,236,000

5,661

573,132

0.5-1 meter

6,098,400

6,465

39,424

1-2 meters

3,800,400

6,628

25,189

2-3 meters

542,800

6,314

3,427

above 3
meters

34,400

2,022

70

0-0.5 meter

109,681,200

5,732

628,718

0.5-1 meter

1,495,200

6,098

9,118

1-2 meters

547,200

6,264

3,428

2-3 meters

19,200

3,930

75

above 3
meters

2,800

1,385

4

0-0.5 meter

110,794,000

5,744

636,360

0.5-1 meter

812,400

5,079

4,126

1-2 meters

110,800

6,953

770

2-3 meters

1,600

327

1

NA

NA

NA

above 3
meters

It is clear that the higher valued lands are likely to be in the flood hotspots. This
study further analyzes commercial and residential zones in flood-prone areas, looking
at the percentage of land occupied by the two zones in different flood-prone areas.
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The results show that there are many commercial zones in the flood-prone areas. In
the extreme weather scenario, it is estimated that 8% of commercial zones and 26% of
residential zoned are located in flood hotspots. However, in general, the residential
zones cover a higher percentage of land than the commercial zones in any level of
flooding (see Table 6-6). For instance, among flood-prone areas with a depth between
1 and 2 meters, the proportion of residential zones is 19.94%, and that of commercial
zones is 12.41%. Because the total area of residential zones is about 4.3 times that of
commercial zones in Taipei overall,26 it is still a very high proportion of commercial
zones that are located in flood-prone areas compared with residential zones. When
looking at one severe flood hotspot of 1.2 square miles in Zhongshan district, it is
estimated that commercial zones account for 25.78% of the flood-prone areas with
flooding depth between 2 and 3 meters compared with residential zones’ 26.7% (see
Figure 6-16, Table 6-7). Hence, the high proportion of commercial zones in the city
that are located in flood-prone areas needs to be reduced in the future.

26

The total area of commercial zone is 3.2% of total Taipei City land areas of 271.8 square kilometers

or 104.9 square miles in 2014; The total area of residential zone is 14% of total Taipei City land areas
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Figure 6- 16 Taipei’s commercial and residential zones in flood hotspots (left), one
1.2-square mile hotspot in the Zhongshan District has approximately 26% commercial
zones of the hotspot (right)

Table 6- 6 Taipei’s commercial and residential zones in flood hotspots

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Flood depth

Residential
zone
(m2 )

Commercial
zone
(m2 )

Percentage
of
residential
zone

Percentage
of
commercial
zone

0-0.5 meter

27,630,000

6,962,400

27.15%

6.84%

0.5-1 meter

1,192,800

922,000

19.08%

14.75%

1-2 meters

774,000

481,600

19.94%

12.41%

2-3 meters

128,800

60,000

23.37%

10.89%

4,000

NA

8.7%

NA

above 3
meters

209

Table 6- 7 High percentage of commercial zone in a flood hotspot of Zhongshan district

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Flood depth

Residential
zone
(m2 )

Commercial
zone
(m2 )

Percentage
of
residential
zone

Percentage
of
commercial
zone

0-0.5 meter

593,600

318,800

37.65%

20.22%

0.5-1 meter

244,400

83,200

36.41%

12.40%

1-2 meters

258,400

114,400

36.73%

16.26%

2-3 meters

55,200

53,200

26.74%

25.78%

NA

NA

NA

NA

above 3
meters

This study also looks at Taipei City-owned property (see Table 6-8).27 After
mapping City-owned property with flood hotspots, the results show that at least 5% of
property, $12.5 billion, is located in the flood-prone areas (see Figure 6-17). The
authority of Taipei City-owned property, Department of Finance of Taipei City
Government, has been the major agency who executes and contributes to important
development projects and urban renewal plans for City-owned property. However, it
has not analyzed or collected the potential losses of City-owned property. The lack of
awareness and management of potential floods for City-owned property remains high.

27

The total value is $264 billion (NT$7.922 trillion). Real estate property accounts for 94%, with

value of $250.4 billion (NT$7.512 trillion) by the end of 2014.
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Table 6- 8 Vulnerable city-own property value
Taipei
City-own real
estate property

Number

Area
(hectare)

Property value
(billion)

Vulnerable
property value
(billion)

Land

83,245

5,505

$240.7

$12

Building

16,524

1,311

$9.7

$0.5

In total

99,769

6,816

$250.4

$12.5

Source: Taipei City Government’s Department of Finance

Figure 6- 17 The large amount of Taipei City-owned properties is in flood hotspots
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6.4.2.2 Vulnerable buildable land, housing and residential property value

This section analyzes the vulnerable buildable land, housing units, and
residential property values in different flood scenarios. Of the total buildable land in
the flood-prone areas, more than 90% is located in flooding depth below 0.5 meter.
There is very little possibility (almost 0 percent) that building land would be flooded
above 2 meters in the heavy rain scenario. However, in the extreme weather scenario,
approximately 10% of buildable land will be flooded above 0.5 meter, 4% flooded
above 1 meter (see Figure 6-18).

Figure 6- 18 Buildable lands (in blue dot areas) in flood hotspots
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Moreover, in order to analyze the housing vulnerability, this study calculates the
proportion of residential land in different flood scenarios.28 The result shows that
more than 13% of total residential land will be flooded. In an extreme weather
scenario, the vulnerable housing units flooded will reach 130,000 units, or 14% of the
total units.29 As many as 12,000 housing units, 1.3%, will be flooded above 0.5 meter.
The residential property value in flooding areas will reach about $91 billion; $82
billion of housing property will be flooded below 0.5 meter, and $9 billion above 0.5
meter (see Table 6-9).

Furthermore, this study collects district data of building permits from Taipei City
Government,30 to analyze how many building permits were approved in the flood-prone
areas. This study assumes that the building permit approval is related to the construction
of building in the future. The results show that most building permits approved since
2006 were in flood-prone areas. In the extreme weather scenario, more than 90% of total
floor areas in building permit approved are located in flooding below 0.5 meter in depth,

28

According to Taipei City Government’s Development of Urban Development, residential zone accounts

for 14% of urban development land in 2014
29

Most of Taipei’s housing units are condominiums. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior’s

housing statistics, Taipei City has a total of 935,535 housing units is by the end of 2013; Taipei
City’s average housing price per unit is estimated at $698,266 in 2014.
30

Taipei City Government released the total square meter of building permit approval since 2006 in

Taipei’s 12 districts by the end of 2013. Data was collected by Taipei City Construction Management
Office. Retrieved from http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp (In Chinese)
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10% of total floor areas in building permits approved in flooding above 0.5 meter in
depth, and more than 4% in flooding above 1 meter.

Next, the vulnerability analysis looks at the density of building permit approvals;
the highest density is located in flood hotspot areas with flooding above 0.5 meter (see
Table 6-10). In the heavy rain scenario, the highest density of building permit approvals
is located in areas with flooding between 2 and 3 meters. In the typhoon scenario, the
highest density of building permits approved is located in flooding between 1 and 2
meters. This implies that the process of building permits approved by the Taipei City
Construction Management Office may not consistently consider the issue of
vulnerability to flooding. This may be the result of a lack of accurate flood-prone area
simulation and analysis in Taipei. When Taipei has a thorough analysis of flood risk, the
flood risk map can help the decision-making of building permit approval.
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Table 6- 9 Vulnerable buildable land, housing units, and property in three flooding
scenarios

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Typhoon
Conditions

Heavy Rain

Flood depth

Percentage
of buildable
land in
hotspots

Percentage
of
residential
land in
hotspots

Vulnerable
housing
units

Vulnerable
value of
residential
property
(million
US dollars)

0-0.5 meter

90.29%

12.64%

118,257

82,575

0.5-1 meter

5.64%

0.79%

7,387

5,158

1-2 meters

3.55%

0.5%

4,650

3,247

2-3 meters

0.51%

0.07%

668

466

above 3
meters

0.008%

0.001%

10

7

0-0.5 meter

98%

13.72%

128,355

89,626

0.5-1 meter

1.38%

0.19%

1,807

1,262

1-2 meters

0.49%

0.06%

642

448

2-3 meters

0.007%

0.001%

9

6

above 3
meters

0.001%

0.0001%

1

1

0-0.5 meter

99%

13.86%

129,665

90,541

0.5-1 meter

0.7%

0.1%

917

640

1-2 meters

0.1%

0.01%

131

91

2-3 meters

NA

NA

NA

NA

above 3
meters

NA

NA

NA

NA
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Table 6- 10 Building permit analysis in three flooding scenarios

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Flood depth

Building permit
approval since
2006
(m2 )

Heavy Rain

Density of
building permit
approval since
2006
(m2/km2)

0-0.5 meter

893,130

90%

8,780

0.5-1 meter

85,740

5.5%

13,728

1-2 meters

52,604

3.5%

13,562

2-3 meters

5,870

0.5%

10,782

267

0.04%

6,189

0-0.5 meter

1,017,338

98%

9,222

0.5-1 meter

14,444

1.3%

9,438

1-2 meters

5,717

0.5%

10,051

2-3 meters

135

0.01%

8,663

above 3 meters

22

0.04%

5,544

0-0.5 meter

1,029,095

99%

9,232

0.5-1 meter

7,276

0.75%

8,670

1-2 meters

1,235

0.1%

10,089

2-3 meters

24

0.002%

10,097

above 3 meters

3

0.001%

3,733

above 3 meters

Typhoon
Conditions

Percentage of
building permit
approval since
2006
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6.4.3

How vulnerable is the GDP in flood-prone areas?
Taipei City is the capital and economic center of Taiwan. According to Taipei

City Government, the city’s total GDP is approximately $354 billion.31 What if
devastating floods happen in Taipei? How would the GDP be impacted? This study
collects GDP data in Taipei’s 12 districts, and creates a map of GDP contribution
allocated in each square meter of these 12 districts. This helps explain the GDP
contribution in every square meter in Taipei’s 12 districts. Then, this study overlaps
with flood hotspot maps to analyze the GDP impact in flood-prone areas.
The results indicate that approximately 75% of the city’s total GDP is located in
flood-prone areas. More than 4% of the city’s total GDP is in flooding areas with
above 1 meter depth for the extreme weather. Furthermore, this study analyzes the
GDP contribution density in Taipei’s 12 districts.32 This result indicates that the highest
GDP contribution density matches with the highest flooding depth (see Table 6-11). For
instance, in the heavy rain scenario, the highest GDP contribution density is $3,144 per
square meter, the location is also with severe flooding areas between 2 and 3 meters in
31

According to Taipei City Government’s statistics website by the Department of Budget, Accounting

and Statistics, the total GDP is 10,636.634 billion New Taiwan Dollar by the end of 2011. Retrieved
from http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp (In Chinese)
32

GDP density is calculated according to Taipei’s 12 districts GDP dataset from the result of “2011

Industry, Commerce and Service Census” by Taiwan’s Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics; Retrieved from Taipei City Government’s statistics website
http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp. (In Chinese)
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depth. Hence, the higher the GDP contribution density area, the more vulnerable to
floods it could be.
Table 6- 11 The GDP impact in three flooding scenarios

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Flood depth

Average GDP
contribution per
square meter
(US dollar/m2)
2,340

238,002

67%

0.5-1 meter

2,463

15,386

4.3%

1-2 meters

3,176

12,319

3.5%

2-3 meters

2,509

1,367

0.4%

843

36

0.01%

0-0.5 meter

2,367

261,066

73.6%

0.5-1 meter

2,913

4,458

1.26%

1-2 meters

2,734

1,555

0.4%

2-3 meters

1,733

27

0.01%

730

3

0.001%

0-0.5 meter

2,377

264,977

74.7%

0.5-1 meter

2,151

1,805

0.51%

1-2 meters

2,589

318

0.09%

2-3 meters

3,144

8

0.002%

43

0

NA

above 3 meters

Heavy Rain

Percentage of
GDP impact

0-0.5 meter

above 3 meters

Typhoon
Conditions

Total GDP
impact
(million US
dollars)

above 3 meters
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6.4.4

How vulnerable are major critical facilities?

This section analyzes critical facilities and how many are located in flood hotspot
areas in different scenarios though GIS-based mapping in ArcMap 10.2.2 software. The
result indicates that there is no evidence showing that Taipei’s major medical centers,
electric power substations, and gas/oil stations are located in flood-prone areas (see
Figure 6-19, 6-20, 6-21). This implies that planning for those facilities associated with
life and death would not be at high risk of flooding. However, some major facilities are
at risk. For instance, public schools, administrative buildings, and some of the subway
stations are located in severe flood-prone areas.

One of the most severe floods involving subway stations happened on Sep. 17,
2001, caused by Typhoon Nari. This made Taipei’s major subway stations a giant
underground reservoir. The Taipei Main Station was flooded at a level up to 2.3 meters
in depth.33 Subway stations were shut down for more than a month. According to Taipei
Rapid Transit Corporation’s statistics, the daily ridership before the typhoon was
998,153 on Sep. 14, 2001, but, it was 14,116 on Sep. 17, 2001. A month after the
flooding, the daily ridership was 529,808, half of that prior to flooding. In three months,
the ridership increased up to 828,910, but still had not recovered to the pre-flood

33

Taipei Main Station is the transportation hub of Taiwan High-Speed Railroad, Taiwan Railroad, and

Taipei Metro.
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ridership. It was not until the end of 2001 that the daily ridership returned to its ridership
of that prior to flooding. Hence, once the main stations were flooded, it took more than 3
months to resume and recover to normal capacity.

According to the ridership statistics, the affected passengers during the 3-day
flooding event was almost a million daily. During the first month after flooding, more
than half million passengers were still affected daily. Nowadays, the daily ridership of
Taipei Metro is 1.8 million, double that in 2001. In this subway vulnerability study, at
least 5 Taipei Metro34 stations are located in severe flood-prone areas (see Figure 6-22).
These stations are: Xingtian Temple (7.4 million ridership annually), Songjang (9
million ridership annually), Minquan E. Road (8.99 million ridership annually),
Daqiaotou (3.68 million ridership annually), and Sandao Temple (6.85 million ridership
annually). There are 4 flood-prone stations on the same subway line, Line 4 of Taipei
Metro (Zhonghe-Xinlu Line or Orange Line), was completed in 2010. Hence, if a
severe flood caused by a typhoon happens again, it will cause more severe impacts. The
affected daily ridership will be more than a million passengers.

34

Taipei Metro, formally known as Mass-Rapid Transit System(MRT), has 109 stations. The total

length is 121.3 kilometers. The ridership is 634,961,083 annually as of the end of 2013. The average
distance per passenger is 8.34 kilometers.
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In the hospital vulnerability analysis,35 there is no evidence that major medical
centers are located in flood-prone areas.36 However, an analysis of the distribution and
density of all the 3,382 hospitals and clinics in Taipei’s 12 districts,37 shows that about
65% are located in flood-prone areas, meaning that most smaller local hospitals and
clinics are vulnerable to floods. In the extreme weather scenario, more than 8% of all
hospitals and clinics are situated in flood-prone areas above 1 meter (see Table 6-12).
Additionally, the higher density of hospitals and clinics is located in flood hotspot areas
between 0.5 and 3 meters.

More than 90% of all the 232 public schools are located in flood hotspot areas (see
Figure 6-23, Table 6-13).38 In the extreme weather scenario, 12% of public schools
would be flooded above 0.5 meter in depth. However, the density of schools does not
show that a high density of schools are located in more severe flood hotspot areas. The
density is distributed normally in flooding areas between 0.5 and 2 meters.

35

Jonkman et al. (2009)’s case study after Hurricane Katrine indicate that one-third of the analyzed

fatalities occurred outside the flooded areas or in hospitals in the flooded area due to causes such as
strokes, heart attacks, and lack of medical services.
36

There are 4 types of hospitals: medical center , district hospital , local teaching hospital , local

hospital
37

The dataset of hospitals and clinics data in Taipei’s 12 districts is retrieved from Taipei City

Government’s statistics website. http://163.29.37.101/pxweb2007-tp/dialog/statfile9.asp. (In Chinese)
There are 3,382 hospitals and clinics in Taipei by the end of 2013
38

Public elementary, junior high, and senior high schools are included. There are 232 public schools

(92 high schools; 140 elementary schools)
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Taipei is also the political center of Taiwan; most of Taiwan’s central government
offices are located in Taipei. The vulnerability analysis of public administrative buildings
shows that the highest-ranking executive government, the Executive Headquarter is
adjacent to the flood hotspot with 1-2 meters in depth (Figure 6-24). The Legislative
Center and the Investigative Center are also both adjacent to it.39 Taiwan’s Criminal
Investigation Bureau and the Taipei Revenue Service are located in flood hotspot
areas. Hence, if extreme weather happens, these high-ranking central or local
governments could possibly be flooded between 1 and 2 meters in depth.

Figure 6- 19 Vulnerability of Taipei’s major oil and gas stations, in red dot areas
39

Executive Headquarter is officially known as the Executive Yuan; the Legislative Center is

officially known as the Legislative Yuan; the Investigative Center is officially known as the Control
Yuan in Taiwan.
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Figure 6- 20 Vulnerability of Taipei’s major electric power substations, in red dot areas

Figure 6- 21 Vulnerability of Taipei’s major medical centers, in red dot areas
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Figure 6- 22 Vulnerability of Taipei Metro lines (top) and stations (lower), in red dot
areas
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Figure 6- 23 Vulnerability of Taipei’s public schools in flood hotspots, in blue areas

Figure 6- 24 Locations of high-ranking central governments (public administrative
buildings) in flood hotspots, in orange areas
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Table 6- 12 Hospitals and clinics vulnerability analysis in three flooding scenarios

Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Typhoon
Conditions

Heavy Rain

Flood depth

Hospitals and
clinics
(3,382 in total)

Percentage of
total hospitals
and clinics

Density of
hospitals and
clinics
(number/km2)

0-0.5 meter

1,933

57%

19

0.5-1 meter

156

4.6%

25

1-2 meters

105

3%

27

2-3 meters

15

0.4%

27

above 3 meters

1

0.01%

9

0-0.5 meter

2,206

65%

20

0.5-1 meter

37

1.1%

24

1-2 meters

14

0.4%

24

2-3 meters

1

0.01%

23

above 3 meters

1

NA

8

0-0.5 meter

2,229

65%

20

0.5-1 meter

18

0.5%

22

1-2 meters

3

0.1%

27

2-3 meters

1

NA

24

above 3 meters

1

NA

6
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Table 6- 13 Vulnerability analysis of public schools in three flooding scenarios
Three
scenarios

Extreme
Weather

Typhoon
Conditions

Heavy Rain

Flood depth

Percentage of
total public
schools

Public schools
(232 in total)

Density of
public schools
(number/km2)

0-0.5 meter

203

88%

2

0.5-1 meter

12

6%

2

1-2 meters

8

3.3%

2

2-3 meters

1

0.5%

2

above 3 meters

1

0.2%

1

0-0.5 meter
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95%

2

0.5-1 meter

3

1.32%

2

1-2 meters

1

0.5%

2

2-3 meters

1

0.01%

2

above 3 meters

1

NA

1

0-0.5 meter
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96%

2

0.5-1 meter

2

0.7%

2

1-2 meters

1

0.1%

2

2-3 meters

1

NA

2

above 3 meters

1

NA

1
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Lastly, this study analyzes the relationship between green spaces40 and
flood-prone areas to discover if more green spaces area is associated with less severe
flooding. Except for the smallest proportion of severe flood-prone area around the
mountain area, the results indicate that the flooding area with below 0.5 meter in
depth has the higher green space area per capita. For instance, in an extreme weather
scenario, the green space area per capita in the flooding area below 0.5 meter is 33 m2 ,
double that of the more severe flooding areas above 0.5 meter in depth (see Table
6-14). When calculating the density of green space area, it is estimated at 439,811 m2
green spaces per km2 in the least severe flood-prone area, which is higher than that of
flooding areas with 1-3 meters in depth. Both the green space area per capita and
green space density indicates that the flood-prone areas with 1-3 meters have the least
green space area per capita and lowest green space density. This implies that the
higher green space density and green space area per capita has a relationship with
flood risk reduction in Taipei City.

40

According to Taipei City Government (2014), green spaces (or green resource areas) include the

areas of constructed parks, green fields, plazas, sports areas for children, athletic complexes, riverside
parks and scenic areas under the management of Taipei City Government. The total green spaces was
53.36 square miles (13, 819 hectares) at the end of 2013.
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Table 6- 14 The relationship between flood-prone area and green space
Three
scenarios

Extreme Weather

Typhoon
Conditions

Heavy Rain

Green space
per capita (m2)

Flood depth

Green space
density
(m2/km2)

0-0.5 meter

33

439,811

0.5-1 meter

17

307,388

1-2 meters

16

293,299

2-3 meters

18

314,632

above 3 meters

57

511,555

0-0.5 meter

31

428,171

0.5-1 meter

22

352,519

1-2 meters

24

364,647

2-3 meters

29

400,532

above 3 meters

60

513,688

0-0.5 meter

31

427,080

0.5-1 meter

28

398,583

1-2 meters

27

383,495

2-3 meters

26

351,595

above 3 meters

58

510,715
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6.5

Likelihood and cost-benefit analysis
Three-quarters of the heavy rain events (24 hour duration/14 inches) in Taiwan

were caused by typhoons in 2003-2014. This study assumes that the likelihood of the
three different scenarios are associated with typhoons. Hence, the likelihood of three
flooding scenarios will be calculated based on the possibility of typhoons and the
possibility of different levels of rainfalls. For instance, the likelihood of a heavy
rainfall scenario is based on the possibility of a typhoon and the possibility of rainfall
above 14 inches within a 24-hour duration, P (heavy rainfall flooding) = P (typhoon) *
P(rainfall above 14 inches within 24-hour duration).

6.5.1

The likelihood of an extreme weather rainfall

This study collects historic data of rainfalls and typhoons during the past four
decades, 1975 to 2014, from the Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon
DataBase.41 Most of the heavy rain events resulted from typhoons in 2003-2014.
According to Taiwan CWB’s Typhoon DataBase, there were 249 typhoons in
1975-2014, with an average of 6 typhoons annually. The likelihood of a typhoon is
622% annually or 1.7% daily (see Table 6-15). When a typhoon hits Taipei, the

41

Taiwan CWB’s Typhoon Database_historic typhoons and cumulative rainfalls

data:http://rdc28.cwb.gov.tw/TDB/ntdb/pageControl/rain (In Chinese) ; According to Taiwan’s Central
Weather Bureau, 75% of heavy rain (with 350 m.m./14 inches rainfall in 24 hour duration) caused by
typhoon in 2003-2014.
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likelihood of rainfall above 14 inches/350 m.m. in 24 hour duration ranges from 0.8%
in the downtown area to 6.8% in the mountain area (see Table 6-16 and Table 6-17).42
The likelihood of heavy rain in Taipei’s mountain area is about 8 times as much as
that in the downtown area. Therefore, if a typhoon causes heavy flooding, the
likelihood ranges from 4.96% to 42.2% annually. However, there is another 25% of
weather conditions which also cause heavy rain. The annual likelihood of a heavy rain
flooding scenario needs to be adjusted to 6.6% in the downtown area
(1.7%*0.8%*365/0.75) and 56% in the mountain area (1.7%*6.8%*365/0.75).
Table 6- 15 The likelihood of a typhoon from 1975 to 2014
Period

Number of typhoon

Likelihood of a typhoon

2005-2014

57

1.56%

1995-2004

62

1.7%

1985-1994

66

1.8%

1975-1984

64

1.75%

1975-2014

249

1.7%

Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon DataBase; Typhoon Alert Announcement
by Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB) in 1975-2014

42

Data of the downtown Taipei is collected from CWB’s Taipei Weather Station; Data of Taipei

mountain area is collected from CWB’s Taipei Anbu Weather Station.
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Table 6- 16 The likelihood of typhoon and heavy rain in Taipei from 1975 to 2014

Year

Number of
typhoons

Downtown
Taipei_
Heavy rain

19752014

249

2

Mountain
area_
Heavy
rain

17

Likelihood
Likelihood of heavy
of typhoon
rain in
per day
downtown
Taipei

1.7%

0.8%

Likelihood
of heavy
rain in
Taipei
mountain
area
6.8%

Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon DataBase

Table 6- 17 The likelihood of different rainfall scenarios in Taipei from 1975 to 2014
Rainfall

Number of

Number of

Likelihood

Likelihood

Likelihood

(24 hour

typhoons

typhoons

of rainfall

of rainfall

of rainfall

duration)

(downtown)

( mountain)

(downtown)

( mountain)

in average

8 inches
(200 m.m.) up

16

58

6.4%

23.3%

14.85%

12 inches
(300 m.m.) up

4

36

1.6%

14.5%

8.05%

14 inches
(350 m.m.) up

2

17

0.8%

6.8%

3.8%

16 inches
(400 m.m.) up

2

15

0.8%

6%

3.4%

1

7

0.4%

2.8%

1.6%

24 inches
(600 m.m.) up

0

5

NA

2%

1%

28 inches
(700 m.m.) up

0

2

NA

0.8%

0.4%

32 inches
(800 m.m.) up

0

1

NA

0.4%

0.2%

20 inches
(500 m.m.) up

Source: Taiwan Central Weather Bureau (CWB)’s Typhoon DataBase
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Because Taipei’s rainfall datasets are collected from Taiwan CWB’s Taipei
Weather Station (downtown) and Taipei Anbu Weather Station (mountain area), this
study analyzes different likelihoods: conservative (downtown likelihood), medium
(average likelihood), and aggressive conditions (mountain area likelihood). For
example, the annual likelihood of heavy rain in a conservative analysis is 6.6%. This
would be 31.4% in a medium likelihood, and would be 56% in an aggressive
likelihood analysis. In addition, because Taiwan’s CWB Typhoon Database collects
rainfall in 6, 12, 18, and 24 hour durations for each typhoon event, there is no 48 or 72
hour duration rainfall dataset. The likelihood of typhoon conditions in this study, with
48 hour duration/24 inches, is based on the historically actual data of 24 hour
duration/16 of inches and up. An extreme weather rainfall, with 72 hour duration/47
inches, is calculated based on the historically actual data of 24 hour duration/20
inches up. Therefore, the likelihood of a typhoon scenario with 48 hour duration/24
inches ranges from 5% (downtown Taipei) to 37% (Taipei mountain area) according
to the historically actual data over the past four decades. The likelihood of extreme
weather rainfall, with 72 hour duration/47 inches, is from 2.5% to 17% annually (see
Table6-18).
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Table 6- 18 Summary of three likelihood models in three flooding scenarios
Conservative
likelihood model

Medium
likelihood model

Aggressive
likelihood model

6.6%

31.4%

56%

(=1.7%*0.8%*365/0.75)

(=1.7%*3.8%*365/0.75)

(=1.7%*6.8%*365/0.75)

Typhoon
conditions (48
hour duration/24
inches)

5%
(=1.7%*0.8%*365)

21%
(=1.7%*3.4%*365)

37%
(=1.7%*6%*365)

Extreme weather
rainfall (72 hour
duration/47
inches)

2.5%
(=1.7%*0.4%*365)

9.9%
(=1.7%*1.6%*365)

17%
(=1.7%*2.8%*365)

Three scenarios

Heavy rainfall
(24 hour
duration/14
inches)

Note:
1.Likelihood of each scenario = possibility of typhoon*possibility of rainfall= P (typhoon)*P (rainfall)
2.There are 75% of heavy rainfall (24 hour duration/14 inches) caused by typhoon in 2003-2014 .
3.Typhoon conditions (48 hour duration/24 inches) is based on the historically actual data of 24 hour
duration/16 inches up
4.Extreme weather rainfall (72 hour duration/47 inches) is based on the historically actual data of 24
hour duration/20 inches up
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6.5.2

The annual vulnerability analysis in three likelihood models

This study categorizes three different likelihood models, conservative, medium
and aggressive, to analyze different flooding scenarios. In a conservative likelihood
model (a probability of 2.5%) of an extreme weather event, the annual expected
number of vulnerable people in Taipei City is 38,967 persons. The annual vulnerable
GDP is about $6.7 billion. The annual vulnerable land value is about $63 billion. The
annual vulnerable housing property is about $2.3 billion (see Table 6-19).

In a medium likelihood model (a probability of 9.9%) of an extreme weather
event, the annual expected number of vulnerable people in Taipei City is 154,308.
The annual vulnerable GDP is about $26 billion. The annual vulnerable land value is
about $16 billion. The annual vulnerable residential property is about $9 billion (see
Table 6-20).

In an aggressive likelihood model (a probability of 17%) of an extreme weather
event, the annual expected number of vulnerable people in Taipei City is about
265,000. The annual vulnerable GDP is about $45 billion. The annual vulnerable land
value is about $109 billion. The annual vulnerable residential property is about $15.5
billion (see Table 6-21).
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Table 6- 19 The conservative likelihood model and annual vulnerabilities in an extreme
weather
Annual likelihood
of an extreme
weather

Conservative
model
2.5%

Flood
depth
(meter)

Vulnerable
population

Vulnerable
GDP
(million)

Vulnerable
land value
(million)

Vulnerable
residential
property
(million)

0-0.5

34,179

5,950

14,328

2,064

0.5-1

2,789

385

986

129

1-2

31,746

308

630

81

2-3

243

34

86

12

above 3

10

1

2

0.2

In total

38,967

6,678

16,031

2,286

Table 6- 20 The medium likelihood model and annual vulnerabilities in an extreme
weather
Annual likelihood
of an extreme
weather

Medium model
9.9%

Flood
depth
(meter)

Vulnerable
population

Vulnerable
GDP
(million)

Vulnerable
land value
(million)

Vulnerable
residential
property
(million)

0-0.5

135,349

23,562

56,740

8,175

0.5-1

11,046

1,523

3,903

511

1-2

6,912

1,220

2,494

321

2-3

962

135

339

46

above 3

39

4

7

1

In total

154,308

26,444

63,483

9,054
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Table 6- 21 The aggressive likelihood model and annual vulnerabilities in an extreme
weather
Annual likelihood
of an extreme
weather

Aggressive model
17%

Flood
depth
(meter)

Vulnerable Vulnerable
population GDP
(million)

Vulnerable
land value
(million)

Vulnerable
residential
property
(million)

0-0.5

232,418

40,460

97,432

14,038

0.5-1

18,968

2,616

6,702

877

1-2

11,869

2,094

4,282

552

2-3

1,652

232

583

79

above 3

66

6

12

1

In total

264,973

45,409

109,011

15,547

237

6.6

The cost of a severe flood in Taipei metropolitan region

Taipei City’s flood vulnerability and likelihood analysis finds that the annual expected

number of vulnerable people is approximately 40 thousands people, GDP impact is
approximately $6.7 billion, and residential property is approximately $2.3 billion in a
conservative likelihood model (a probability of 2.5%) of an extreme weather event
with rainfall of 72 hour duration/47 inches. However, this study also notes that some
flooding areas exist on the border of the west-side of Taipei City, where one river runs
between Taipei City and New Taipei City. The Taipei Twin Cities, as a metropolitan
region, have a population of 6.7 million people. The population of Taipei
metropolitan region is larger than the U.S.A.’s Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of 6,034,678 as of 2013. New Taipei City is
the most populous city of Taiwan. Besides, Taipei Twin Cities are intensely
interdependent regarding housing, jobs, transportation, environment, and facilities.
Hence, this study broadens the research scope into a metropolitan region scale and
asks some questions: How much does flooding cost if 1% of Taipei metropolitan
region is flooded above 1 meter in depth?43

43

Taipei metropolitan region refers to Taipei Twin Cities: Taipei City (2.7 million people within 104.9

square miles) and New Taipei City (3.95 million people within 760.7 square miles); This section
assumes that a flood above 1 meter is viewed as a severe flood. In Taipei City, the severe flood-prone
areas accounts for approximately 1.7% (1.8 out of 104.9 square miles) of total land areas.
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However, due to the data limitation of New Taipei City, this study does not allow
a thorough vulnerability, likelihood, and cost-benefit analysis of the Taipei
metropolitan region as it did for Taipei City in previous sections. Nonetheless, this
section simplifies the evaluation based on limited datasets and some assumptions. For
instance, this section assumes that 1% of the Taipei metropolitan region will be
flooded at a depth of 1 meter. The cost analysis is based on the
government-announced current land value,44 residential property value, and unit
damage to understand the cost.45 First, this section finds that there is approximately
2.6%, or 20 square miles of New Taipei City in flood-prone areas. This is less than
Taipei City’s 41%, 43 square miles. Additionally, because New Taipei City’s land
value per unit is lower than Taipei City, the vulnerable land value in New Taipei City
is lower. The damage per unit from floods in New Taipei City is half that of Taipei
City. For instance, the medium unit damage is $300 per square meter in Taipei City,
and it is an estimated $150 in New Taipei City (Wang 2003). Despite this, New Taipei
City has many highly developed areas within the flood-prone areas, particularly in
Banqiao, Zhonghe, Xinzhuang, Sanchong, and Xindian districts,46 which are adjacent
to Taipei City and major rivers (see Figure 6-25 and 6-26).
44

Government-announced current land value of 2014 in Taipei City and New Taipei City is about 89%

of the market value according to Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior’s statistics
45

The unit damage is based on flood damage of central Taipei areas (Wang 2003; Hsu 2013).

46

There are 29 districts in New Taipei City. The municipal seat is located at Banqiao district.
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Figure 6- 25 Flood hotspots in the extreme weather scenario in Taipei metropolitan
region

Figure 6- 26 The vulnerable land value in the extreme weather scenario in New Taipei
City
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Further, how much will a flood covering 1% of the Taipei metropolitan region
cost in property and land value? In estimating the cost, this study adopts the
government-announced current land value of 2014, which adjusts the market land
value. For example, the current land value is 89% of the market land value in Taipei
City and New Taipei City in 2014. The total land value of Taipei’s metropolitan region
is estimated at $1,531 billion. A flood covering 1% of the metro Taipei area at more
than 1 meter could cost $1.5 billion. The cost is larger than previous studies measured by
the unit damage (Wang 2003; Hsu 2013). Hence, when there is extreme weather with 47
inches of rainfall in 72 hours, this study estimates that 1% of Taipei metropolitan region
flooding above 1 meter will cost up to $ 1.5 billion in damage, presented in Table 6-22,
Table 6-23, and Table 6-24.
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Table 6- 22 Cost analysis of a flood by property-based estimation in Taipei
Cost estimation

Taipei City

New Taipei City

Taipei Twin Cities

Average housing price:
US dollars
(a 1,260 square feet
unit)

$687,333
($546 per square
foot)

$350,280
($278 per square
foot)

$519,306

Number of housing
units (most are
condominiums)

935,535

1,546,874

2,482,409

Total housing asset
(billion US dollars)

$644

$541

$1,185

1% of housing flooded
above 1 meters
(billion US dollars)

$6.44

$5.41

$11.85

The proportion of
buildings older than 30
years

58%

37%

47%

Possible damages of
vulnerable old
buildings in the 1% of
housing flooded above
1 meters
(billion US dollars)

$3.74

$2

$5.74

$0.75

$0.4

$1.15

Estimated cost of the
floods damage
(assuming 20% of
vulnerable old
buildings damage)
(billion US dollars)
Note:

1. Average housing price is based on housing statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior in 2013;
2. The average housing price of purchase contrast is $698,266 in Taipei City and $385,866 in New
Taipei City. It’s based on the Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior’s statistics in 2014 Q2.;
3. Taipei’s standard housing price in 3 districts of 2013 is $687,333, Taipei City Government’s
Department of Land;
4. The proportion of buildings over 30 years old is based on Taipei City Government’s Department of
Urban Development’s and New Taipei City Government’s statistics. This study assumes that older
buildings are more vulnerable to floods.
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Table 6- 23 Cost analysis of a flood by land value-based estimation in Taipei
Cost estimation
Total parcels of land

Taipei City

New Taipei City

Taipei Twin Cities

415,194

1,092,233

1,507,427

Total land area
(hectare)

25,970

197,013

222,983

Government-announced
current land value
(billion US dollars)

$850.707

$511.794

$1,362.5

Adjustment to market
land value
(billion US dollars)

$955.851

$575.049

$1,530.9

$9.56

$5.75

$15.31

$0.96

$0.58

$1.54

Possible floods damage:
1% of land flooded
above 1 meters
(billion US dollars)
Estimated cost of the
floods damage
(assuming 10% of
possible floods damage)
(billion US dollars)

Source: Taiwan Ministry of the Interior; Taipei City Government
Note: Government-announced current land value is based on land value statistics from the Taiwan’s
Ministry of the Interior, Taipei City Government, and New Taipei Government in 2014.
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Table 6- 24 Cost analysis of a flood by the unit damage in Taipei
Cost estimation

Taipei City

New Taipei City

Taipei Twin Cities

Total land area
(hectare)

25,970

197,013

222,983

Urbanized area

100%

60%

80%

1% of urban area in
flooding (m²)

2,597,000

11,820,780

14,417,780

The least unit damage
(US dollars/m²)

$100

$50

NA

$0.26

$0.59

$0.85

Estimated cost of the
floods damage based on
the least unit damage
(billion US dollars)

Note: The unit damage is based on flood damage of central Taipei areas (Wang 2003; Hsu 2013). The
unite damage ranges from $100-$600 per square meter in central Taipei areas. This study assumes the
least unit damage of $100 per square meter for cost analysis. The unit damage of New Taipei City is
estimated on the property value in comparison with Taipei City.
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Research has found that every dollar invested into disaster preparedness would
save $4 to $7 dollars in post-disaster damages (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005;
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP 2012; The National Academy of
Sciences 2012). Wahlström (2015) also indicates that typical cost-benefit ratios lie in
the range of 3:1 to 15:1. The European Union states that 1 euro dollar invested in
disaster-risk reduction saves from 4 to 7 euro dollars in disaster response. New York
City and Randstad provide examples. New York City’s resilience plan is expected to
cost approximately $20 billion over 10 years to save future flood damage of $35
billion by 2020 or $90 billion by 2050. The Dutch government is spending $2.9
billion over 10 years to protect 4 million citizens from floods. Taipei Twin Cities have
similar characteristics in common with Randstad47 and New York City. For instance,
the population size is similar, approximately 7 million. There is more than 50% of the
national GDP concentrated in Randstad, which is similar to Taipei Twin Cities.
Randstad’s flooding area is estimated at 5% of total land submerged, but the worstcase scenario is 50% of total land submerged, costing approximately $180 billion
(The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007). In New

47

The Randstad is a polycentric urban area in western Netherlands, comprising Amsterdam, Rotterdam,

The Hague, Utrecht and several smaller cities. Randstad is one of the most densely populated areas in
the OECD, and has developed into an advanced urban economy with many leading sectors, such as
logistics, horticulture and financial services (OECD 2007).
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York City, it is estimated that the flooding areas with severe economic losses48
accounts for 5% of the total land area in 2013 to almost 25% by 2050s (The City of
New York 2013).

In New York, Randstad, and Taipei, at least 5% of total land is likely to flood.
This will cost Taipei metropolitan region approximately $7.7 billion if 5% of the total
area is flooded more than 1 meter in depth. When calculating the damage per capita,
Randstad is the highest: 5% of the land flooding with $21 billion in damage, costing
$2,943 per person (The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
2007). The second highest is New York City, the damage of $19 billion from
Hurricane Sandy would cost $2,260 per person (The City of New York 2013). Then,
the damage per capita in Taipei metropolitan region is the lowest, with an estimated
cost of $1,149 per person (see Table 6-25). However, although Taipei has the lowest
flood damage per capita in comparison with Randstad and New York City, Taipei
metropolitan region’s 1% of total land submerged above 1 meter, costing
approximately $1.5 billion, is still a huge amount. Urban and regional resilience
planning policies using land-use and environment planning to reduce its vulnerability
and damages from flooding is essential and critical in Taipei.

48

Each neighborhood, defined by the zip code, with economic losses of more than $30 million from

flooding
246

Table 6- 25 Cost analysis of floods in New York City, Randstad, and Taipei
New York City,

Randstad,

Taipei Twin Cities,

U.S.A.

the Netherlands

Taiwan

Population
(million)

8.4

7.1

6.7

Percentage of the
country’s
population

2.6%

44%

29%

GDP
(billion US dollars)

$1,358

$343

$300

Percentage of the
country’s GDP

8%

51%

60%

Cost analysis

Projection of severe
flooding areas

5%
(Assuming 5% of
5%~25%

5% ~ 50%

land submerged
above 1 meter in
depth)

$20.9 billion
(5% of total land
submerged)
The possible cost
of a severe flood

Floods cost per
capita (US dollars)

$19 billion in 2012
$35 billion in 2020
$90 billion in 2050

$180 billion
(worst-case
scenarios: 50% of
total land
submerged)

$7.7 billion

$2,943

$1,149

$2,260

Source: The City of New York 2013; The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
2007
Note:
1.The GDP of New York City is the gross metropolitan product; New York City’s severe flooding
areas is based on a neighborhood (zip code) with economic losses of $30 million.
2. The GDP of Randstad is estimate at approximately 271 billion euros.
3. In Taipei Twin Cities, 1% of total land submerged above 1 meter could cost approximately $1.5
billion
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In order to save future flood damages of $7.7 billion in Taipei metropolitan
region, Taipei should formulate resilience-related policies of at least $1 billion over
the next 10 years. These resilience-related policies and strategies can include: 1.
setting up organization, funding, and analysis of a resilient city as defined by the
United Nations; 2. implementing land use policies and urban growth management to
direct development away from floodplains providing a strategy for reducing flood risk
and vulnerability; 3. reducing development density in severe floods areas; 4.
redirecting riverside condominium development projects and to retreat from flood
risks; 5. creating more wetlands and parks; 6. planning more open spaces, water
retention ponds, and permeable surfaces to accommodate floods (see Table 6-26).
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Table 6- 26 Policy plans toward resilience in New York City, Randstad, and Taipei
Randstad’s
Resilience-related A Stronger, More
Resilient New York
policy plan

Spatial Planning Key Suggested Policies
Decision: Room for for a Resilient Taipei
the River

Budget

$20 billion

$2.91 billion

$1 billion

Period
(year)

2013-2022

2006-2015

2016-2025

Save at least $9.6
billion by 2015
Safety for 4 million
Dutch citizens

Save $7.7 billion
by 2025

Benefit of
implementing
resilience-related
policy plan

Save $35 billion
by 2020
Save $$90 billion
by 2050

Setting up organization,
funding, and analysis
towards a resilient city;
A scenario planning
method towards natural
disasters; citywide

Strategy

infrastructure and the
built environment;
developing community
rebuilding and resilience
plans

Lowering and
broadening floodplain;
creating river diversions
and temporary
water storage areas;
restoring marshy
riverine landscapes;
natural water storage
sponges

implementing urban
growth management;
reducing density in
severe floods areas;
redirecting riverside
condominium
development; creating
more wetlands and
parks; planning more
open spaces, water
retention ponds, and
permeable surfaces to
accommodate floods

Source: The City of New York 2013; Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
2007
Note: 1.A Dutch human life has an estimated value of approximately $2.4 million; The Dutch
resilience plan is to provide safety for 4 million people, 25% of the country’s total population,
and assumes a resilience plan can save the lives of 0.1% of 4 million people. The benefit is
estimated at $9.6 billion.
2. New York City’s resilience plan is also to adapt for 30 inches of sea level rise and twice the
number of residents (up to 800,000) living in the 100-year-floodplain by the 2050s.
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A RESILIENT TAIPEI
Major cities around the world, New York City, London, Tokyo, and Randstad,
are all preparing for flood resilience (see Chapter 3). The research suggests that
Taipei’s resilience planning for flooding should shift from controlling water through
costly engineering and structural construction to accommodating and absorbing water
through land-use and environmental planning. In other words, rather than structural
planning, land-use and environmental planning should play a proactive role in urban
flood resilience. However, at this time a disconnect between flood prevention and
land-use planning remains. Hence, this research suggests that Taiwan’s central and
local governments reorganize agencies and increase funding for resilience. A budget
of at least $100 million each year should be allocated to strengthen flood resilience in
Taipei. A ten-year Taipei flood resilience plan with a total budget of $1 billion would
save the possible cost of approximately $7.7 billion in the Taipei metropolitan region
by 2025.

Taiwan is now planning to create the Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources, which could be used to strengthen the coordination of urban flood
resilience. In local governments, a regional government agency that can promote the
coordination of policies in the Taipei metropolitan region is needed, as demonstrated
by the Greater London Authority and Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Additionally,
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Taipei should address the gaps of a resilient city’s essentials as defined by the United
Nations. Taipei also needs to coordinate with planning-related universities and
institutions to strengthen the study of urban resilience and data collection. Moreover,
Taipei should adopt a growth management policy to direct development away from
flooding hotspots. Furthermore, urban regeneration policy should require developers
to improve storm sewers, water retention ponds, and permeable surfaces. Planning
more space for rivers, more constructed wetlands, and more ecological ponds to
accommodate water is important. Also, Taiwan’s central and local governments
should promote an actuarially fair flood insurance program which can reflect actual
flood risks. Finally, a bottom-up community resilience plan would assist achieving
urban resilience.
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7.1

Address the gaps of a resilient city’ essentials as defined by the United Natons
This section identifies the needs for Taipei resilience. Although the United

Nations has identified the 10 essentials for resilient cities (see Table 7-1), Taipei’s
priorities for urban resilience should focus on organization, funding, and land-use
planning policy to reduce flood risk. A comprehensive flood risk analysis is necessary
in Taipei. In the future, Taipei needs to do more research on flood risk assessment and
provide the results of vulnerability mapping to citizens. This would increase people’s
risk awareness and allow them to take actions to reduce or transfer the risk.
Additionally, risk compliant land-use principles and policies need to be promoted in
Taipei.

In disaster management, Taipei City Government established two related
organizations to coordinate risk reduction: the Disaster Prevention and Rescue
Committee in 2002 and the Office of Disaster Management in 2011. The former is to
plan, supervise, and integrate disaster prevention and rescue tasks. The latter is to
reduce the impact of and respond to disasters. However, with both organizations,
rescue after a disaster is the primary focus, not risk reduction and prevention. Both
organizations should put their priorities into preparedness and prevention, and then
cooperate with different departments such as the Department of Urban Development,

252

Department of Transportation, Department of Rapid Transit Systems, Department of
Public Works to plan for disaster risk reduction.
According to Taipei City Disaster Reduction and Prevention White Paper in 2013,
the annual execution budget for disaster reduction and prevention was approximately
$7.7 million, meaning that only $3 dollars per capita has been spent annually on
disaster reduction. In this annual execution budget, 53% was spent on levee-related
and other flood control projects, 27% on disaster organization and responsiveness,
and only 6% on disaster risk reduction education. Based on this, Taipei still relies on
levees and other public works to reduce disaster risk. As a result, very little of the
budget has been allocated to providing incentives for homeowners, low-income
families, communities, and businesses to invest in risk reduction. The annual budget
of $200,000 in risk education programs in public schools of Taipei City should be
increased. Reducing money spent on levee-related and other flood control projects
and using that money for land-use planning for resilience and increased risk reduction
education programs would help to achieve urban resilience. Increasing funding for
flood prevention is important. It is estimated that a budget of at least $100 million
each year should be allocated to strengthen flood resilience in the Taipei metropolitan
region.
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Table 7- 1 The gaps and needs of Taipei in the United Nations 10 essentials of a resilient
city
United Nations
10 essentials for
a resilient city

Gaps of urban resilience in Taipei City

 Taipei City Disaster Prevention and Rescue

Committee was established in 2002 to plan,
supervise, and integrate disaster prevention
and rescue tasks
 Taipei City Office of Disaster Management

Organization and coordination
to understand and reduce

was established in 2011 to reduce effect,
prepare for, respond to disasters. This

disaster risk

office is a newly-established organization
and coordination system under Taipei City
Fire Department
 Both organizations mainly focus on rescue

after a disaster, rather than risk reduction
planning

 The annual budget of disaster reduction and

Assign a budget for disaster risk
reduction and provide
incentives for homeowners,
low-income families,
communities, businesses and
public sector to invest in
reducing the risks

prevention is approximately $7.7 million in
2013
 53% was spent in levee-related or flood

control projects, 27% in disaster
organization and responsiveness, and only
6% in disaster risk reduction education
 A lack of budget in providing incentives for

homeowners, low-income families,
communities, businesses to invest in
reducing the risks
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United Nations
10 essentials for
a resilient city

Gaps of urban resilience in Taipei City

Maintain up-to-date data on
hazards and vulnerabilities,
prepare risk assessments and
use these as the basis for urban
development plans and
decisions

 Little study in flood risk assessment and

Invest in and maintain critical
infrastructure that reduces risk,

 Flood drainage has been improved since the

such as flood drainage, adjusted
where needed to cope with
climate change

vulnerability analysis
 A lack of applying the up-to-date flood risk

maps as the basis for urban development
plans and decisions

1990s, but not significantly improved
 Continuing improvement of flood drainage is

necessary

 Most of public schools and public buildings

are located in flood-prone areas
Assess the safety of all schools
and health facilities and
upgrade these as necessary

 A lack of risk assessment among public

schools, public buildings, and health
facilities
 A lack of budget investment in public

schools, public buildings, and health
facilities for disaster risk reduction

 Risk compliant building regulations

Apply and enforce realistic, risk
compliant building regulations
and land use planning
principles. Identify safe land for
low-income citizens and
develop upgrading of informal
settlements, wherever feasible

adjustment is mostly focused in the
earthquake risk reduction. But, little for
flood risk
 Need more land-use planning principles for

flood risk reduction
 Growth management policy can be adopted

to direct urban development away from
flood-prone areas
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United Nations
10 essentials for
a resilient city

Gaps of urban resilience in Taipei City

Ensure education programs and
training on disaster risk
reduction are in place in schools
and local communities

 A lack of education and programs
 A lack of budget in education programs and

training

 Need more wetlands to reduce flood risks.

Protect ecosystems and natural
buffers to mitigate floods, storm
surges and other hazards to

For example, Taipei Guandu floodplain is
an example for reducing flood
 Green infrastructure strategies such as green

which your city may be

roof, drainage system, water retention

vulnerable. Adapt to climate
change by building on good risk
reduction practices

ponds, and permeable surfaces can also be
applied for flood risk reduction
 Need to plan for more ecosystems and natural

buffers to mitigate floods

 Although the automatic remote surveillance

Install early warning systems
and emergency management
capacities in your city and hold
regular public preparedness
drills

systems for storm sewer systems were
established in 2007, there are 26 pumping
stations along Keelung River and 50
stations along Tamsui River that have not
been implemented completely yet
 Need more comprehensive early warning

systems for river flooding, pumping
stations, and sewer systems
The risk compliant building regulations in Taipei are primarily focused on
earthquake risk. Taipei has adopted an urban renewal policy as a strategy to reduce
damage from earthquakes. However, there are fewer land-use planning principles for
reducing flood risk and damage. In the future, more studies of urban flood resilience
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through land-use planning are necessary. Urban growth management can be adopted
to prevent intensive development in or adjacent to flood-prone areas. Moreover, not
only does the need of natural buffers to mitigate floods exist in outer Taipei, but
downtown Taipei also needs natural buffers such as man-made wetlands, parks, and
natural conservation to reduce flood risk. The implementation of green infrastructure
strategies such as green roofs, drainage systems, water retention ponds, and permeable
surfaces can also be applied for flood risk reduction when developers apply for new
building permits. Finally, improving the early warning system is essential. Taipei’s is
not sufficient yet. Although automatic remote surveillance system for storm sewers
was established in 2007, most pumping stations, 76 out of 86 stations along rivers,
have not yet been completely implemented. In the future, strengthening
comprehensive flooding early warning systems can help to implement an efficient
evacuation plan and reduce damages.
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7.2

Strengthen data collection and the study of urban resilience

Data insufficiency, inconsistency, and the lack of urban resilience study exist in
Taipei. Since data collection is the basis for risk analysis, local and central
governments can arrange a task force in coordination with planning-related
universities and institutions to collect up-to-date and consistent data on disaster
exposure, losses, locations, reasons, and physical or social vulnerabilities. Since 2006,
Taiwan’s National Development Council has managed the multiple organizations
involved with the national geographic information system (NGIS). A ten-year
(2006-2015) NGIS project has now been implemented. Nine groups of different
central government agencies have been established for the collection of nine
databases.49 However, because different datasets were produced originally by
different agencies, inconsistency occurred. For example, this research on Taipei flood
vulnerability (see Chapter 6) indicates a mismatch between the land-use and flood
GIS-based maps. Different coordinates and projections of GIS shape files remain in
these databases. Additionally, there is little data collection of actual economic losses
or cost estimation of flood events by local governments, but Taipei City Government

49

Nine databases include: the Natural Environment Database, Natural Resources and Ecological

Database, Environmental Quality Database, Social Economic Database, Transportation Network
Database, Land Information Database, Land-use Planning Database, Public Pipeline Database and
Topographic Database.
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began to collect this data in 2011. Further, New Taipei City, the most populous city in
Taiwan, lacks a city-wide flood vulnerability and risk map as the basis for urban
development decisions.

Data collection and further study of Taipei flood resilience is necessary. Taipei
Twin Cities should strengthen data collection of flood losses, cost estimation,
locations, reasons, and impacts. Additionally, the consistency of databases among
different agencies also needs to be strengthened. Taiwan’s National Development
Council and other central government agencies should cooperate with
planning-related universities and institutions to help to review data consistency among
the nine databases of the NGIS project. Further, strengthening the study of flood risk
assessment, vulnerability analysis, and risk maps will be important. This could
provide citizens with better risk awareness and information. A thorough study of risk
assessment regarding properties, schools, subways, and other critical facilities would
also provide local governments and policy makers with a tool to make better urban
development policies and land-use planning decisions.
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7.3

Emphasize the importance of land-use and environmental planning for resilience
Most cities adopt costly engineering and structural facilities for flood resilience.

Some cities provide financial support directly to buyout occupants living in
flood-prone areas. Approximately $200 million was spent each year from 1982 to
2005 by Taiwan’s Water Resource Agency to build numerous public works to control
floods in Taipei. Dikes and pumping stations both tripled. A man-made river, a
floodway, was completed in the 1980s. An underground flood diversion built at the
cost of approximately $100 million per kilometer, began operation in 2005. Storm
sewer systems have been improving. These costly flood control facilities have been
completed in Taipei. However, with all these structures, floods still threaten Taipei.
Recent experience shows that stormwater overtopped some of dikes and that the storm
sewer systems and pumping stations could not handle the amount of water from some
storms or heavy rainfalls caused primarily by typhoons. While adding height to the
levees or more capacity to the storm sewer systems and pumping stations may help in
reducing flood damage, this solution is costly and, in the case of levees, less
sustainable than dedicating funds to other solutions in land-use and environmental
planning such as adopting a growth management policy to direct development away
from flood-prone areas, planning for more space to accommodate water, preserving
natural buffers, designing water retention ponds and permeable surfaces, and
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implementing green infrastructure strategies. These alternatives in planning, rather
than engineering, will strengthen Taipei’s flood resilience.
Since it has been established that Taipei’s costly structures cannot protect the
city from flooding, this research suggests the importance of land-use and
environmental planning to achieve urban resilience in the future. However, to date
land-use planning has been little used in the decision-making of water resource
management and flood control projects. Chang et al. (2013) discover that the
management of Tamsui River in Taipei is governed by the water resource agency, but
the land use agency has little authority to participate in the control of land use
activities on rivers. In Taipei, the Department of Urban Development makes minor
revisions of urban plans when Taiwan’s Water Resources Agency announces an
adequate width for floodway according to the protection criteria of a flood in every
200 years. Planning, building or rebuilding levees and drainage systems are primarily
decided by the central government. Little coordination exists between the central and
local governments as well as the water resource and the land-use agency. Thus, the
land-use agency in the local government often either ignores flooding issues or plays
a minor role in alleviating the problem.
Major cities’ engineering strategies to reduce flood risk by costly dikes, dams,
storm-surge barriers and dunes have proved their inadequacy. Taipei had a similar
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experience, discussed in Chapter 5. Hence, increasing the local government’s role in
land-use and environmental planning for urban flood resilience is essential.
Additionally, ensuring the policy integration of land-use and water resource
management is necessary. First, Taiwan’s National Development Council can
coordinate with the Water Resource Agency and the Construction and Planning
Agency to develop a project of urban and regional flood resilience planning policies
and guidelines. With this planning policy either recommended or mandated by the
central government, local governments can play a more proactive role in the
implementation of land-use plans, growth management, zoning ordinances,
subdivision regulations, infrastructure investment, and building codes to consider
flood resilience. Any pro-growth action by the local government should also require
developers to implement any needed storm sewer improvements, provide water
retention ponds, more open spaces, constructed wetlands, and more permeable
surfaces in each development. Rather than engineering structures, emphasizing the
importance of land-use and environmental planning towards flood resilience can
perform better in preventing and reducing flood damages.
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7.4

Accelerate reorganization of public agencies to strengthen resilience
Capable organizations play an important role in achieving urban resilience.

Taiwan is working to create the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
(MENR) by merging different ministries and agencies in Taiwan’s central
government. The MENR is expected to integrate the policies of environmental
protection and conservation, water resource management, disaster reduction and
prevention, and urban resilience. Similar to the Netherlands’ creation of the Ministry
of Infrastructure and Environment in 2010, Taiwan’s reorganization of public
agencies would strengthen collaboration and resources to achieve resilience.

This section suggests that the reorganization of Taiwan’s central and local
governments adapt a focus toward urban resilience because recent rebuilding
examples indicate little integration of natural disaster management and spatial
planning existed. Taiwan’s National Development Council, reorganized in 2014, can
become an important platform in the central government and coordinate with different
agencies to promote urban resilience through existing major national development
plans regarding disaster resilience. The management for natural disaster prevention
and response needs to be restructured and integrated with national spatial planning.
National spatial planning strategies should also be based on risk assessment and
vulnerability analysis of natural disasters.
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Water resource planning is often viewed as a factor of economic development in
Taiwan. Taiwan’s Water Resources Agency, under the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
is the central authority of water resource and flood prevention. At the local level,
Taipei City’s Hydraulic Engineering Office of the Department of Public Works often
adopts the central government policies. Thus, flood resilience relies on structural
facilities because the central and local agencies have concentrated on civil
engineering and structure construction, rather than land-use planning for risk
reduction.
Because there is no river basin management agency in Taiwan, fragmented river
management authorities also exist. A river’s upstream conservation, middle stream
management, and downstream control belongs to three different central agencies: the
Soil and Water Conservation Bureau of the Council of Agriculture, the Water
Resource Agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Construction and
Planning Agency of the Ministry of the Interior. Coordination problems exist in river
management, conservation, and land-use planning. Moreover, Taiwan’s
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with primary focus on clear water and
pollution improvement, plays a passive role in flood resilience and prevention. Further,
in disaster management, Taiwan’s National Fire Agency, under the Ministry of the
Interior, is mainly involved with disaster rescue, rather than prevention. Taipei’s Fire
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Department plays a similar role. In the future, in order to address these coordination
problems among public agencies, it is necessary to accelerate the ongoing central
government reform and the creation of the Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources to ensure the integration of river management and land-use planning for
strengthening urban resilience.
At the local level, the land-use planning sector ought to play a proactive role in
urban flood resilience. Because structural facilities cannot completely prevent Taipei
from flooding (see Chapter 5), Taipei Hydraulic Engineering Office of the Department
of Public Works cannot be viewed as the only authority on flood resilience. Taipei
Department of Urban Development has to develop a comprehensive resilient plan to
prevent floods by land-use principles and strategies. A growth management policy can
be evaluated toward flood resilience by identifying the location, time, and density of
development in a safer place. A zoning revision and down-zoning strategy for
ensuring lower density development in the flood-prone areas should be initiated.
Local government reorganization also improves coordination. New Taipei City
was established as a special municipality in 2010, when 29 townships and cities of
Taipei County were consolidated into the 29 districts of New Taipei City. The
reorganization of New Taipei City reduced local governments and improved
coordination problems. However, there is still a need for cooperation in the Taipei
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metropolitan region. Although, in 2011 the two mayors of Taipei and New Taipei City
did establish a task force, the Tamsui River Management Committee, to integrate
policies of river management. This committee is a temporary organization with lack
of funding and personnel to initiate and implement policies of river basin management.
Besides, the goal of this committee mainly focuses on water pollution improvement,
and little on flood prevention. In the future, formulating a new river basin
management authority to replace the Tamsui River Management Committee will
allow continuing funding and personnel to implement the goals of the integration of
river management and spatial planning. Another commission, the Northern Taiwan
Development Commission, formed in 2004, was established by eight local
governments. This commission provides a platform for cooperation in the Taipei
metropolitan region. However, the agenda at this commission’s annual meeting
concentrates on transportation, tourism, crime prevention, and disaster rescue. Little
attention is given to disaster resilience and flood prevention. In the future, urban flood
resilience should be promoted in Taipei. A new organization integrating river
management, land-use and environmental planning on a regional approach should be
considered. Taipei needs to create a regional organization or authority to promote
coordination of resilience policies in the Taipei metropolitan region.
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7.5

Increase budget and allocation of tax for flood resilience
The lack of an adequate sewer system in a city increases its flood risk. Notable

was the city of New Orleans with insufficient sewer systems which increased the
severe flooding when Hurricane Katrina devastated the city in 2005. Tokyo improved
its sewer systems after the city’s most severe flood in 1958. Nowadays, Tokyo’s
metropolitan area outer underground discharge channel provides an example for flood
risk reduction by strengthening drainage systems (details are found in Chapter 3).
Thus, this research suggests an increased budget for water resource management and
sewer system improvement in Taiwan’s central government. At the local level, Taipei
should consider making use of the existing land value increment tax, which is based
locally on the total incremental value at the time of the transfer of the title of the land.
Taipei and New Taipei City can reallocate some portion of this for flood resilience.
The Property Transfer Tax Program of Berkeley, California provides an example. In
1992, Berkeley adopted an additional 0.5% transfer tax on top of the existing 1% tax
on all real estate transactions to fund for disaster resilience from earthquakes. This
program has led to more than 60% of the residences in Berkeley becoming more
disaster resilient (The National Academy of Sciences 2012). Taipei can make use of
the existing land value increment tax to invest in urban resilience. However, since
2002, Taipei followed the national policy that reduced by half the rate of land value
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increment tax on all real estate transactions in order to boost real estate and economic
development. In 2002, $333 million was collected in Taipei City. Nowadays, Taipei
and New Taipei City account for more than 41.1% of Taiwan’s total land value
increment tax on real estate transaction.50 If 5% of the annually collected tax can be
allocated for urban flood resilience, Taipei Twin Cities can allocate approximately
$55 million each year for flood risk reduction. In the future, when Taiwan’s policy of
land value increment tax returns to its normal rate, this will result in an increase of
$110 million each year to implement urban resilience plans. However, the allocation
of tax revenues needs strong political leadership and support. In the Chapter 6
vulnerability analysis, Taipei City-owned properties are estimated at approximately
$40 billion in the flooding depth between 0.5 and 1 meter in an extreme weather
condition. At least $12.5 billion of Taipei City-owned properties are located in the
severe flood-prone areas. Hence, when Taipei’s political leaders are aware of the risk
and its vulnerability, more attention and support will be gained to allocate tax revenue
for urban resilience plans in Taipei. In flood resilience planning and implementation,
increased funding of at least $100 million annually for Taipei metropolitan region is
necessary.

50

According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance, Taiwan’s total land value increment tax on all real estate

transactions is approximately $2.7 billion in 2012. Taipei City accounts for 20.2%, and New Taipei
City accounts for 20.9%.
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At the national level, Taiwan’s central government should also increase the
budget for storm sewer systems. The budget of storm sewer improvement remains a
small proportion, approximately 6% of the total budget among major infrastructure
projects51 scrutinized by Taiwan’s National Development Council. Water resource
management accounts for another 8% at the budget. However, transportation accounts
for half of the total budget, a large amount of which goes to highway and road
construction and maintenance. For example, the 2015 annual budget for major
infrastructure is approximate $5.6 billion, with 23% of that total budget going into
highways, expressways, and roads. However, massive highway or expressway
construction would reduce the ability to accommodate water and increase flood risk in
the city. Taipei found that highway and expressway construction caused the moving of
some parts of rivers and irrigation tunnels. This resulted in more vulnerability and
damage from flooding. Hence, highway budget should be adjusted and lowered in order
to increase the budget for storm sewer improvement. In doing so, urban flood resilience
can be strengthened by reducing highways and increased storm sewer investments.
Thus, in order to promote urban flood resilience, the proportion of storm sewer
improvement and water resource management should both be increased to 10% of the
51

A single infrastructure investment project over $34 million ($1 billion New Taiwan dollars) of the

central government agency should be scrutinized and approved by Taiwan’s National Development
Council for further budget allocation. This is known as the Annual Preliminary Work and Screening of
Government Infrastructure Project.
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total budget among major infrastructure projects. This will create an additional $280
million each year for investing in flood resilience in Taiwan. Taipei can benefit from the
increased budget. This provides more funding for improving storm sewers and water
management, especially in the older communities with no adequate drainage systems.
Continuing storm water sewer improvement and water management integrated with
land-use planning would reduce flood risk and damage in Taipei.

270

7.6

Plan more space for rivers to accommodate flood

This research suggests a planning strategy for more space to accommodate flood
water, rather than blocking water out by building massive dikes. McHarg (1969)
explains that the 50-year floodplain in a river basin has little tolerance for urban
development because floodplains are suitable for accommodating water and natural
resources instead of intensive urban development. However, in the Taipei Basin, many
floodplains were converted into development lands. Taipei’s fast urbanization has
threatened floodplains, which increased vulnerability. For example, after the
completion of a river reshaping project, the Straightening Project of Keelung River, in
1993, a large amount of floodplains, approximately 270 hectares, were converted into
urban development lands (see Figure 7-1). High density developments were located
on what was previously floodplains, especially in some newly developed areas in the
Neihu, Songshan, and Zhongshan districts of Taipei City. This resulted in increased
floods and damages. Taipei’s floods from 1991 to 2012 show that those areas along
the Keelung River were flooded frequently.
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Figure 7- 1 Urban development in floodplains (in black dot) after reshaping the river
in 1993
Source: Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban Development

Chapter 6, Flood Simulation, found that many areas along the Keelung River will
be flooded above 1 meter with the 24-hour duration rainfall when the
200-year-frequency flood occurs. Because high-rise condominiums, highways, and
massive riverside levees were built along the Keelung River after the 1990s, and the
relocation of these structures for creating more space for the river is costly, thus
impossible to achieve. Hence, a cost-effective way to create more space to
accommodate flood water is to lower floodplains and plan for constructed wetlands
and water retention ponds in the floodplains, instead of the existing plans for more
public works in floodplains such as flood control facilities, roads, parking lots,
basketball courts, and bike lanes. However, this project needs strong political support
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to change the plans for public works in floodplains. A new strategy of planning more
space for the river to accommodate flood water, rather than to block water out by
building massive dikes, is necessary in Taipei. Rather than creating more public works
and activities in floodplains, planning to lower and broaden floodplains, and to create
river diversions and water storage areas can help to accommodate water, which would
reduce flood risk in Taipei.
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7.7

Strengthen flood resilience in transportation hubs
As explained in Chapter 6, Flood Simulation, 4 out of 5 existing Taipei Metro

lines run through flood-prone areas. Subway stations such as Xingtian Temple,
Songjang, Minquan E. Road, Daqiaotou, and Sandao Temple stations are located in
flood hotspots. In addition, Taipei Main Station, the most important transportation hub,
with Taipei high-speed rail, Taipei railway, Taipei inter-city bus, and Taipei Metro
stations, is also adjacent to the flood-prone area. Historic floods in 2001 inundated
Taipei Main Station, more than 2 meters in depth. The Nangang Depot was also
flooded. When Taipei Metro subway systems flood, this research finds that at least a
million ridership daily would be affected (see Chapter 6). Hence, in order to prevent
Taipei Main Station from flooding, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and
Communication, Taipei City Government’s Department of Rapid Transit Systems, and
Department of Transportation should play a proactive role in flood prevention based
on flood risk assessment. Strengthening drainage systems, electricity back-up
facilities, flood protection facilities, and evacuation plan will be necessary in Taipei.

Another transportation hub, the Taipei Songshan International Airport, built in
1950 within a 0.7 square mile area, is one of the busiest airports in Taiwan with more
than 6 million passengers in 2014. This airport is partially located in a flood-prone
area and adjacent to the Keelung River. Some areas along the river have overflowed
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in the past. Because of the limitation of property development around the airport,
many nearby neighborhoods are decaying, having inadequate sewer systems, which
has led to increased vulnerability. This airport redevelopment has been debated for
more than 10 years. The arguments are to expand its capacity, or to move the airport
to another area, and use this space for real estate development. In fact, this airport has
provided a global connection and convenience for both business and tourism in Taipei.
This airport is expanding its capacities, however, in order to prevent it from flooding,
Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration has to coordinate with Taiwan’s
Construction and Planning Agency and Taipei City Government to strengthen
drainage and plan more space around the airport for water storage. The argument for
moving this airport suggests a plan for property development of approximately 183
hectares of land. The idea of moving the airport primarily focuses on real estate
development, which would cause more vulnerability to floods since this area is
located in the flood-prone area along the Keelung River. If the relocation of the
airport becomes a national spatial development policy, environmental resilience
should be the priority of any redevelopment, rather than property development. Thus,
a resilient planning concept should be at the root of whether to expand or relocate the
Taipei Songshan International Airport. In the future, Taipei City Government,
Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Ministry of Transportation and
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Community, and the National Development Council can coordinate together to
rethink the airport’s function, and to improve flood resilience in and around the
airport.
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7.8

Plan for wetlands, water plazas, green roofs, and permeable surfaces

Wetlands, water retention areas, and permeable surfaces can reduce flood risk
(details are found in Chapter 2). Wetlands are a most significant factor for flood risk
reduction (Brody et al. 2007). In 2013, Taiwan passed the Wetland Conservation Act, a
legal basis for conserving natural wetlands and creating constructed wetlands. One
main purpose of this act is to ensure natural flood control. Both the conservation of
natural wetlands and the creation of constructed wetlands are important in Taipei. For
instance, the Daan Park, approximately 25 hectares, was built in downtown Taipei in
1994. This park was designed with an ecological wetland pond in the center, and most
parts of the park are permeable surfaces (see Figure 7-2). But, in the 1970s, major
plazas were built in downtown Taipei, which were mostly impermeable surfaces such
as the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall Plaza (approximately 25 hectares) and Sun
Yat-Sen Memorial Hall Plaza (approximately 13 hectares) (see Figure 7-3). These
plazas have both a lack of permeable surfaces and man-made wetlands in it.
Surrounded by expensive residential properties, intensive commercial activities, and
subway systems, these major plazas should play a role in absorbing water to reduce
flood risk in downtown Taipei.
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Figure 7- 2 Permeable surfaces and a wetland pond in Daan Park
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014)

Figure 7- 3 The need for the improvement of impermeable surfaces in major plazas:
Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall (left) and Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall (right)
(Photographs were taken by the author in 2014)

Since 1998, Taiwan’s Construction and Planning Agency has been promoting
permeable pavement and sidewalks. Recently, a permeable pavement with a built-in
system of hollow cylinders which act as water diversion pipes and increase
underground water storage has been used to reduce runoff in Taipei. Additionally,
Taipei can learn from the Randstad’s adaptive innovation of “water plazas”, the
alternative form of water storage. The Rotterdam Water Plan 2030 is planning for an
additional 600,000 m3 of water storage space. Moreover, another adaption option is to
develop green roofs to decrease the total amount of runoff. In Rotterdam, a green roof
can retain an average of 100-200 m3 water. There is a large government support
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program in place for the development of green roofs in Rotterdam (Aerts et al. (2009).
Therefore, creating space for rainwater storage becomes important for flood
resilience in Taipei. In order to reduce downtown flood risk and damage, local
governments should review major parks and plazas to revitalize them with ecological
ponds, water plazas, water retention ponds, and permeable surfaces. Additionally,
green roofs should be promoted, subsidized, and implemented. These efforts can
retain and absorb flood water, resulting in flood risk reduction in Taipei.
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7.9

Revitalize expressways and roads to accommodate floods
Two major north-south elevated expressways, Xinsheng and Jianguo, cross Taipei

City, with lengths of 2.5 and 3.7 miles. They were built in the 1980s to mitigate traffic
congestion. As Chapter 6, Flood Simulation, indicates some flood hotspots are located
between the two elevated expressways. Because Taipei has been developed as a city
with convenient public transportation systems,52 the revitalization of the two elevated
expressways should be taken into consideration. The two elevated expressways could be
used for elevated highland parks to provide for flood risk reduction and aesthetic
landscape. New York City’s Highland Park was developed by revitalizing abandoned
railways and provides an example for the retrofitting of Taipei’s Xinsheng and Jianguo
elevated expressways. Taipei City Government, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation
and Communication, and National Development Council can rethink the revitalization of
Taipei’s Xinsheng and Jianguo elevated expressways to become Taipei’s
“Green-pressway”, thriving greenway corridors. This project can create greenway
corridors and highland parks, which will also help to increase flood resilience in Taipei.
Taipei’s irrigation systems were converted into roads during the 1970s. Since the
convenience of public-transit systems, the demand for roads has reduced. Some major

52

The first line of Taipei Metro began operation in1996. Within less than 20 years, the total length

increased from 10 to 121 kilometers with 109 stations, and the daily ridership increased from 82,678 in
1996 to 2 million in 2014.
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roads can be reduced by a lane, and that area can be used to create a water tunnel or a
greenway corridor. For example, some areas along Taipei’s major north-south
boulevard, the Xinsheng South Road, with its 40 meters of width, was part of a major
irrigation system before 1972. Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban
Development was planning for a lane reduction of Xinsheng South Road to create a
river corridor in 2005, however, the resistance from the automobile drivers postponed
this project. Nowadays, when citizens are made aware of Taipei flood risk based on
this research, the public will be more likely to embrace the concept. Hence, in terms
of urban flood resilience and risk reduction, converting some parts of roads into a
water or green corridor can help to increase space for accommodating flood water and
creating more permeable surface to absorb runoff, which leads to reduced flood risk.
Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban Development can coordinate with the
Department of Transportation to create a Taipei road revitalization project, working
towards flood risk reduction by converting parts of a road into a water storage space
or a greenway corridor with permeable surfaces, reducing flood risk in Taipei.
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7.10 Implement urban growth management to reduce vulnerability
Areas along the Keelung River and downtown Taipei are vulnerable to flooding
(details are found in Chapter 6). Currently two polices encourage higher development
density along this riverside. First, the zoning incentive policy encourages developers
to build higher density residential developments if the residential site is located in
front of a river. The current Taipei zoning ordinance, implemented in 1983, gives a
zoning bonus in a residential zone located in front of the river as decided by Taipei
Urban Planning Commission. Because of this zoning incentive, a large number of
condominiums have been built along the Keelung River.

Another planning policy in Taipei City is the implementation of the transfer of
development rights. This policy has created dense developments in flood-prone areas.
Starting in 1999, Taipei City implemented transfer of development rights, and most of
the transferable rights have been received in new development areas53 such as Neihu
and Nankang districts, which are adjacent to floodplains along the Keelung River and
are flood-prone areas. Thus, a policy review of the transfer of development rights
based on urban flood resilience is necessary in Taipei.

Luxury condominiums, a 3-bedroom unit exceeding $1 million, have been built
next to riverside levees along the Keelung River starting in the early 2000s. Because

53

The received site is allowed to have an additional 30% to 50% of its original floor area ratio (FAR)
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developers did not bear the external costs related to floods, the ongoing housing
development eventually increased higher vulnerability to floods in those flood
hotspots. Thus, managing urban growth away from the flood-prone areas is essential
to reduce Taipei’s vulnerability. In the future, Taipei City Government can adopt a
growth management policy to limit and direct new development away from these
flood hotspots. In the U.S.A., Florida’s Growth Management Act in 1985 provided an
example for reducing damages from hurricane flooding. A policy of urban growth
management directing development away from floodplains would provide a strategy
for reducing flood risk and vulnerability in Taipei.
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7.11 Provide zoning incentives as a strategy to increase urban resilience

Urban regeneration policy plays a major role in strengthening disaster resilience
in Taipei, primarily in fire and earthquake disasters. In order to improve flood
resilience, Taipei City Government’s Department of Urban Development and the Taipei
Urban Regeneration Office can provide developers with zoning incentives when they
strengthen a neighborhood’s drainage systems, open spaces, and permeable surfaces. In
fact, Taipei City Government adopted zoning incentives for creating open spaces in
the process of urban regeneration in 2009. Because the International Flora Expo was
held in Taipei City in 2010, Taipei City Government initiated the “Taipei Beautiful
Program” in 2009, allowing owners of abandoned buildings, located within 500
meters of major tourist attractions and transportation hubs, to earn an extra 3% to 10%
zoning bonus when owners agreed to tear down their buildings, and provide green or
open spaces for 18 months. This program eventually made Taipei greener. The
“Taipei Beautiful Program” also included the large-scale demolition of more than 600
City-own abandoned buildings to create green spaces. The “Taipei Beautiful Program”
revitalized abandoned places and created approximately 20 hectares of green space.
The higher green space density had a positive effect on flood risk reduction (see
Chapter 6). The “Taipei Beautiful Program” resulted in more green and open spaces
which helps to retain water, reduces runoff, and thus reduces flood risk. Taipei can
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move from a beautiful Taipei toward a resilient Taipei by providing developers with
zoning incentives to create more open spaces and green spaces. Particularly in the old
communities, adopting zoning incentives in the process of urban revitalization would
provide a strategy to make a resilient community of Taipei.
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7.12 Revitalize public-owned vacant lands to accommodate floods
Most Taipei City-owned properties are in flood-prone areas (see Chapter 6).
Taipei City’s Department of Finance needs to take actions on city-owned properties to
prevent damages from flooding. Revitalizing vacant city-owned properties in order to
create open spaces and to accommodate water can reduce risk and damage. According
to Taipei City Government’s estimation, there are approximately 14,034 vacant
public-owned properties, with a total of 2 square miles of vacant lands in Taipei City.
Three major property owners are Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of
National Defense, and the Ministry of Transportation and Communication. These
public-owned vacant properties should be revitalized, strengthening urban flood
resilience.
Since the late 1990s, Taiwan’s National Property Administration, under the
Ministry of Finance, has been revitalizing public-owned property for efficiency. A
National Property Revitalization task force was established in 2009 to achieve the
goal of the revitalization of public-owned property. However, the revitalization
focuses primarily on the sale and lease to private developers in order to increase
national tax revenue, rather than maintenance and management of public-owned
property. In the future, Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance can review and evaluate
public-owned vacant properties, and coordinate with Taipei local governments to
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revitalize and to create open spaces and water storage spaces to improve flood
resilience.

Further, since 2006, a large amount of building permit approvals are for properties
located in flood-prone areas (see Chapter 6). This implies that the process of building
permit approval has not consistently considered the issue of vulnerability. In the architect
checklist of building permit approval, drainage improvement is not yet a major
concern. In the future, the Taipei Construction Management Office, under the
Development of Urban Development, requires developers to improve drainage, storm
water management, and storage of water when they apply for building permit approval.
Every individual building permit needs to strengthen its drainage system requirements.
When developers postpone actual construction after building permit approval, Taipei
City Government can require them to provide a temporary water storage park or open
space before the construction, which can increase storm water storage and reduce flood
risk.
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7.13 Promote an actuarially fair flood insurance program which can reflect risks

Insurance, a non-planning strategy, is an economic strategy to allow financial
risk to be transferred from a single entity to a pooled group of risks through a contract
(Kunreuther and Roth 1998). In Asian countries, most properties are not insured. The
uninsured losses in Asia account for approximately 83% of all losses in 2011, in
comparison with America’s 49%. In Germany and France, only 20% of losses are
uninsured. Flood or other natural disaster insurance should be promoted in Taiwan to
transfer risks and reduce homeowner’s burden. Notable is the U.S.A.’s National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968. Although there are some criticisms of
the NFIP such as increasing debt, out-of-date flood maps, insurance premiums with
little reflection of actual flood risks, and the encouragement of new developments in
floodplains, as discussed in Chapter 2. The NFIP still can provide a financial strategy
to reduce homeowner’s burden from floods. Moreover, in the Netherlands’s
experience indicates that many homeowners are willing to invest in adaption
measures in exchange for discounts on their insurance premium. Insurance plays an
important role in requiring or promoting the adoption of stricter building codes and
other adaption measures (Aerts et al. (2009).
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In Taiwan, there is less than 1% of residential properties covered by flood
insurance. Flood insurance is not familiar to property owners because the insurance
industry is still developing, and people are not generally aware of where flood risk
exists. After 2001’s devastating Typhoon Nari damaged Taipei, the purchase of flood
insurance increased significantly. However, starting three years after Typhoon Nari,
flood insurance purchases have been declining. In general, property owners purchase
flood insurance after a severe flooding occurs and they suffer losses from it, but they
often cancel their policies several years later if flooding doesn’t occur again. People
often view flood insurance as a poor investment (The National Academy of Sciences
2012). In the future, Taiwan central government should mandate and regulate banks to
require homeowners to have flood insurance when there is a mortgage.

Taipei City flood-prone areas account for 41% of total land area, higher than that
of Tokyo, New York City, and London. Approximately 26% of residential zones are
located in flood hotspots. The annual vulnerable residential property is estimated at
approximately $2.3 billion in a conservative likelihood model of extreme weather in
Taipei City. In Chang et al. (2008) study, they indicate that Taiwan had approximately
3,000 buildings damaged by floods with an economic loss of approximate $43 billion
annually, 4.5 times the losses from fire damages. Many insurers became extremely
cautious when underwriting their flood policies for people living in areas that are
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frequently struck by floods. The increasing damage from flooding demands an
adequate flood insurance program which can reflect actual flood risks.

A flood insurance program should be promoted to reduce losses. However, flood
insurance, compared to earthquake insurance,54 has not been promoted in Taiwan.
Currently, a flood insurance contract is a sub-contract under the residential fire
insurance. The premium is calculated based on three factors: the location, the
structure, and the height of building. The average annual premium is from 0.1% to
0.5% of the coverage. Supposing Taipei’s annual premium is based on 0.3% of
coverage, the average property value is $687,333 in Taipei City and $350,280 in New
Taipei City. Thus, the average annual premium would be approximately $2,062 in
Taipei City and $1,051 in New Taipei City if a property is covered. This premium of
flood insurance would be more than 10 times that of its property tax. People are
reluctant to accept the expensive premium of flood insurance, and would like to take
the flood risk by themselves. However, a government-subsidized flood insurance
program, taking the U.S.A.’s NFIP for example, would cost a lot of money. A
government-subsidized flood insurance program would also encourage intensive
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In Taiwan, earthquake insurance has been promoted since the Jiji earthquake in 1999. All residential

fire insurance policies must automatically include basic coverage for residential earthquake risk since
2002, with a maximum insured amount of $40,000 per household. The annual premium was set at
approximately $50 (Taiwan Residential Earthquake Insurance Fund). Retrieved from
http://www.treif.org.tw/e_contents/A_aboutTREIF/A1.aspx). (In Chinese)
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property developments in flood-prone areas because of the lower cost for people to
live in these areas. This would induce greater damage. Therefore, in the future,
Taiwan central and local governments should promote an actuarially fair flood
insurance program. This will increase the insurance cost if people choose to live in the
flood-prone areas, and then discourage people from moving in these areas. Thus,
Taiwan’s National Development Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Insurance
Bureau under the Financial Supervisory Commission, Taiwan’s Water Resource
Agency, and Taipei and New Taipei City Governments can initiate a coordinating
committee to initiate an actuarially fair flood insurance program which reflect actual
flood risks in Taipei and to mandate and regulate the purchase of flood insurance in
flood-prone areas when the property owner has a mortgage.
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7.14 Initiate bottom-up community resilience plans

This research suggests a bottom-up neighborhood resilience plan in Taipei based
on the location of a flood hotspot (see Chapter 6 and Figure 7-4). This section further
creates a neighborhood GIS-based property map,55 approximately 0.2 to 1 square
miles, to explain and suggest future community development strategies toward
resilience. Seven neighborhoods are identified: 1. Xingtian Temple neighborhood of
Zhongshan district; 2. Daqiaotou (Taipei Bridge) neighborhood of Datong district; 3.
Huashan neighborhood of Zhongzheng district; 4. Lungshan Temple neighborhood of
Wanhau district; 5. Zhongzheng bridge neighborhood of Shilin district; 6. Dazhi
neighborhood of Zhongshan district; and 7. Gangqian neighborhood of Neihu district.

Figure 7- 4 Taipei City’s seven flood hotspots (in red and yellow)
55

Data is retrieved from the Taipei city GIS-based map center of the Taipei City Government’s

Department of Information Technology.
http://www.tpgos.taipei.gov.tw/ (In Chinese)
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Every property in each flood hotspot is identified in the neighborhood. In general,
the seven neighborhoods have different land-use development patterns, characteristics,
and strategies to achieve flood resilience (see Table 7-2). However, strong political
committee and leadership are essential to achieve the goals of these neighborhood
resilience plans. This section also lists the central and local government agencies to
support these projects. In doing so, Taipei flood resilience can be strengthened by a
bottom-up community resilience plan.
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Table 7- 2 Community resilience plan, strategy, and government cooperation in Taipei
City
Community
resilience plan

Development suggestion

Government cooperation

1.Accelerate storm sewer
improvement
2.Revitalize Taipei’s First
Funeral Parlor and plan for
parks, wetlands, and water
retention ponds
3.Plan for green corridors
4.Revitalize elevated
expressway to become a
“green-pressway”

Taipei City Government,
Taiwan’s Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of
Transportation and
Communication, and the
National Development Council

Taipei City Government,

Taipei Datong
District

1.Initiative public school green
infrastructure planning
2.Manage water by using
vegetation, soils, and
natural processes to reduce
runoff and flood risk

Taipei City Government,

Huashan
neighborhood,

1.Increase permeable surfaces
in the public administrative
buildings
2.Initiative public school green
infrastructure planning
3.Create water storage spaces
and improve drainage
around Taipei Main Station
4.Revitalize Huashan Creative
Park for a constructed
wetland or a water retention
pond

Environmental Protection
Agency, the Ministry of
Transportation and
Communication, and the
Ministry of Education

Xingtian Temple
neighborhood,
Taipei
Zhongshan
District

Daqiaotou
(Taipei Bridge)
neighborhood,

Taipei
Zhongzheng
District

294

Taiwan’s Environmental
Protection Agency, the
Ministry of Education, and the
National Development Council

Taiwan’s Construction and
Planning Agency of the
Minister of the Interior, the

Community

Development suggestion

Government cooperation

resilience plan
Lungshan
Temple
neighborhood,
Taipei Wanhau
District

1.Accelerate storm sewer
improvement
2.Initiate zoning incentives for
urban flood resilience
3. Increase open spaces and
permeable surfaces

Taipei City Government,

1.Growth management policy
2.Consider down-zoning
strategy
3.Reduce housing development
density along the Keelung
River and retreat residential
development from the river
4.Buyout occupants living in
severe flood hotspots.

Taipei City Government,

Taiwan’s Construction and
Planning Agency of the
Minister of the Interior

and
Zhongzheng
bridge
neighborhood,
Taipei Shilin
District

Dazhi
neighborhood,
Taipei
Zhongshan
District
and
Gangqian
neighborhood,
Taipei Neihu
District
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Taiwan’s Water Resource
Agency of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, and the
Construction and Planning
Agency of the Minister of the
Interior

7.14.1 The Xingtian Temple neighborhood suggestions

There is a lack of open spaces, green spaces, and storm sewer systems in the the
Xingtian Temple neighborhood, which is approximately 0.2 square mile (see Figure
7-5). The Xingtian Temple is one of Taipei’s most important religious centers for
citizens. Next to the temple is a government-owned property, Taipei City’s first funeral
center (approximately 2 hectares). This funeral center was built in 1965 on swamp
land at the end of Taipei’s irrigation system. Now most of Taipei mortuary services
have moved to a newer and bigger funeral center in the outer area of Taipei. Thus, this
downtown funeral center could possibly be revitalized. In order to improve resilience
in this neighborhood, the relocation of Taipei City’s first funeral center could help to
create a park with a constructed wetland and water retention ponds and to restore
wetlands for reducing floods in this community. Taipei City Government, Taiwan’s
Ministry of the Interior, and the National Development Council can coordinate to plan
for the relocation of the first funeral center, and to create a resilient community by
planning for a flood prevention park.

One major east-west boulevard is located in this neighborhood, the Minquan E.
Road or 9th Boulevard, with a width of 30 meters. In 2010, a new subway line, the
orange line of the Taipei Metro, was built under the Minquan E. Road. Hence, a subway
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station for this new line, Xingtian Temple Station, with an annual ridership 7.4 million, is
located in this flood-prone area. If this subway station floods, it will have a big impact on
the community because this line provides service for most commuters from populous
New Taipei City. In order to reduce the flood risk of this new subway line, more water
storage spaces are needed above ground. Because of this new subway line, plus a new
bus-exclusive lane of the Minquan E. Road, the traffic volume on the road is expected to
decline. Thus, one lane of the Minquan E. Road can be eliminated, and this space used of
for a greenway and permeable corridor, which will help to increase water storage and
strengthen community resilience.

Figure 7- 5 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Xingtian Temple
neighborhood of Zhongshan District

297

7.14.2 The Daqiaotou neighborhood suggestions

The Daqiaotou (Taipei Bridge) neighborhood, approximately 0.26 square mile
(see Figure 7-6), is one of the Taipei’s oldest neighborhoods. A lack of green spaces
and storm sewer systems exist in this neighborhood. Besides, the Tamsui River on its
west side increases the flood risk. There are 6 public schools in this neighborhood:
Yongle Elementary School, Taiping Elementary School, Daqiao Elementary School,
Shuanglian Elementary School, Minquan Junior High School, and Chenyuan Senior
High School. These schools could play an important role in strengthening community
resilience. The idea of green infrastructure should be applied, integrated, and
implemented in these public schools. These public school should take advantage of
vegetation, soils, and natural processes to manage water, and create a resilient and
healthier community. Hence, Taiwan’s Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry
of Education, the National Development Council, and Taipei City Government can
coordinate to initiate a project of public school green infrastructure planning, and
promote a pilot in this flood-prone community.
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Figure 7- 6 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Daqiaotou
neighborhood of Datong District
7.14.3 The Huashan neighborhood suggestions
There is a smaller proportion of residential buildings in the Huashan neighborhood,
approximately 0.2 square mile (see Figure 7-7). A large number of the Taiwan central
governmental agencies are located in this flood-prone area, especially Taiwan’s
highest-ranking executive, legislative, and investigatory headquarters56. Many
Cabinet’s Ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education,
and Taiwan’s Joint Central Government Office Buildings are located in this
neighborhood. If this flood-prone neighborhood floods, the country will suffer a big
impact. Although the relocation of the Taiwan political center has been debated, this
needs more comprehensive national spatial planning and complicated political
decisions to be made. This section does not discuss the options of relocation.

56

In Taiwan, these headquarters are officially known as the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and

the Control Yuan.
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Currently, improving these administrative sites to become more flood resilient is
essential since they are covered with impermeable surfaces. Taiwan’s Construction
and Planning Agency of the Minister of the Interior and Taipei City Government can
cooperate with these agencies to improve permeable surfaces to reduce flood risk.
Additionally, there are also many colleges in this neighborhood: National Taiwan
University’s Law School, College of Social Science, and College of Public Health,
National Taipei University of Business, and Kainan University. Green infrastructure
practices can be implemented to strengthen community resilience. Further, there is a
Huashan Creative Park, approximately 9 hectares, in this neighborhood. Taipei City
Government can consider the redesign for water retention ponds to increase the ability
to accommodate storm water, and then promote community flood resilience.

Figure 7- 7 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Huashan
neighborhood of Zhongzheng District
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7.14.4 The Lungshan Temple and Zhongzheng bridge neighborhood suggestions
The Lungshan Temple neighborhood, approximately 0.27 square mile (see Figure
7-8), is another old neighborhood. There is a lack of storm sewers, open spaces, and
green spaces in this neighborhood. The Zhongzheng bridge neighborhood of Shilin
district has a similar situation (see Figure 7-9). Taipei City Government has accelerated
the urban renewal policy in thess two neighborhoods. Urban renewal policy in this
community can also be viewed as a community resilience policy. Taipei City
Government’s Department of Urban Development and Taipei Urban Regeneration
Office can consider zoning incentives, for example the maximum zoning bonus of an
additional 20% of a site’s floor area ratio when developers strengthen the neighborhood’s
drainage systems, create open spaces, green spaces, and permeable surfaces. The “Taipei
Beautiful Program” in 2009 was implemented to increase open spaces and green spaces,
which helped to retain water, reduce runoff, and thus reduce flood risk. Thus, it is
essential to adopt zoning incentives in the process of urban regeneration to move
Taipei’s old communities toward resilience communities.
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Figure 7- 8 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Lungshan Temple
neighborhood of Wanhau District

Figure 7- 9 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Zhongzheng
Bridge neighborhood of Shilin District
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7.14.5 The Dazhi and Gangqian neighborhood suggestions

The Dazhi neighborhood, approximately 0.2 square mile (see Figure 7-10), and the
Gangqian neighborhood, approximately 1 square mile (see Figure 7-11), are both
located along the middle stream of the Keelung River. The two neighborhoods are
comparatively new development areas, most of the housing developments were built
after the completion of the reshaping of the river in the 1990s. Around this area, the
average floor area ratio of the residential zone is 4. However, Taipei zoning ordinance
since 1983 has provided a zoning bonus to a residential zone located in front of the
river. More intensive residential developments were built. Additionally, the
implementation of the transfer of development rights increased its development
density because many transferable floor areas were being received in these
newly-developed communities. High-rise condominiums were developing adjacent to
the river levee, ranging from approximately 25 meters to 55 meters, which also led to
higher vulnerability and potential flood damage. In order to reduce vulnerability and
create community resilience, a down-zoning policy to reduce development density
adjacent to floodplains should be considered. However, this requires strong political
support in order to provide a resilience community practice in the future.
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Figure 7- 10 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Dazhi
neighborhood of Zhongshan District

Figure 7- 11 The need for strengthening community flood resilience in Gangqian
neighborhood of Neihu District
In summary, effective strategies and strong political committees discussed above
would strengthen communities resilience in these neighborhoods in flood hotspots.
Taipei flood resilience can also be achieved through these bottom-up community
resilience plans.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
Every city’s common goals include an environmentally responsible development
in the face of continued population growth and being resilient regarding natural
disasters (Birch and Wachter 2011). A resilient city can be achieved when the
resilience concept and initiation of it are rooted in the minds of planners, policy
makers, and political leaders. Urban resilience planning encourages rethinking,
regenerating, and reinventing polices toward resilience. A risk-based analysis, risk
awareness, preparedness, and adaptiveness, before and after a disaster, will strengthen
a city’s resilience. Rather than the common definition of resilience, “bouncing back”,
resilience should focus on the ability to “bounce forward” or “forward planning”. The
public sector, Taiwan’s central and local governments, with the inclusion of involved
citizens, have opportunities to reinforce urban resilience, leveraging adequate
organization, sufficient budgeting and funding, and insightful research of resilience.
Finally and most importantly, a resilient city needs a strong political commitment and
leadership to implement policies toward resilience.
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8.1

Concluding Remarks

Resilience is the increasing ability to evolve, adapt, and regenerate after a
disaster. Urban resilience means that a city is adaptive, adjustable, and flexible
enough to evolve in the face of uncertainty and disasters (The National Academy of
Sciences 2012). There is still a lack of research regarding urban resilience in the world.
But over the next 15 years, the United Nations will be encouraging cities to take
actions toward urban resilience to reduce disaster mortality, reduce the numbers of
people affected, reduce economic losses, and reduce the impact on critical
infrastructure.
Taiwan ranked as the country most exposed to multiple hazards (The World Bank
2005). This research concludes that Taiwan, over the past three decades, indeed has
had the highest disaster occurrence and the highest death toll using the natural disaster
density indicator (NDDI) model, in comparison with Japan, China, U.S.A., U.K.,
France, and the Netherlands. China has the highest number of affected people from
natural disasters, and Japan has the highest economic losses. Cities in Asia have to
take responsibility and take action moving toward disaster risk reduction and urban
resilience.
Taipei City is the capital as well as the economic, political, and cultural center of
Taiwan. Floods caused huge amounts of damage during the 1960s while Taipei was
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experiencing fast urbanization. Farms, irrigation systems, and parts of rivers were
converted into urban development areas. In order to reduce flood damage, which
accompanied urbanization, in the 1970s a relocation policy to move people away from
flood risk areas was adopted. However, since the 1980s, achieving urban flood
resilience by using the engineering strategy for flood control has prevailed over the
retreat and land-use planning strategies for reducing the risk of flooding in Taipei.
Costly engineering structures were constructed to resist flooding. Dikes have tripled
in the past three decades. However, floods occurred after the completion of these
structural protection facilities in the twenty-first century. Rebuilding, resistance, and
fortification against floods eventually created a false sense of security. This false
sense of security resulted in planning for more intensive development in Taipei, which
has led to a higher level of vulnerability to floods. In 2012, Taipei City was third on
the list of the top 10 urban areas with a population of 750,000 or more inhabitants
exposed to three or more natural hazards, and with the highest risk of cyclones, floods,
and landslides (United Nations 2012).
This research finds that Taipei City’s flood-prone areas account for
approximately 41% of its total land area in an extreme weather rainfall scenario with
72-hour duration/47 inches. This percentage of flood-prone areas is higher than other
global cities such as London’s 15%, Tokyo’s 10%, and New York City’s 25%. In
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Taipei City’s severe flooding areas, it is estimated that 10% would be flooded above
0.5 meter. Based on severe flooding, the vulnerable population is estimated at 200,000
people, or 7% of the total population. Ten percent of the buildable land and eight
percent of the total households, or 83,000 households are vulnerable to flooding. The
GDP impact will be more than $28 billion, accounting for 8% of Taipei City’s GDP.
More than $67 billion of land value is vulnerable. Approximately 126,000 employees
will also be impacted. Flooding in subway stations will impact at least one million
passengers each day.
Taipei City’s future flood locations will be different from the floods of the past.
Many flood hotspots are located in downtown Taipei, where there is also higher
population density, higher land and property values, and more critical facilities. In
general, approximately 26% of residential zones are located in flood hotspots in an
extreme weather scenario. Some hotspots have a large number of commercial zones.
For instance, in a hotspot in Zhongshan district of Taipei City, the area of commercial
zones account for 25.78% of the flood hotspot. This also implies that land-use plans,
residential, and commercial developments have not considered vulnerability to
flooding in the past.
Research of urban flood resilience indicates the urban poor live in more
environmentally vulnerable areas (The World Bank 2001, 2013; Sinh et al. 2012;
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Thomas et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013). This is not the situation in Taipei City. Taipei
City shows no tendency toward different levels of household income living in
different levels of flood-prone areas. In other words, there is little evidence that the
urban poor are particularly vulnerable to floods in Taipei City. On the contrary,
neighborhoods with high income households also face a higher risk of floods.
The vulnerability of critical facilities in Taipei City indicates that a large number
of public schools, administrative buildings, and major subway stations are located in the
severe flood-prone areas. For instance, the national highest-ranking government
executive, legislative, and investigatory headquarters and their buildings are all
located in a flood-prone area. Additionally, this research estimates that 4 out of 5
existing Taipei subway lines partially run through flood-prone areas. Subway stations
such as Xingtian Temple, Songjang, Minquan E. Road, Daqiaotou, and Sandao Temple
stations are located in flood hotspots. At least one million passengers each day could be
impacted during flooding. In addition, two important transportation hubs, the Taipei
Main Station, including high-speed rail, railway, and Taipei Metro stations, and the
Taipei Songshan International Airport, are all adjacent to flood-prone areas.
The likelihood analysis of flooding in an extreme weather rainfall scenario
concludes that the possibility of a severe flood will be five times that of the existing
assumption of a flood in every 200 years. This is more severe than that of New York
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City projection indicating that “current 1 in 100 year flood will occur approximately
four times more than often by the end of the century” (Aerts et al. 2009). In Taipei,
the probability of a severe flood is estimated at 2.5% annually using a conservative
model, meaning that a severe flood occurs once in every 40 years. Thus, Taipei City’s
infrequent “once-in-two-century” floods are likely to occur more frequently. Every
citizen in Taipei will experience at least two overwhelmingly devastating floods based
on an average life expectancy of 82 years. The annual number of vulnerable people is
estimated at 38,967 persons. The annual vulnerable GDP is about $6.7 billion. The
annual vulnerable residential property is approximately $2.3 billion. This research
predicts that 1% of Taipei metropolitan region floods above 1 meter, the cost would be
up to $1.54 billion in damage. This would be a cost of $7.7 billion if 5% of Taipei
metropolitan region floods. An annual budget of $100 million for ten years should be
allocated in Taipei Twin Cities to reduce flood damages in the future. A worst-case
scenario assumes that a super cyclone floods 10% of the Taipei Twin Cities with
flooding above 1 meter in depth, with damage estimated at an cost of $2,300 for every
person, which is similar to New York City’s damage from Hurricane Sandy in 2012
with a cost $2,260 for every person (The City of New York 2013) and Randstad’s
projection with at least 5% of its land submerged, costing $2,943 every person (The
Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2007).
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8.2

Future Research

This research conducts a Taipei flood simulation that assumes the normal
operation of flood control facilities, sewers, reservoirs, and average tide patterns. How
does one evaluate the scenarios of vulnerabilities and likelihood possibilities if there
is a failure of flood control facilities such as dikes or pumping stations? This needs to
be studied further. This worst-case scenario with the failure of facilities would help to
implement an evacuation plan in order to reduce the damage and save lives.
Additionally, a sea level rise will increase flood damages. For example, a sea level
rise of 30 cm in Rotterdam could cause an increase in the fatality rate by 20% (Aerts
et al. 2009). Hence, the sea level rise increases vulnerability and threatens resilience,
which also needs to be studied in the future.

Moreover, since there is no sufficient database on flood loss or damage of the
past, a regression model of urban flood resilience cannot be adopted to evaluate key
factors associated with flood loss. However, since 2011, Taipei City has collected
flood loss data every year. In the future, this flood loss data can provide more
information for the further study of a regression model and factor analysis such as
land-use pattern, type of building, the distance to floodplains, the improvement of
storm sewers, and the ratio of permeable surfaces. This further study can help to
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identify important factors associated with flood losses, and then address them. Further,
urban resilience needs to consider the spatial interdependence between two
neighborhoods or cities. What is the impact when a neighborhood strengthens its
resilience, but the other does not? The effect of externality between two
neighborhoods or cities needs to be studied in the future, especially in Taipei and New
Taipei City in the Taipei Basin. How to strengthen resilience in a metropolitan region
also needs to be further studied, which can also provide a basis for regional
cooperation.
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8.3

Suggestions

This research demonstrates a case study of flood resilience in Taipei City. Other
cities in Taiwan and Asia should initiate a study of urban resilience. A resilient city
needs both a strong political commitment and strong leadership to implement policies
toward resilience. Taipei flood resilience should shift from controlling water by costly
structures to accommodating water by land-use and environmental planning. Land-use
and environmental planning should play a proactive role in local governments to
achieve urban resilience. In planning for the future, Taipei should address the gaps
and needs of a resilient city as defined by the United Nations, especially regarding
organization, funding, and research. An annual budget of $100 million for ten years
should be allocated in Taipei Twin Cities to reduce flood damages of $7.7 billion by
2025. Taiwan’s central and local governments also need to coordinate with
planning-related universities and institutions to strengthen the study of resilience and
data collection.
Taipei City should consider a growth management policy to direct development
away from flooding hotspots. Two current polices, the transfer of development rights
and the zoning incentive, have encouraged extensive development along the
flood-prone areas of the Keelung River. A revision of the two polices is essential.
Additionally, Taipei’s urban regeneration policy should require developers to
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implement green infrastructure, improve storm sewers, water retention ponds, and
permeable surfaces, which can strengthen the city’s resilience. Further, planning more
space for rivers, restoring wetlands, redesigning permeable surfaces and water
retention ponds, and creating thriving greenway to accommodate water are also
important. Also, a non-planning strategy, an affordable flood insurance program,
should be promoted to reduce financial losses. A bottom-up community resilience
plan in Taipei would help to achieve urban resilience.
Last but not least, the public sector, especially Taiwan’s central and local
governments, with the citizens being included, have opportunities to reinforce urban
and regional resilience leveraging adequate organizations, sufficient budgeting and
funding, and insightful research of resilience. These measures will demand a strong
political commitment, the leadership, and vision to implement urban or regional
policies toward resilience.
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